INCOMING UNIFICATION MINISTER URGES FLEXIBILITY ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 004309

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM KS KN
SUBJECT: INCOMING UNIFICATION MINISTER URGES FLEXIBILITY ON
DPRK

REF: STATE 197902

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on December 18,
Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung reaffirmed that the
U.S.-ROK alliance was "essential" to peace on the Korean
Peninsula and Northeast Asia. The ROKG would work closely
with the USG, fully implement UNSCR 1718, and cooperate with
the international community to resolve the DPRK nuclear
issues peacefully. Lee expressed his hope that the USG and
DPRK would present a more flexible and productive approach
than previously at the Six Party Talks. He also asserted
that Six Party Talks and inter-Korean talks were
complementary. The Ambassador agreed that two forums were
connected and suggested ensuring that our combined leverage
with the DPRK was carefully calibrated to facilitate progress
in the Six Party Talks. He also encouraged the ROKG to
strengthen inspections on cargo going through two DMZ
transportation corridors in light of UNSCR 1718 (ref A). The
two also spoke to the need for USG-ROKG consultations before
any potential ROK-DPRK summit. END SUMMARY.
.
ALLIANCE, 6PT, AND INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS
--------------


2. (C) In welcoming the Ambassador during a December 18
courtesy call, Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung, who took
office on December 11, referred to his background as an
Anglican Pastor and recalled that U.S.-Korean relations
reached back over 100 years. The relationship had benefited
from early efforts of American Horace Allen's Protestant
missionary work in the 19th century and his role as
Ambassador to Korea (1897-1905). Making a biblical reference
to the Season of Lent, Lee remarked that after being
nominated as Minister on November 1, he had to endure for
forty days due to political opposition from the conservative
Grand National Party (GNP). In the current Season of Advent,
which he implied was a time for anticipation and hope, he was
preparing for his new role and was excited to be working as
Unification Minister on the North Korea issue. He expressed
his satisfaction at hosting the Ambassador as the first
foreign envoy received in his capacity as Unification
Minister.


3. (C) Reading from prepared notes, Lee emphasized the
"essential" nature of the U.S.-ROK alliance to peace on the
Peninsula and in Northeast Asia and to the effort to achieve
a peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue. The ROKG
would work closely with the USG, fully implement UNSCR 1718,
and cooperate with the international community to resolve the
nuclear issue peacefully. He was hopeful that at the Six
Party Talks (6PT),the USG would demonstrate a flexible
approach and that the DPRK would bring a more productive
attitude than before. The Six Party Talks and North-South
talks were two wheels of a wagon that moved in the same
direction; progress in one benefited the other. He expressed
appreciation for President Bush's remarks in Hanoi on a
possible ceremony to end the Korean War should North Korea
fulfill its denuclearization commitments, adding that he
wished the DPRK would make such an outcome possible. It
remained important for the USG and ROKG to cooperate to
achieve a peace regime for the Peninsula that would benefit
not only Koreans but also Northeast Asia. In that regard, a
peace regime was the ultimate objective.


4. (C) He continued that the ROKG would appreciate USG
support for the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mt.
Kumgang tourism project. These projects were not just
economic in nature but represented Korean dreams for peace
and a vehicle to promote reconciliation and cooperation on
the Peninsula. He appreciated USG cooperation with the ROK's
pending export license request for a Radio Frequency
Identification Device (RFID) system that Seoul has argued
would assist its monitoring of cross-border cargo shipments
to North Korea. USG support would not only help North-South
relations but also benefit the U.S.-ROK relationship, he said.


5. (C) The Ambassador said that Washington and Seoul shared
the same goals and strategic objectives even if there were
sometimes disagreements over tactics. He argued that the Six
Party Talks and North-South talks were complementary.
However, in light of the North's missile launches and nuclear
test, U.S.-ROK cooperation and coordination were more
important to improve prospects for the 6PT. The USG was
committed to achieving a diplomatic resolution and to
implement all aspects of the September 19, 2005 Joint
Statement. North Korea would stand to gain if it
denuclearized and cleared the path toward a permanent peace
regime, which would not only improve U.S.-DPRK relations but
also the North's role and status in the world. In the short
term, the North had the heaviest burden to show good faith
because of its actions in July and October and should not be
given benefits simply for returning to the 6PT. If the North
demonstrated a seriousness of purpose, the United States and
the international community were prepared to take steps that
should give the DPRK confidence that it could have a
different relationship with the outside world.


6. (C) On inter-Korean relations, the Ambassador expressed
appreciation that President Roh had signaled that food and
fertilizer assistance would only resume after tangible
progress had been made in the 6PT. This was a good message
to North Korea. The USG understood the significance of the
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and the Mt. Kumgang tourism
project for South Korea. The KIC offered the potential for
supporting change in the DPRK by giving North Koreans
experience with market economic practices and with ROK
companies that might overcome what they had been taught about
the outside world. The USG was actively reviewing the RFID
application, and Seoul should be aware that USG actions had
demonstrated that Washington was not opposed to KIC. In
light of DPRK actions, however, it was natural that the ROKG
would make certain adjustments in its policy toward the DPRK,
such as delaying the expansion of the KIC and cutting
subsidies at Kumgang. We knew that the food and fertilizer
suspension was not an easy decision for the ROKG, but it was
a good example of efforts to calibrate exchanges to support a
more productive Six Party Talks by encouraging North Korea to
show more flexibility. The Ambassador also encouraged Seoul
to find ways to tighten inspections for cargo going through
two DMZ transportation corridors to ensure that UNSCR 1718
was implemented fully.
.
ENDURING IMPORTANCE OF ENGAGEMENT
--------------


7. (C) Asked about recent opinion polls indicating growing
frustration among the ROK public with DPRK intransigence and
how it might affect MOU policy, Lee replied that South
Koreans overwhelmingly wanted to ensure peace on the
Peninsula. South Koreans wanted North Korea to eliminate its
nuclear weapons, but since the former Kim Dae-jung
administration, South Koreans also sought greater
reconciliation and cooperation. Lee opined that consistency
was important in relations with North Korea as a way to
increase inter-Korean confidence. Based on a commitment to
engagement, the ROKG would implement steps in line with UNSCR
1718 and the Six Party Talks. Again, he said, he was
confident North-South cooperation would help achieve results
at the Talks.


8. (C) Lee said that if ROK-DPRK bilateral meetings occurred
at the Six Party Talks, Seoul would clearly communicate what
Pyongyang needed to do and why the South had decided to
suspend food and fertilizer assistance following the DPRK
provocations. Lee asserted that the ROKG aid suspensions
were probably the most painful penalty faced by the DPRK.
North Korea had indirectly requested that Seoul resume its
aid, but the ROKG, currently, was not considering a
resumption. In his view, sanctions would be more effective
if their period of implementation was shorter and not seen as
an end in and of themselves. The Unification Ministry's
mandate was to explore new alternatives, approaches, and
avenues to improve North-South relations. Inter-Korean
relations had been troublesome for decades, and only in the
past five years had North-South talks shown real results.
The DPRK was a poor country, and the ROK felt a moral
responsibility to help improve the situation in the North.
If North-South issues remained unresolved, U.S.-DPRK and
regional issues could not be achieved and the potential for

lasting peace in Northeast Asia would be unrealized.


9. (C) The Ambassador agreed that sanctions were a means to
an end rather than a long-term solution. The ROKG aid
suspension probably was painful for the DPRK. The challenge
remained to get others, such as China, to take similar
actions to steer the DPRK in the direction of
denuclearization. The DPRK needed to make the choice to get
serious at the Talks and start fulfilling its promises to the
international community, including South Korea. The North
had reneged on a return visit by North Korean leader Kim
Jong-il to South Korea after the North-South summit in 2000,
and the DPRK had refused to allow the connection of
inter-Korean railways. The North was probably afraid that
increased contacts with the South would undermine its myths
about the reality in South Korea.
.
NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT?
--------------


10. (C) Responding to a question from the Ambassador, Lee
said that the two prerequisites for an inter-Korean summit
were an agreement from North Korea and a national consensus
in South Korea on the value of a summit. Lee emphasized
that, in his view, a second summit should be held. However,
the North had not delivered on its promises. The nuclear
issue was a dangerous situation that would determine the fate
of the Korean Peninsula, so it would be natural for North and
South Korean leaders to get together to make progress toward
a resolution. President Roh had called on North Korea to
hold a second summit, but the DPRK never responded. Lee also
said that a second summit should not be interpreted
politically as an effort to influence the 2007 presidential
election in the ROK. Therefore, it was important for there
to be a national consensus in South Korea on the need for a
summit. The Ambassador said he hoped that the ROKG would
consult with the USG on any inter-Korean summit, given the
current situation on the Peninsula and the fragile state of
the Six Party Talks. Lee responded, in English, that he
totally agreed that the USG had an important stake in any
summit and that the MOU would be forthcoming.
VERSHBOW