U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT - LOOKING AHEAD TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SEOUL 004260 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE ALSO PASS USTR AND COMMERCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016 TAGS: KS PREL SUBJECT: U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT - LOOKING AHEAD TO 2007 Classified By: AMB Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) With only 12 months left until the next presidential election, President Roh finds himself stuck in the lowest approval ratings ever for a Korean president -- 5.7 percent according to the most recent poll, low teens according to others. Roh's desperation to recover and have some say in the choice of his successor will color virtually all aspects of ROK political life in the coming year. Inevitably, U.S.-ROK relations will be involved. Our actions and words will be scrutinized and criticized, and there will be much more than the usual quota of exaggeration and fabrication by the Korean press and politicians. The following issues come in "fragile: handle with care" packaging: -- PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. The USG must vigorously and continuously battle the South Korean conventional wisdom that the U.S. favors a GNP candidate; the top priority is to avoid the U.S. becoming an election issue as in 2002, when Roh Moo-hyun's campaign exploited the death of two schools girls hit accidentally by a USFK vehicle. -- NORTH KOREA. President Roh continues to believe that his best chance of leaving a legacy -- and, at the same time, of regaining some popular support -- is through a "home run" on North Korean issues. Since a breakthrough in the Six Party Talks is unlikely, at least in the short term, Roh may seek to arrange a North-South summit to demonstrate that engagement with Pyongyang is still working, despite the likely dearth of any concrete results. Our challenge is to pursue denuclearization of North Korea divorced from South Korean domestic political developments, and to keep the ROK from breaking ranks in the Six Party Talks. -- THE KORUS-FTA. The latest round of discussions in Montana was a disappointment, although an FTA deal is still achievable. Nevertheless, we need to prepare for the possibility that, lacking leadership from the top, the ROKG team will be unable to make the tough decisions required on our most sensitive issues. A failure to come to an agreement could take a toll on our bilateral relations; the challenge would be to avoid recriminations that could make "resisting U.S. pressure" a campaign issue. -- USFK ISSUES. The overarching issue is to maintain momentum toward alliance transformation, preparing the ground for transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON),USFK realignment, and range sharing. The Defense Ministers' meeting (SCM) in October did not decide on the exact date of OPCON transfer. This politically charged decision must now be made during the first half of election year 2007. Reaching agreement on the related issue of the transfer of Armistice maintenance responsibilities will also be extremely difficult. Other thorny USFK issues include base closures, training needs, and the move from Yongsan Garrison to Pyeongtaek. ¶2. (C) While 2007 will be a turbulent year for Korean politics, we need to minimize the ups and downs in our bilateral relationship. We believe the new foreign policy team led by Song Min-soon could prove to be helpful, probably more so than some may expect in Washington. Song, the dominant foreign policy player within the ROKG, now has reached the pinnacle of his chosen career; he must be prodded to pursue broader interests and perspectives rather than just following Roh's political agenda. For our part, we need to assure the Koreans that we are doing everything possible to achieve a negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear issue and that we are not opposed in principle to the ROK's policy of engagement with the DPRK, while doing our best to keep Seoul on the same page in the Six Party Talks. We also need to manage USFK issues, such as OPCON and base relocation, so that they do not become domestic political SEOUL 00004260 002 OF 005 footballs. These policies, implemented consistently and transparently, will place the USG in a better position to protect the Alliance and work with the next ROK president, whoever that might be. END SUMMARY. -------------- DESPERATION POLITICS -------------- ¶3. (C) Few in South Korea would dispute that Roh is the lamest of lame duck presidents. He has virtually no control over his party, the legislative agenda, or high-level appointments. A recent poll show Roh's approval rating at an amazingly low 5.7 percent. Even at the height of the "IMF" crisis, when the South Korean economy was rapidly sinking with the won-dollar exchange rate at over 2000, Kim Young-sam had a higher approval rating. Roh's recent woe-is-me comments about possibly being the first Korean president not to finish his term illustrate his profound frustration and desperation. ¶4. (C) After having promised so much -- new politics based on ideas, not regionalism -- Roh is deeply disappointed that his own political party wants to abandon him to form an alliance with the Democratic Party, a regional party from which Uri members broke away and whose support is exclusively from the eastern region of the country. Over the next month or so, things will get worse for Roh as neither the opposition GNP nor the ruling Uri will cooperate with him on issues such as education reform, real estate prices, and possibly the budget for next year. ¶5. (C) Roh has nobody but himself to blame. From the beginning, Roh has attempted to put in place policies and ideas out of the mainstream, including the reform of the national security law and education reform. Equally troubling were his appointments, such as Rhyu Shi-Min at the Ministry of Health and Lee Jong-seok at the Ministry of Unification, who were ideological and divisive. Perhaps worst of all, Roh's penchant for publicly verbalizing his private thoughts -- his anti-American tendencies, hatred of the Japanese, loathing for the South Korean elite and educated class, and revisionist tendencies in all things North Korean -- have alienated even many of his supporters. ¶6. (C) Still, Roh is not a quitter and we don't expect him to act on his recent musings about not finishing his term. Rather, throughout his political life, Roh's strategy has been to create deep divisions, which he then takes advantage of, allowing him to survive and even prosper. For example, in 2004, Roh used the impeachment triggered by the opposition GNP to appeal directly to voters, allowing his newly formed Uri Party to gain a majority of the seats in the National Assembly elections that year. The GNP, having learned its lesson in 2004, is not likely to give Roh another such opportunity. ¶7. (C) Roh's strategy has also been to tap nationalism to his advantage. Nationalist sentiment played a key role in Roh's election in 2002, and has been a prominent theme throughout his presidency, from his vision of Korea as a regional "balancer," to his calls for Korea's resumption of OPCON, to his aggressive denunciations of Japan's historical record. Knowing that these issues resonate deeply with the Korean public, it is likely that Roh will amplify some or all of these issues in his final year in office. -------------- NORTH KOREA -------------- ¶8. (C) Issues related to North Korea present such political opportunities for Roh. For Roh, the developments in North-South relations during his tenure rank among his greatest achievements and biggest disappointments. He is proud of his engagement policy, which he believes has brought about a reduction in tensions with North Korea, and of the SEOUL 00004260 003 OF 005 launch of projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex that are supposed to encourage Chinese-style reforms in the DPRK. At the same time, Roh is acutely aware that the DPRK's development and testing of nuclear devices represent a failure of his North Korea policy. Over his remaining time in the office, Roh will press for virtually any nuclear deal to achieve vindication. Our MOFAT contacts have told us that Song Min-soon, as foreign minister, will be the day-to-day manager of the Six Party Talks. As the talks resume in Beijing and inevitably become laborious, we can expect Roh to show increasing mood swings as he vacillates between Pyongyang and Washington in dishing out the blame. ¶9. (C) North Korea is very much a "wedge" issue. Domestically, Roh will defend engagement as the only way to maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula, appealing to the broadest possible electorate while trying to portray conservatives as reckless warmongers. To highlight the peace-vs.-war theme, Roh may seek a summit meeting with Kim Jong-il as a kind of electoral wild card, even if there is no assurance of a substantive outcome. Roh has said on many occasions that he is prepared to meet with KJI anywhere, anytime. So far, KJI has shown no indications of obliging, but the electoral dynamics in the South -- not to mention monetary benefits -- could sway the North Korean leader. ¶10. (C) North Korea issues in the ROK will inevitably involve the U.S. As his time in office runs out -- and as his frustrations at the lack of progress in the Six Party Talks likely mount -- Roh is fully capable of blaming U.S. hardliners for the problem and making new overtures to Pyongyang. -------------- USFK ISSUES -------------- ¶11. (C) Polls consistently show that a sizable majority of the Korean public supports the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, and we believe that support has increased as a result of the DPRK July missile launches and October nuclear test. Still, specific issues and unexpected events involving USFK are likely to be exploited during the election campaign. Some of the following items could become domestic political issues next year: -- The transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK. Progressives will cast it as the return of Korean sovereignty. Conservatives will argue it weakens South Korea's national security. Similar arguments will surround the related issue of the transfer of Armistice maintenance responsibilities to the ROK. Despite election-year rhetoric, we need to work behind the scenes to ensure that the ROKG is taking the steps necessary prepare for assuming OPCON. -- Basing and training issues, most notably implementation of the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and Land Partnership Plan (LPP) provide a host of political targets at which politicians will take aim. Topping the list are cost concerns, real estate issues and the environmental impact on local communities posed by the consolidation and relocation of a significant portion of the U.S. Forces on the Peninsula. -- The ROK troop deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan will also likely remain controversial throughout the ROK presidential campaign, particularly if the security situation in either area of operation worsens. ¶12. (C) The new Defense Minister, General Kim Jang-soo, promises to be a good ally in our combined effort to implement this very heavy POL-MIL agenda in 2007 and to transform the alliance, but he clearly lacks the strong political influence enjoyed by Song Min-soon and other Blue House confidants of President Roh. We must nonetheless encourage the entire ROK national security team to stand up for the U.S.-ROK alliance and to educate the Korean populace about the fact that the Mutual Defense Treaty, and our joint SEOUL 00004260 004 OF 005 commitment to it, are as important now to the security of the region as they ever were. More specifically, we should try to clear the decks of as many unresolved alliance issues as possible in the first half of 2007, to reduce the risk that alliance problems could become campaign issues. --- FTA --- ¶13. (C) The successful conclusion of the KORUS-FTA next year would mark another major step forward in the alliance, but we must also be prepared for a different outcome, particularly since ROKG senior leaders have done little publicly to make the case for the FTA, or to explain why the short-term economic costs are worth the long-term benefits. Indeed, supporters of the FTA (most of them in the opposition GNP party) are highly critical of Roh, many of them doubting there was ever strong support for the FTA at the highest levels of his government. Others in Roh's own party question whether he carefully assessed the extent of the changes and market openings needed to conclude a deal. Such doubts -- magnified by the media, National Assembly, and anti-FTA lobbies -- have contributed to the lack of progress in the negotiations. The most recent round in Montana again revealed a big gap on key issues, including trade remedies, pharmaceuticals and autos, not to mention long-standing differences on agriculture, services and textiles. ¶14. (C) The KORUS-FTA has to be concluded by March 31 to allow Congress enough time to review it before Trade Promotion Authority expires on June 30, 2007. While there is still a chance we can resolve the tough issues in the next 2-3 months, we need to prepare for the possibility that negotiations might not conclude in time. As March 31 draws nearer, we will be better able to assess how much more work remains to be done. If the gap still remains large, we will have to decide whether to seek an extension of Trade Promotion Authority or just shelve the work until a later date. Walking away from the talks, if agreed upon by both sides, must be carefully justified to minimize the political damage to the alliance that many will read into it. ¶15. (C) We would add that success in achieving an FTA will bring its own set of challenges, given the strong political opposition here -- including a significant fraction of ruling party politicians. We will need to press the ROKG to be more forceful in selling the FTA to its own constituents, rather than leaving it to us to make the case. Absent their advocacy for the agreement, the impression will be that the U.S. gains more from the FTA and that we shoved it down the Koreans' throats. -------------- NEW FOREIGN POLICY TEAM -------------- ¶16. (C) Song Min-soon has moved from the Blue House to MOFAT with his authority and influence substantially enhanced. He clearly overshadows the new national security advisor, Baek Jong-chun, a little known academic (and retired military officer) from Sejong Institute, who will likely be an advisor in the Kwon Chin-ho mold rather than someone who oversees day-to-day foreign policy-making and implementation. Baek's deputy is Yun Byung-se, a career MOFAT officer close to Song. In his inaugural remarks to MOFAT staff, Song made it clear that his number-one priority was to denuclearize North Korea, followed by strengthening the U.S.-ROK alliance. 17 (C) Song will be a hands-on foreign minister. He has already told his staff that he wants to run the Six Party Talks. His first trip abroad will be a short overnight stay in Tokyo followed by a longer visit to Washington, now likely in early January. In both capitals, he will have forthcoming messages. The Tokyo stop is considered symbolic by Song's staff, because he has had notably poor relations with Japanese diplomats. Song has been particularly critical of SEOUL 00004260 005 OF 005 Japanese positions in the Six Party Talks, regarding them as obstacles to reaching a deal with North Korea. In Washington, Song will make a big effort to correct some of his remarks critical of the U.S. during his last days in the Blue House. ¶18. (C) Combative and outspoken, Song does not instinctively embrace U.S. views as do some of his colleagues, like Ban Ki-moon or Former Vice Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan. Still, he has a good understanding of the United States and an acute appreciation of the importance of the alliance. Our MOFAT contacts expect him now to champion these traditional foreign affairs causes a lot more than he did when he was in the Blue House. We understand that several recent developments, including the early wrap-up of the negotiations on USFK's burden-sharing costs, the proposal to deploy ROK peacekeeping troops to Lebanon, and the proposal to extend ROK troops in Iraq were all overseen by Song with an eye toward improving the ROK's standing -- and his own image -- in Washington. -------------- PROTECTING THE ALLIANCE -------------- ¶19. (C) Our most fundamental objective is to protect the U.S.-ROK alliance, which has kept peace on the Peninsula and the region. The alliance is not just about security or even economic benefits. It is about shared values -- democracy, human rights, open society and open markets. It is also about having a U.S. presence in this volatile part of the world known for historical enmity and tensions. We need to be in Korea to help manage the rise of China and defuse tensions between Japan and its neighbors. A strong alliance relationship with the ROK is certainly in our interest, whatever our frustrations with its current leadership. ¶20. (C) To ensure that the alliance emerges unscathed from domestic political developments next year, we need consistent and predictable policy implementation on a number of fronts. --On the alliance itself, we need to continue the transformation by sticking to the roadmap of making South Korea a true partner in alliance evolution: the transfer date for OPCON needs to be settled; bases have to move. --On North Korea, we need to reassure the Koreans that we are committed to a negotiated settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue and that this will be done through the Six Party process. We also must combat the strong misperception among South Koreans that we are opposed to the ROK's engagement policy, as long as it is calibrated to maximize leverage in the Six Party Talks and, in the longer term, to promote real reform in the North. --On FTA, we should continue to negotiate patiently and see if there is a procedural move that could placate the Koreans on trade remedies, but also realize that we may not get there at all and strive for an amicable conclusion of negotiations, in the event there is no agreement. --Finally, on Korea's entry into the Visa-Waiver Program, we need to make visible progress on our roadmap to send a powerful message to the Korean people that we welcome Koreans in the United States. We are confident that through these steps, taken consistently and predictably, the United States will preserve a strong alliance relationship with South Korea and be well placed to work with Roh Moo-hyun's successor in 2008 and beyond. VERSHBOW