SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM'S CONSULTATIONS ON CENTRAL ASIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 SEOUL 004285 SIPDIS SIPDIS SCA/FO, ALMATY PLEASE PASS TO ASTANA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD KS UZ KZ SUBJECT: SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM'S CONSULTATIONS ON CENTRAL ASIA SEOUL 00004285 001.2 OF 007 Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Visiting SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan Feigenbaum on December 11 inaugurated a U.S.-Korea consultation on Central Asia. Feigenbaum reviewed with ROKG officials U.S. objectives in the region, including enlisting less traditional partners, such as Korea, to help promote economic liberalization, political reform, diversification of global energy supplies, and security cooperation in Central Asia. ROKG officials welcomed discussions with Washington on Central Asia and described South Korean commercial, ethnic, and political ties to the region. They characterized ROKG policies toward Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as efforts to increase economic and trade linkages that would benefit, and benefit from, the sizable ethnic Korean populations in both countries; Korean investment, they predicted, would gradually induce economic and political development akin to South Korea's modernization under the Park Chung-hee regime. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan Feigenbaum held consultations December 11 in Seoul, meeting separately with Park Ro-byug, Director General of the European Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Park In-kook, Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations, and Cho Tae-yong, Director General of the North American Affairs Bureau. DAS Feigenbaum also met with Lim Sung-nam, Senior Adviser to Foreign Minister Song Min-soon; Kim Kyou-hyun, Director General for the International Policy Bureau at the Ministry of National Defense; Park Jin, Grand National Party lawmaker; and several ROK academics specializing on Russia and Central Asia. STARTING A U.S.-KOREA CONVERSATION ON CENTRAL ASIA -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) In his meeting with DG Park Ro-byug, DAS Feigenbaum outlined the three purposes of his trip to Seoul. First, the USG wanted to expand conversations with countries that had an interest in Central Asia; beyond its extensive and long-standing discussions on Central Asia with European partners, it was important that Washington begin talks with less traditional partners in the region, such as Seoul, and expand talks with others, including Tokyo, Ankara and New Delhi. Second, South Korean ties to Central Asia were wider and deeper than commonly known. ROK companies, such as Daewoo, had been involved in the automobile, construction, and oil sectors. The Korea International Cooperation Agency maintained a field office in Tashkent and had run an assistance and training program for Uzbeks over the years to the tune of some USD 15 million. There was also a growing South Korean political relationship with Central Asia, especially Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, symbolized by presidential visits, such as President Roh's in 2005 and Uzbek President Karimov's four visits to Seoul, most recently in 2006, as well as ROK Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook's visit to Central Asia in September 2006. The ROK was even providing low-level military aid to Kazakhstan, selling coastal patrol boats and offering some language training. Third, said Feigenbaum, consultations on Central Asia could meet an important goal envisioned in the U.S.-ROK Strategic Consultations on Allied Partnership, namely to broaden the foundation of the bilateral relationship by discussing our shared global interests beyond the Korean Peninsula. ¶4. (C) DG Park responded that Seoul shared the goal of broader dialogue with Washington as then Foreign Minister Ban and Secretary Rice had agreed in January 2006 in Washington and reaffirmed during Under Secretary Burns's visit in November 2006 to Seoul. Park noted some coordination between ROK and U.S diplomats on the ground. For example, the U.S. mission in Turkmenistan, where the ROK lacked an Embassy, had SEOUL 00004285 002.2 OF 007 helped South Korea. South Korea's relationship with Central Asia had begun shortly after the independence of these states in 1991, with the establishment of a presence in 1992. In this sense, said Park, Central Asia was a "new horizon" for Seoul. ROK APPROACH: TRADING, NUDGING, AND ENCOURAGING -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Park characterized Seoul's Central Asian priorities as threefold: (1) diversification of its energy supply (the ROK imports nearly all of its supplies); restoration of links with, and protection of, the Korean diaspora deported by Stalin from the Russia Far East to Central Asia; and (3) offering a "Korean model" of economic and political development. The ROK had over-relied on the Middle East for energy supplies, thus Seoul had very recently begun to seek exploration opportunities around the Caspian and Aral Seas. The ROK also had an historic connection to the region because of the deportations: the ROKG felt a responsibility to assist the 200,000 Koreans in Uzbekistan and 100,000 Koreans in Kazakhstan. These ethnic communities could help provide a bridge between South Korea and Central Asia. Finally, ROK officials assessed that South Korea provided a model for economic growth and democratic modernization because of the lessons of former President Park Chung-hee's legacy, i.e., rapid economic growth leading ultimately to a political transition. ¶6. (C) Park explained that the President's staff at the Blue House had recently written a paper emphasizing the need to enlarge South Korean contacts in Central Asia. Increased overseas developmental assistance (ODA) was one method to do so; deals for energy exploration rights, usually linked to technology transfer, was another. South Korea now did roughly USD 1.2 billion in trade with Central Asia, with USD 900 million in exports and USD 300 million in imports, which represented 0.2 percent of global ROK trade. The ROK had invested USD 2.4 billion in the region, three-fourths of which was in Kazakhstan. ROK economic activity with Uzbekistan focused on trade (30-40 ROK companies were involved in trading operations); in Kazakhstan, ROK economic activity focused on investment (30-40 ROK companies were involved in sectors like construction and chemicals). Over the past ten years, said Park, the ROK had provided USD 25 million in ODA grants to Central Asia, primarily to Uzbekistan (USD 15 million) and Kazakhstan. Korean economic and development assistance reached USD 140 million, with over half going to Uzbekistan. Still, he noted, Central Asia was not an immediate priority for Seoul. The ROK spent about USD 500 million per year for oil and gas exploration, which was not a large amount. Moreover, such exploration in Central Asia would take years to produce results. ¶7. (C) The ROK was pursuing a gradual approach to improving relations with Central Asia, Park said. While Seoul appreciated Washington's multi-dimensional approach to the region, i.e., simultaneous promotion of markets, democracy, energy development, and security cooperation, the ROKG viewed Central Asia as a region needing economic development, above all. Most of the countries were newly independent and relatively poor and might not be ready for democracy "on a Western model." However, the ROK could help encourage democracy gradually and from the bottom up. Leaders of Central Asia probably were more comfortable with South Korea's "softer" approach that focused primarily on trade and aid rather than on other, more sensitive dimensions, such as political reform. Park commented that Central Asians appreciated Korean music and movies and probably saw an Asian cultural "connection" with South Korea. The ROK had opened educational centers to teach Korean language and culture in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The ROK Ministry of Education had sent two to three teachers to teach skills to local ethnic Koreans, many of whom sought jobs with Korean companies. The Korea International Cooperation Agency also SEOUL 00004285 003.2 OF 007 had a field office in Tashkent to help promote exchanges. The ROK in 2006 joined Kazakhstan's Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in an effort to broaden ties and to help Central Asian development. In return for these various forms of partnership, Central Asian states supported the ROK on the DPRK nuclear issue, backed former Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon's successful candidacy for UN Secretary General, and supported the ROK's interest in playing a larger role in international organizations. ¶8. (C) On human rights more generally, Park opined that, much like the dilemma the ROK faced with the DPRK, Seoul wanted to encourage openness and transparency and an improvement in living standards in Central Asia. Seoul was concerned, however, that pushing too hard on this front might hurt emerging relations. It would be more effective to nudge and encourage until the time for change was more appropriate. Asked whether the ROKG saw linkages between its efforts in Afghanistan and its goals in Central Asia, Park said these were different issues. The ROKG had sent military forces to Afghanistan and Iraq to help promote stability, reflecting its role as a strong U.S. ally. Central Asia, however, was relatively stable and offered more prospects for economic growth. As a middle power, Park said South Korea was doing its part to encourage modernization, but it could not tackle as many issues as the United States while still protecting its companies and the Korean diaspora in the region. ¶9. (C) Asked about the ROK view of Japanese involvement in Central Asia, Park, surprisingly, was dismissive of Japanese efforts to engage the region. Park opined that Prime Minister Koizumi's trip to Central Asia had yielded few, if any, tangible results. U.S. GOALS AND INTENTIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA -------------- ¶10. (C) DAS Feigenbaum provided Park with an overview of U.S. strategies, goals, and intentions in Central Asia. He also offered some examples of U.S. assistance programs, discussed the commercial climate, and explained the rationale behind efforts to facilitate economic linkages between Central and South Asia, including electricity trading between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Central Asia, said Feigenbaum, is a microcosm of some of the most important challenges in American foreign policy: a Russia resurgent in its neighborhood; China's growing regional and global footprint; the role of Iran; high oil prices; democracy promotion in very tough environments; balancing efforts to promote political liberalization with other goals; the future of Afghanistan; the role of Islam in society; the challenge of terrorism; and so on. In perhaps no other region of the world, said Feigenbaum, do so many issues and challenges come together in such interesting combinations that draw high-level USG interest. Since 1991, the USG had helped Central Asian states assure their sovereignty and independence. Our goal was to strengthen that independence by facilitating access to more options, choices, partners, and markets, as well as furthering the integration of Central Asian countries with one another, their neighbors, and the world economy. Oil, for instance, is a global commodity traded on a vibrant futures market; thus, the USG sought to facilitate more supply to the world market. In short, the countries of Central Asia needed options: more than one market, more than one pipeline, more than one dominant partner; in the energy field, this entailed selling their oil and gas to the world unfettered by monopolies or geographic choke points. ¶11. (C) More generally, the USG maintained a multidimensional approach to the region that touched on multiple baskets, including economics and trade; security; transnational issues of environment, water, and terrorism; and political reform, Feigenbaum said. The United States, he said, focused much of its assistance on issues that wedged SEOUL 00004285 004.2 OF 007 across these major baskets. For example, the rule of law had implications both for democracy promotion and trade; stronger rule of law would mean greater political openness but also a more attractive investment climate. The modernization of customs and border controls, too, both of which were areas of significant U.S. assistance and involvement, improved security while also expanding trade opportunities. Efforts on these "wedge" issues, said Feigenbaum, could help to build capacity for the long-term. ¶12. (C) The USG also saw a strong linkage between the region and Afghanistan, he continued. Stability in Afghanistan was important to Central Asia because in the past Afghanistan had been viewed as a security threat. It was important to give landlocked Central Asian states access to seaports and more markets in every direction on the compass. Afghanistan literally separated Central from South Asia on the map, but if trade routes opened and infrastructure improved, Central Asian states would have access to additional seaports to the south; in this sense, Afghanistan could become a bridge. Each country of Central Asia was unique, including with respect to their resources and endowments. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan had oil and/or gas resources. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, by contrast, were less blessed, but had snow, rivers, and thus hydroelectric generation potential. Seasonal complementarity on peak demand between Central and South Asia created opportunities for electricity trading. Building infrastructure for energy development would enhance trade and thus support sovereignty and independence. ¶13. (C) DAS Feigenbaum noted that in Central Asian countries, like Uzbekistan, a disenfranchised population could turn to more radical politics or Islamic extremism. Uzbekistan's citizens were becoming increasingly alienated from their government. We did not, said Feigenbaum, want Central Asia's future to look like Afghanistan's pre-2001. The USG sought to avoid instability, and this required better governance, the long-term development of stable institutions, and the investment of citizens in their political process by giving them a stake in their system of government. One could not simply separate economic development from political development. Moreover, the challenge of Islamic radicalization meant that we did not simply have the luxury of waiting interminably for governments to invest their citizens in the political process. ROKG: KOREAN DEVELOPMENT MODEL -------------- ¶14. (C) Park characterized the ROK model as one that included economic and political development, but sequenced transition in each of these two baskets. Feigenbaum agreed that this was the ROK model. Park explained that former dictator Park Chung-hee's legacy had been reevaluated to some degree inside South Korea because his contributions to economic progress were now seen as more important to Korea's development than at the time, he said. The ROKG had invited Central Asian leaders to Seoul, where they could learn about the ROKG experience, see the role of street demonstrations, and learn about the need to avoid corruption. Still, the ROKG wanted to encourage change in a subtle way. For Central Asia, however, this type of sequenced political development might prove more difficult than it had for Korea because, unlike the ROK, Central Asian states could not rely on a military alliance with the United States. Central Asia, however, could benefit from modern technology, for example greater information technology (IT) could improve transparency in economic and politics, thus the ROK was focusing some of its assistance to Uzbekistan in this area. ¶15. (C) DAS Feigenbaum noted the Park Chung-hee model but then contrasted the experience of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, he said, the parallel seemed more credible: leaders in Kazakhstan had made some smart economic decisions, SEOUL 00004285 005.2 OF 007 including macroeconomic and structural reform and banking sector reform, and they were seeking to join the World Trade Organization. While flawed in the political realm, this element of Kazakhstan's development contrasted with the Uzbek experience, where President Karimov had made poor macro- and microeconomic choices in addition to his apparently poor political choices. Broadly speaking, the people of Central Asia needed to be invested in their system of government or the region risked instability; the United States recognized, he added, that Central Asia would not "look like Denmark by next Tuesday." UZBEKISTAN -------------- ¶16. (C) Park reiterated that ROKG policy toward Uzbekistan focused on increasing trade for economic and humanitarian reasons. Uzbek leaders had more experience with dictatorships than with market economics and were probably uncomfortable with openness and reform. The ROK was hoping to promote change via increasing Korean-Uzbek contacts, exchange, and dialogue; there were now six flights per week between Uzbekistan and South Korea (Uzbekistan Airlines and Asiana Airlines) and more and more Uzbek citizens were looking for jobs in South Korea. By the same token, without such contacts the ROK would have a weaker ability to protect the Korean diaspora or to secure access to energy resources. Immediate progress in Uzbekistan was unlikely, Park lamented. There were 200,000 ethnic Koreans in Uzbekistan, and most faced economic problems and discrimination. Some had even moved back to Russia to seek better opportunities, so Seoul was working with Moscow to help provide assistance to the Korean diaspora. Speaking of Uzbek President Karimov, Park said despite his flaws, the ROK wanted work with him to help the citizens of Uzbekistan. ¶17. (C) DAS Feigenbaum noted that the United States, too, engages in dialogue with Uzbekistan, including with President Karimov. But, he urged Seoul in its discussions with Tashkent to continue to stress the importance of reform, including economic reform. Uzbek leaders did not need to view this as an "American" message; they could look to Kazakhstan to see an example of how better economic management could improve the lives of citizens. Unfortunately, things were not going so well between the United States and Uzbekistan: the U.S. had lost its airbase, the Peace Corps, NGOs, and some U.S. companies that had long provided opportunities to Uzbek workers. These decisions would hurt economic prospects in Uzbekistan. KAZAKHSTAN -------------- ¶18. (C) Park remarked that the ROK-Kazakh economic relationship was booming, but changing. Ten years ago, Kazakh leaders wanted to imitate the Korean developmental model, but now they had a growing confidence in their own system, their own "Kazakh model." As a result, it was becoming harder to negotiate with Kazakhstan because its leaders were more confident and wanted a more comprehensive relationship: one that not only exported Kazakhstan's resources to Korea but imported advanced technology from Korea. The ROK view was that Kazakhstan offered cheap labor that would enable some Korean companies in "downside sectors" to compete again. Compared to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan offered more opportunities with an economy that had grown ten times over the past ten years. The Korean minority was also doing better in Kazakhstan than in Uzbekistan, where ROK minorities appealed for financial assistance and where the ROKG was building elderly welfare centers for Uzbek Koreans. DAS Feigenbaum noted that Kazakhstan had made the connection between education and development. It had also made a connection between oil and development and was determined not to become resource rich but economically poor, like Nigeria. Feigenbaum also noted Kazakhstan's "Bolashak" program, which SEOUL 00004285 006.2 OF 007 had sent thousands of Kazakh students abroad for an education. Park added that Korea would probably get its first Bolashak student in the coming year. He confirmed a report Feigenbaum had read on the internet that Samsung had sponsored Kazakh students in IT training courses. As to military cooperation, said Park, the need for security in the Caspian was one reason Seoul had fulfilled a Kazakh request for assistance. Seoul had provided some decommissioned ships as part of a modified barter agreement to help the Kazakh Caspian navy, always mindful of the need to avoid provoking an arms race in the region. Park also mentioned that Seoul had not yet moved its Embassy from Almaty to Astana but planned to build one. KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN -------------- ¶19. (C) Lacking diplomatic missions in Bishkek and Dushanbe, the ROK Ambassador to Uzbekistan is accredited to Tajikistan, Park said, while the ROK Ambassador to Kazakhstan is accredited to Kyrgyzstan. Still, the ROK does not pay much attention to Tajikistan, and only about two or three ROK companies operated there. Kyrgyzstan was scarcely on the ROK radar screen. As to Ashgabat, the ROK had not established diplomatic relations with Turkmenistan, but planned to do so. Park had just visited Ashgabat, where he met with Foreign Minister Meredov and invited him to visit Seoul in 2007. Park had been astonished by the size of Meredov's office, which, he said, not only was smaller than his own DG office in Seoul but smaller than the one of the president of Turkmenistan's main gas company, which, to Park, showed where the real action and money were. Park said that Seoul planned to establish relations with Turkmenistan and eventually open an embassy there. First, it would accredit its ambassador to Russia to Turkmenistan. Then, in two to three years, it would seek to open a separate embassy with a distinct ambassador. DAS Feigenbaum noted the need for more transparency in Turkmenistan, including on its gas supplies. He also noted the role of Gazprom in Turkmenistan and the region. He added that Ashgabat should hear from Korea that human rights were important. RUSSIA -------------- ¶20. (C) Park added that South Korea was not deeply engaged with Russia on Central Asia. He perceived that Moscow was not too worried about Korea's role in the region because Seoul's main objective was stability. Moscow had not approached Seoul on the UNGA Third Committee discussion on Uzbekistan, but it had approached South Korea on the Belarus resolution. South Korea's policy toward Russia was focused on encouraging Moscow to play a positive role in the Six Party Talks. Seoul hoped that Moscow would provide energy assistance to North Korea should the nuclear issue allow. Russian officials sometimes expressed their displeasure when they were not briefed about U.S.-PRC-DPRK meetings on the nuclear issue. Finally, bilateral issues with Russia also included fisheries and a Russian desire for more ROK investment, possibly in a Russian energy pipeline. SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AND CHINA -------------- ¶21. (C) In separate meetings with North American Affairs Director General Cho Tae-yong and Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations Park In-kook, DAS Feigenbaum asked about the ROKG view of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Cho said that Seoul had joined the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) as well as several other multilateral groups (APEC, ASEAN PLUS 3, EAS, ARF, ASEM),but was unsure about SCO's function. The ROKG was concerned about sizable Korean minorities in Central Asia and wanted to promote increased economic ties to Central Asia, but questioned SEOUL 00004285 007.2 OF 007 whether SCO was an appropriate vehicle. Deputy Minister Park indicated that he remained skeptical about SCO. How would it evolve, did Washington have suspicions about China's role in the organization, and would SCO operate in parallel to or at cross purposes with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? DAS Feigenbaum, separately, told both DG Cho and DFM Park that Washington also was unclear about what SCO intended to be and therefore found it difficult to assess precisely how it might affect USG interests. He added that the role of Iran bore watching, adding that the U.S. had been unhappy with a 2005 SCO statement on the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. COMMENT -------------- ¶22. (C) South Korea's approach to Central Asia, while still emerging and evolving, focuses on promoting economic and humanitarian exchanges to secure energy resources and to protect ethnic Korean populations. Seoul remains less willing to increase pressure on Central Asia for economic, much less political reform. MOFAT and academic interlocutors in conversations with DAS Feigenbaum applied the template of engagement with North Korea to their strategy for promoting relations with Central Asia. The ROK sought to avoid provoking Central Asian leaders in ways that might invite retaliation against ROK companies and interests. Despite an expressed desire to broaden the foundation of the alliance to global interests beyond the Korean Peninsula, most ROK interlocutors appeared uncomfortable discussing issues, such as Central Asia, not traditionally associated with the Alliance. Park and Feigenbaum agreed to continue their conversation; Park noted his desire to visit Washington in ¶2007. END COMMENT. VERSHBOW