LEE JONG-SEOK HEARING OCCASIONS REHASH OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000434

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KS
SUBJECT: LEE JONG-SEOK HEARING OCCASIONS REHASH OF
"STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY"

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MOU-designate Lee Jong-seok's hearing at
the National Assembly has served as a stage for renewed
controversy over the recent U.S.-ROK agreement on strategic
flexibility of U.S. Forces in Korea. The debate was sparked
last week when a ruling party lawmaker disclosed classified
records of internal debates that he claimed showed that the
ROKG had failed to defend the national interest in its
negotiations with Washington. A small minority in the
Assembly have called for "re-negotiation" on strategic
flexibility. Clearly flustered, the Blue House has refuted
the allegations and has announced an investigation into how
classified documents found their way into unauthorized hands.
ROK officials continue to reassure us that the common
understanding on strategic flexibility remains solid and that
there is no confusion within the ROKG on the parameters of
the agreement. The controversy over strategic flexibility is
not likely to affect Lee Jong-seok's nomination. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On February 1, Rep. Choi Jae-cheon of the ruling Uri
Party revealed the classified minutes of a NSC meeting in
which principals hashed out their respective positions on
strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces in Korea. Those minutes
recorded that FM Ban Ki-moon and other members of the NSC
expressed support for the USG's position on the necessity of
strategic flexibility in response to contingencies off the
Peninsula. The next day, Choi brandished another classified
Blue House document that Choi claimed proved that MOFAT had
exchanged "s-e-c-r-e-t diplomatic notes" with the USG in
October 2003 without reporting that fact to President Roh.
(NOTE: The "s-e-c-r-e-t diplomatic notes" were in fact
informal working-level documents exchanged during discussions
between MOFAT and OSD/Embassy. END NOTE.) Choi went on to
accuse the MOFAT and the NSC of routinely failing to defend
the national interest and of deliberately keeping President
Roh in the dark about how it was conducting U.S.-ROK
relations.


3. (C) The Blue House appears to have been caught off-guard
by these accusations, especially as they come from a member
of the ruling party. In its initial reaction, the Blue House
on February 2 expressed deep regret over Rep. Choi's
disclosure of classified information. Then, President Roh
issued an ambiguous statement the following day calling for
the ROKG to "pay more attention to future negotiations over
the new U.S. strategy, rather than engage in consumptive
debate and defeatism." Roh added that "we can more flexibly
reflect our positions in U.S. military realignments on the
basis of mutual confidence and our negotiating power." On
February 5, the Blue House issued another statement
specifically refuting Rep. Choi's charges, asserting that
President Roh had in fact been fully informed of and engaged
in the strategic flexibility issue from the beginning, and
that there were no problems with the NSC's reporting
procedures. The Blue House also announced that it had
launched an internal investigation to identify who had leaked
the classified documents to Rep. Choi. MOFAT has also
protested Rep. Choi's characterization of its management of
the ROKG response to the U.S. requirement for strategic
flexibility.


4. (C) Lee Jong-seok, who until his nomination to be MOU was
Deputy Secretary-General of the NSC (but for all intents and
purposes controlled the organization),was grilled over this
issue during his two-day hearings, which ended February 7.
Lee defended the January 19 joint statement by observing that
neither Washington nor Seoul had been able to retain its
original position, i.e., the agreement reflects concessions
from both sides. The opposition GNP for its part has
attacked Lee from a different angle altogether, accusing him
of favoring North-South engagement at the expense of the
U.S.-ROK alliance. These familiar charges from the right,
however, have largely been overtaken by the unusual and
ironic accusation emanating from the far left: that Lee
Jong-seok, and by extension the Roh Administration, places
too much importance on the U.S.-ROK alliance and has given in
to Washington too easily.


5. (C) COMMENT: As Lee Jong-seok's hearing before the
Assembly's Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee
winds down February 7, there is no indication that the
controversy over strategic flexibility will affect his
ability to assume his new portfolio as Minister of
Unification. As for the debate over strategic flexibility,
the ROKG appears to have been caught flat-footed and fumbled
its initial response to disclosure of classified materials.
The ROKG has assured us in the strongest terms that the
common understanding on strategic flexibility remains solid
and that there is no confusion within the ROKG on the
parameters of the agreement. Although the titillating manner
in which details of the negotiations have been revealed has
renewed public interest, analysts predict that, with Lee's
hearing over, the issue is likely to fade as public attention
shifts in the next day to what promises to be a contentious
hearing for Rhyu Si-min, the president's controversial
nominee for Minister of Health and Welfare.


6. (C) COMMENT CONT'D: Still, attacks from the left against
Lee Jong-seok are a significant new development. We
understand that these criticisms are being led by young Blue
House staffers of the so-called "386" generation who believe
that Lee has failed to uphold the principal of
"self-determination" and "independence" in ROK foreign
policy. These criticisms led directly to Lee's failure to
place his own people in key NSC positions, including Lee
Soo-hyuck as NSA and Suh Chu-seok as Deputy NSA, according to
our Blue House contacts. END COMMENT.
VERSHBOW