SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM'S CONSULTATIONS ON CENTRAL ASIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 SEOUL 004285

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SUBJECT: SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM'S CONSULTATIONS ON CENTRAL ASIA

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Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Visiting SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan
Feigenbaum on December 11 inaugurated a U.S.-Korea
consultation on Central Asia. Feigenbaum reviewed with ROKG
officials U.S. objectives in the region, including enlisting
less traditional partners, such as Korea, to help promote
economic liberalization, political reform, diversification of
global energy supplies, and security cooperation in Central
Asia. ROKG officials welcomed discussions with Washington on
Central Asia and described South Korean commercial, ethnic,
and political ties to the region. They characterized ROKG
policies toward Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as efforts to
increase economic and trade linkages that would benefit, and
benefit from, the sizable ethnic Korean populations in both
countries; Korean investment, they predicted, would gradually
induce economic and political development akin to South
Korea's modernization under the Park Chung-hee regime. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan Feigenbaum held
consultations December 11 in Seoul, meeting separately with
Park Ro-byug, Director General of the European Affairs Bureau
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Park In-kook,
Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International
Organizations, and Cho Tae-yong, Director General of the
North American Affairs Bureau. DAS Feigenbaum also met with
Lim Sung-nam, Senior Adviser to Foreign Minister Song
Min-soon; Kim Kyou-hyun, Director General for the
International Policy Bureau at the Ministry of National
Defense; Park Jin, Grand National Party lawmaker; and several
ROK academics specializing on Russia and Central Asia.

STARTING A U.S.-KOREA CONVERSATION ON CENTRAL ASIA
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3. (C) In his meeting with DG Park Ro-byug, DAS Feigenbaum
outlined the three purposes of his trip to Seoul. First, the
USG wanted to expand conversations with countries that had an
interest in Central Asia; beyond its extensive and
long-standing discussions on Central Asia with European
partners, it was important that Washington begin talks with
less traditional partners in the region, such as Seoul, and
expand talks with others, including Tokyo, Ankara and New
Delhi. Second, South Korean ties to Central Asia were wider
and deeper than commonly known. ROK companies, such as
Daewoo, had been involved in the automobile, construction,
and oil sectors. The Korea International Cooperation Agency
maintained a field office in Tashkent and had run an
assistance and training program for Uzbeks over the years to
the tune of some USD 15 million. There was also a growing
South Korean political relationship with Central Asia,
especially Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, symbolized by
presidential visits, such as President Roh's in 2005 and
Uzbek President Karimov's four visits to Seoul, most recently
in 2006, as well as ROK Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook's
visit to Central Asia in September 2006. The ROK was even
providing low-level military aid to Kazakhstan, selling
coastal patrol boats and offering some language training.
Third, said Feigenbaum, consultations on Central Asia could
meet an important goal envisioned in the U.S.-ROK Strategic
Consultations on Allied Partnership, namely to broaden the
foundation of the bilateral relationship by discussing our
shared global interests beyond the Korean Peninsula.


4. (C) DG Park responded that Seoul shared the goal of
broader dialogue with Washington as then Foreign Minister Ban
and Secretary Rice had agreed in January 2006 in Washington
and reaffirmed during Under Secretary Burns's visit in
November 2006 to Seoul. Park noted some coordination between
ROK and U.S diplomats on the ground. For example, the U.S.
mission in Turkmenistan, where the ROK lacked an Embassy, had

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helped South Korea. South Korea's relationship with Central
Asia had begun shortly after the independence of these states
in 1991, with the establishment of a presence in 1992. In
this sense, said Park, Central Asia was a "new horizon" for
Seoul.

ROK APPROACH: TRADING, NUDGING, AND ENCOURAGING
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5. (C) Park characterized Seoul's Central Asian priorities
as threefold: (1) diversification of its energy supply (the
ROK imports nearly all of its supplies); restoration of links
with, and protection of, the Korean diaspora deported by
Stalin from the Russia Far East to Central Asia; and (3)
offering a "Korean model" of economic and political
development. The ROK had over-relied on the Middle East for
energy supplies, thus Seoul had very recently begun to seek
exploration opportunities around the Caspian and Aral Seas.
The ROK also had an historic connection to the region because
of the deportations: the ROKG felt a responsibility to assist
the 200,000 Koreans in Uzbekistan and 100,000 Koreans in
Kazakhstan. These ethnic communities could help provide a
bridge between South Korea and Central Asia. Finally, ROK
officials assessed that South Korea provided a model for
economic growth and democratic modernization because of the
lessons of former President Park Chung-hee's legacy, i.e.,
rapid economic growth leading ultimately to a political
transition.


6. (C) Park explained that the President's staff at the Blue
House had recently written a paper emphasizing the need to
enlarge South Korean contacts in Central Asia. Increased
overseas developmental assistance (ODA) was one method to do
so; deals for energy exploration rights, usually linked to
technology transfer, was another. South Korea now did
roughly USD 1.2 billion in trade with Central Asia, with USD
900 million in exports and USD 300 million in imports, which
represented 0.2 percent of global ROK trade. The ROK had
invested USD 2.4 billion in the region, three-fourths of
which was in Kazakhstan. ROK economic activity with
Uzbekistan focused on trade (30-40 ROK companies were
involved in trading operations); in Kazakhstan, ROK economic
activity focused on investment (30-40 ROK companies were
involved in sectors like construction and chemicals). Over
the past ten years, said Park, the ROK had provided USD 25
million in ODA grants to Central Asia, primarily to
Uzbekistan (USD 15 million) and Kazakhstan. Korean economic
and development assistance reached USD 140 million, with over
half going to Uzbekistan. Still, he noted, Central Asia was
not an immediate priority for Seoul. The ROK spent about USD
500 million per year for oil and gas exploration, which was
not a large amount. Moreover, such exploration in Central
Asia would take years to produce results.


7. (C) The ROK was pursuing a gradual approach to improving
relations with Central Asia, Park said. While Seoul
appreciated Washington's multi-dimensional approach to the
region, i.e., simultaneous promotion of markets, democracy,
energy development, and security cooperation, the ROKG viewed
Central Asia as a region needing economic development, above
all. Most of the countries were newly independent and
relatively poor and might not be ready for democracy "on a
Western model." However, the ROK could help encourage
democracy gradually and from the bottom up. Leaders of
Central Asia probably were more comfortable with South
Korea's "softer" approach that focused primarily on trade and
aid rather than on other, more sensitive dimensions, such as
political reform. Park commented that Central Asians
appreciated Korean music and movies and probably saw an Asian
cultural "connection" with South Korea. The ROK had opened
educational centers to teach Korean language and culture in
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The ROK Ministry of
Education had sent two to three teachers to teach skills to
local ethnic Koreans, many of whom sought jobs with Korean
companies. The Korea International Cooperation Agency also

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had a field office in Tashkent to help promote exchanges.
The ROK in 2006 joined Kazakhstan's Conference on Interaction
and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in an effort
to broaden ties and to help Central Asian development. In
return for these various forms of partnership, Central Asian
states supported the ROK on the DPRK nuclear issue, backed
former Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon's successful candidacy
for UN Secretary General, and supported the ROK's interest in
playing a larger role in international organizations.


8. (C) On human rights more generally, Park opined that,
much like the dilemma the ROK faced with the DPRK, Seoul
wanted to encourage openness and transparency and an
improvement in living standards in Central Asia. Seoul was
concerned, however, that pushing too hard on this front might
hurt emerging relations. It would be more effective to nudge
and encourage until the time for change was more appropriate.
Asked whether the ROKG saw linkages between its efforts in
Afghanistan and its goals in Central Asia, Park said these
were different issues. The ROKG had sent military forces to
Afghanistan and Iraq to help promote stability, reflecting
its role as a strong U.S. ally. Central Asia, however, was
relatively stable and offered more prospects for economic
growth. As a middle power, Park said South Korea was doing
its part to encourage modernization, but it could not tackle
as many issues as the United States while still protecting
its companies and the Korean diaspora in the region.


9. (C) Asked about the ROK view of Japanese involvement in
Central Asia, Park, surprisingly, was dismissive of Japanese
efforts to engage the region. Park opined that Prime
Minister Koizumi's trip to Central Asia had yielded few, if
any, tangible results.

U.S. GOALS AND INTENTIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA
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10. (C) DAS Feigenbaum provided Park with an overview of
U.S. strategies, goals, and intentions in Central Asia. He
also offered some examples of U.S. assistance programs,
discussed the commercial climate, and explained the rationale
behind efforts to facilitate economic linkages between
Central and South Asia, including electricity trading between
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Central
Asia, said Feigenbaum, is a microcosm of some of the most
important challenges in American foreign policy: a Russia
resurgent in its neighborhood; China's growing regional and
global footprint; the role of Iran; high oil prices;
democracy promotion in very tough environments; balancing
efforts to promote political liberalization with other goals;
the future of Afghanistan; the role of Islam in society; the
challenge of terrorism; and so on. In perhaps no other
region of the world, said Feigenbaum, do so many issues and
challenges come together in such interesting combinations
that draw high-level USG interest. Since 1991, the USG had
helped Central Asian states assure their sovereignty and
independence. Our goal was to strengthen that independence
by facilitating access to more options, choices, partners,
and markets, as well as furthering the integration of Central
Asian countries with one another, their neighbors, and the
world economy. Oil, for instance, is a global commodity
traded on a vibrant futures market; thus, the USG sought to
facilitate more supply to the world market. In short, the
countries of Central Asia needed options: more than one
market, more than one pipeline, more than one dominant
partner; in the energy field, this entailed selling their oil
and gas to the world unfettered by monopolies or geographic
choke points.


11. (C) More generally, the USG maintained a
multidimensional approach to the region that touched on
multiple baskets, including economics and trade; security;
transnational issues of environment, water, and terrorism;
and political reform, Feigenbaum said. The United States, he
said, focused much of its assistance on issues that wedged

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across these major baskets. For example, the rule of law had
implications both for democracy promotion and trade; stronger
rule of law would mean greater political openness but also a
more attractive investment climate. The modernization of
customs and border controls, too, both of which were areas of
significant U.S. assistance and involvement, improved
security while also expanding trade opportunities. Efforts
on these "wedge" issues, said Feigenbaum, could help to build
capacity for the long-term.


12. (C) The USG also saw a strong linkage between the region
and Afghanistan, he continued. Stability in Afghanistan was
important to Central Asia because in the past Afghanistan had
been viewed as a security threat. It was important to give
landlocked Central Asian states access to seaports and more
markets in every direction on the compass. Afghanistan
literally separated Central from South Asia on the map, but
if trade routes opened and infrastructure improved, Central
Asian states would have access to additional seaports to the
south; in this sense, Afghanistan could become a bridge.
Each country of Central Asia was unique, including with
respect to their resources and endowments. Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan had oil and/or gas resources.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, by contrast, were less blessed,
but had snow, rivers, and thus hydroelectric generation
potential. Seasonal complementarity on peak demand between
Central and South Asia created opportunities for electricity
trading. Building infrastructure for energy development
would enhance trade and thus support sovereignty and
independence.


13. (C) DAS Feigenbaum noted that in Central Asian
countries, like Uzbekistan, a disenfranchised population
could turn to more radical politics or Islamic extremism.
Uzbekistan's citizens were becoming increasingly alienated
from their government. We did not, said Feigenbaum, want
Central Asia's future to look like Afghanistan's pre-2001.
The USG sought to avoid instability, and this required better
governance, the long-term development of stable institutions,
and the investment of citizens in their political process by
giving them a stake in their system of government. One could
not simply separate economic development from political
development. Moreover, the challenge of Islamic
radicalization meant that we did not simply have the luxury
of waiting interminably for governments to invest their
citizens in the political process.

ROKG: KOREAN DEVELOPMENT MODEL
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14. (C) Park characterized the ROK model as one that
included economic and political development, but sequenced
transition in each of these two baskets. Feigenbaum agreed
that this was the ROK model. Park explained that former
dictator Park Chung-hee's legacy had been reevaluated to some
degree inside South Korea because his contributions to
economic progress were now seen as more important to Korea's
development than at the time, he said. The ROKG had invited
Central Asian leaders to Seoul, where they could learn about
the ROKG experience, see the role of street demonstrations,
and learn about the need to avoid corruption. Still, the
ROKG wanted to encourage change in a subtle way. For Central
Asia, however, this type of sequenced political development
might prove more difficult than it had for Korea because,
unlike the ROK, Central Asian states could not rely on a
military alliance with the United States. Central Asia,
however, could benefit from modern technology, for example
greater information technology (IT) could improve
transparency in economic and politics, thus the ROK was
focusing some of its assistance to Uzbekistan in this area.


15. (C) DAS Feigenbaum noted the Park Chung-hee model but
then contrasted the experience of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
In Kazakhstan, he said, the parallel seemed more credible:
leaders in Kazakhstan had made some smart economic decisions,

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including macroeconomic and structural reform and banking
sector reform, and they were seeking to join the World Trade
Organization. While flawed in the political realm, this
element of Kazakhstan's development contrasted with the Uzbek
experience, where President Karimov had made poor macro- and
microeconomic choices in addition to his apparently poor
political choices. Broadly speaking, the people of Central
Asia needed to be invested in their system of government or
the region risked instability; the United States recognized,
he added, that Central Asia would not "look like Denmark by
next Tuesday."

UZBEKISTAN
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16. (C) Park reiterated that ROKG policy toward Uzbekistan
focused on increasing trade for economic and humanitarian
reasons. Uzbek leaders had more experience with
dictatorships than with market economics and were probably
uncomfortable with openness and reform. The ROK was hoping
to promote change via increasing Korean-Uzbek contacts,
exchange, and dialogue; there were now six flights per week
between Uzbekistan and South Korea (Uzbekistan Airlines and
Asiana Airlines) and more and more Uzbek citizens were
looking for jobs in South Korea. By the same token, without
such contacts the ROK would have a weaker ability to protect
the Korean diaspora or to secure access to energy resources.
Immediate progress in Uzbekistan was unlikely, Park lamented.
There were 200,000 ethnic Koreans in Uzbekistan, and most
faced economic problems and discrimination. Some had even
moved back to Russia to seek better opportunities, so Seoul
was working with Moscow to help provide assistance to the
Korean diaspora. Speaking of Uzbek President Karimov, Park
said despite his flaws, the ROK wanted work with him to help
the citizens of Uzbekistan.


17. (C) DAS Feigenbaum noted that the United States, too,
engages in dialogue with Uzbekistan, including with President
Karimov. But, he urged Seoul in its discussions with
Tashkent to continue to stress the importance of reform,
including economic reform. Uzbek leaders did not need to
view this as an "American" message; they could look to
Kazakhstan to see an example of how better economic
management could improve the lives of citizens.
Unfortunately, things were not going so well between the
United States and Uzbekistan: the U.S. had lost its airbase,
the Peace Corps, NGOs, and some U.S. companies that had long
provided opportunities to Uzbek workers. These decisions
would hurt economic prospects in Uzbekistan.

KAZAKHSTAN
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18. (C) Park remarked that the ROK-Kazakh economic
relationship was booming, but changing. Ten years ago,
Kazakh leaders wanted to imitate the Korean developmental
model, but now they had a growing confidence in their own
system, their own "Kazakh model." As a result, it was
becoming harder to negotiate with Kazakhstan because its
leaders were more confident and wanted a more comprehensive
relationship: one that not only exported Kazakhstan's
resources to Korea but imported advanced technology from
Korea. The ROK view was that Kazakhstan offered cheap labor
that would enable some Korean companies in "downside sectors"
to compete again. Compared to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan offered
more opportunities with an economy that had grown ten times
over the past ten years. The Korean minority was also doing
better in Kazakhstan than in Uzbekistan, where ROK minorities
appealed for financial assistance and where the ROKG was
building elderly welfare centers for Uzbek Koreans. DAS
Feigenbaum noted that Kazakhstan had made the connection
between education and development. It had also made a
connection between oil and development and was determined not
to become resource rich but economically poor, like Nigeria.
Feigenbaum also noted Kazakhstan's "Bolashak" program, which

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had sent thousands of Kazakh students abroad for an
education. Park added that Korea would probably get its
first Bolashak student in the coming year. He confirmed a
report Feigenbaum had read on the internet that Samsung had
sponsored Kazakh students in IT training courses. As to
military cooperation, said Park, the need for security in the
Caspian was one reason Seoul had fulfilled a Kazakh request
for assistance. Seoul had provided some decommissioned ships
as part of a modified barter agreement to help the Kazakh
Caspian navy, always mindful of the need to avoid provoking
an arms race in the region. Park also mentioned that Seoul
had not yet moved its Embassy from Almaty to Astana but
planned to build one.

KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN
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19. (C) Lacking diplomatic missions in Bishkek and Dushanbe,
the ROK Ambassador to Uzbekistan is accredited to Tajikistan,
Park said, while the ROK Ambassador to Kazakhstan is
accredited to Kyrgyzstan. Still, the ROK does not pay much
attention to Tajikistan, and only about two or three ROK
companies operated there. Kyrgyzstan was scarcely on the ROK
radar screen. As to Ashgabat, the ROK had not established
diplomatic relations with Turkmenistan, but planned to do so.
Park had just visited Ashgabat, where he met with Foreign
Minister Meredov and invited him to visit Seoul in 2007.
Park had been astonished by the size of Meredov's office,
which, he said, not only was smaller than his own DG office
in Seoul but smaller than the one of the president of
Turkmenistan's main gas company, which, to Park, showed where
the real action and money were. Park said that Seoul planned
to establish relations with Turkmenistan and eventually open
an embassy there. First, it would accredit its ambassador to
Russia to Turkmenistan. Then, in two to three years, it
would seek to open a separate embassy with a distinct
ambassador. DAS Feigenbaum noted the need for more
transparency in Turkmenistan, including on its gas supplies.
He also noted the role of Gazprom in Turkmenistan and the
region. He added that Ashgabat should hear from Korea that
human rights were important.

RUSSIA
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20. (C) Park added that South Korea was not deeply engaged
with Russia on Central Asia. He perceived that Moscow was
not too worried about Korea's role in the region because
Seoul's main objective was stability. Moscow had not
approached Seoul on the UNGA Third Committee discussion on
Uzbekistan, but it had approached South Korea on the Belarus
resolution. South Korea's policy toward Russia was focused
on encouraging Moscow to play a positive role in the Six
Party Talks. Seoul hoped that Moscow would provide energy
assistance to North Korea should the nuclear issue allow.
Russian officials sometimes expressed their displeasure when
they were not briefed about U.S.-PRC-DPRK meetings on the
nuclear issue. Finally, bilateral issues with Russia also
included fisheries and a Russian desire for more ROK
investment, possibly in a Russian energy pipeline.

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AND CHINA
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21. (C) In separate meetings with North American Affairs
Director General Cho Tae-yong and Deputy Minister for Policy
Planning and International Organizations Park In-kook, DAS
Feigenbaum asked about the ROKG view of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO). Cho said that Seoul had
joined the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building
Measures in Asia (CICA) as well as several other multilateral
groups (APEC, ASEAN PLUS 3, EAS, ARF, ASEM),but was unsure
about SCO's function. The ROKG was concerned about sizable
Korean minorities in Central Asia and wanted to promote
increased economic ties to Central Asia, but questioned

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whether SCO was an appropriate vehicle. Deputy Minister Park
indicated that he remained skeptical about SCO. How would it
evolve, did Washington have suspicions about China's role in
the organization, and would SCO operate in parallel to or at
cross purposes with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?
DAS Feigenbaum, separately, told both DG Cho and DFM Park
that Washington also was unclear about what SCO intended to
be and therefore found it difficult to assess precisely how
it might affect USG interests. He added that the role of
Iran bore watching, adding that the U.S. had been unhappy
with a 2005 SCO statement on the U.S. military presence in
Central Asia.

COMMENT
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22. (C) South Korea's approach to Central Asia, while still
emerging and evolving, focuses on promoting economic and
humanitarian exchanges to secure energy resources and to
protect ethnic Korean populations. Seoul remains less
willing to increase pressure on Central Asia for economic,
much less political reform. MOFAT and academic interlocutors
in conversations with DAS Feigenbaum applied the template of
engagement with North Korea to their strategy for promoting
relations with Central Asia. The ROK sought to avoid
provoking Central Asian leaders in ways that might invite
retaliation against ROK companies and interests. Despite an
expressed desire to broaden the foundation of the alliance to
global interests beyond the Korean Peninsula, most ROK
interlocutors appeared uncomfortable discussing issues, such
as Central Asia, not traditionally associated with the
Alliance. Park and Feigenbaum agreed to continue their
conversation; Park noted his desire to visit Washington in

2007. END COMMENT.
VERSHBOW