OPPOSITION CHAIRMAIN CLARIFIES OPCON REMARKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003999 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL KS SUBJECT: OPPOSITION CHAIRMAIN CLARIFIES OPCON REMARKS Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Ambassador met with opposition GNP Chairman Kang Jae-sup on November 16 to discuss Kang's November 8 address to the National Assembly which was critical of the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the ROK. Although Kang clarified that he remained supportive of the principle behind the OPCON transfer, he asserted that the timing should be further delayed until the North Korean threat had receded. The Ambassador suggested that the GNP should distinguish their reservations with the timing of OPCON transfer from the general principle of the transfer itself. Representative Chung Hyung-keun who was a member of a GNP delegation that went to Washington to lobby against the OPCON transfer also attended the meeting. END SUMMARY. OPCON TRANSFER -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern that the Korean public may perceive a divide between the GNP's views and those of the USG on the OPCON issue. Given the ROK's military strength and the public opinion in favor of a more balanced U.S.-ROK partnership, OPCON transfer was a natural step in the progression of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Even though North Korea was a legitimate concern to the South Koreans, the strength of the ROK military and the guarantee of U.S. military support in time of crisis allowed for the issue of OPCON transfer to be seriously considered at this time. In a nod to the Korean public who have been calling for a slower pace for OPCON transfer, the U.S. was very flexible at the recent SCM meetings, where the two Defense Ministers agreed on the October 2009 to March 2012 timeframe. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador suggested that the GNP would cause less confusion in the public and within the USG if it clearly separated the principle of OPCON transfer from the timing of the transfer. As the Korean public came closer to the realization that OPCON transfer was indeed natural and beneficial, the GNP's clarity on the issue would be useful for the party's strength. The Ambassador suggested that GNP legislators consider supporting clearly the principle of OPCON transfer, even if there was lingering debate about the exact timing. ¶4. (C) In response to the Ambassador's concerns, Kang said that he did not think there was a difference of opinion on the matter. While supporting the principle of OPCON transfer, Kang said he did not agree with President Roh's efforts to mislead the people by saying OPCON was a sovereignty issue. Kang further clarified his position with two points. First, that OPCON should not be transferred until peace had again taken root on the Peninsula. Second, following the DPRK nuclear test, peace in Korea must be reestablished through consensus-building. He cited polling statistics from early October 2006 in which 60 percent of the Korean people were in favor of OPCON transfer and 30 percent were opposed. The latest poll statistics, in which support for OPCON transfer was only 30 percent, showed that the public had further lost faith in Roh and their sense of insecurity had risen following the DPRK nuclear test. ¶5. (C) Kang suggested that he would first like to see North Korea dismantle its nuclear facilities before considering the OPCON issue again. If the North heard that the Combined Forces Command (CFC) was dismantled, as called for under OPCON transfer, it would be perceived as a win for the North. In today's environment, it was necessary to speak in very simple terms for the Korean people to get the message, Kang said. If the U.S. were to withdraw its troops from Korea, China's influence in the region would be unchecked and North Korea would continue to push the boundaries of unacceptable behavior. ¶6. (C) Kang explained that he was not speaking out against OPCON transfer for political gain. Rather, he was concerned with national security and regional stability, which was why he participated in a demonstration against OPCON transfer at City Hall and told Koreans they should not travel to Kumgang Mountain. GNP colleague Chung Hyung-keun inquired as to the motivation behind OPCON transfer and whether there was truly a military justification for the move or whether it was political price for the perceived anti-Americanism in Korea. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador said that political concerns played only a small part in the decision; military rationale provided the overarching justification. General Bell and other U.S. military leaders strongly believed that it was unnatural for Korea not to assume wartime control of its troops. To guarantee that U.S. troops would be welcomed in Korea in the long term, OPCON transfer was a positive development, the Ambassador said. The structures put in place to replace CFC could be as strong or stronger than the current system, a point that even retired Korean generals have expressed in recent weeks during the annual "Pyoungwa" exercise. Over time, putting the sovereignty argument aside, (which he agreed was specious),many Koreans would prefer that their troops fall under the command of their generals in time of war. SUPPORT FOR PSI -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged that the USG was disappointed that Korea had decided not to come out and fully endorse PSI. The ROKG and South Korean politicians, including the GNP, had failed to adequately explain to the Korean people what PSI was and what it was not. The USG remained hopeful that Korea would consider fully supporting PSI and thereby send a stronger message to North Korea. But we welcomed Korea's selective participation in PSI activities and exercises. Kang said that he and his party had expended a lot of political capital in support of PSI, despite a lack of enthusiasm among the Korean public. SIX PARTY TALKS -------------- ¶9. (C) When Kang expressed his concern that the U.S. appeared to be satisfied merely with getting the DPRK back to the negotiating table and had made a concession by agreeing to discuss the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) case bilaterally, the Ambassador disagreed. He emphasized that the U.S. planned to be firm and demand concrete actions such as early dismantlement and destruction of nuclear facilities and the return of IAEA inspectors. The Ambassador said that the announcement that the talks would resume was a product of multilateral pressure, especially through the UNSCR. We had always been ready to discuss the BDA case bilaterally within the context of the Six Party Talks; this was not a concession. Any resolution to BDA will need to involve the DPRK's curtailment of its illicit activity, the Ambassador said. VERSHBOW