U/S JOSEPH NONPROLIFERATION TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR

S E C R E T SEOUL 003970 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO T: ISN PDAS MCNERNEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2016 TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC MARR JA KS KN CH IR SUBJECT: U/S JOSEPH NONPROLIFERATION TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR PARK IN-KOOK Classified By: DCM BILL STANTON. REASONS 1.4 (b/d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) Under Secretary Joseph and his delegation met with Deputy Foreign Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations, Park In-kook, on November 7 to discuss implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and other key counterproliferation initiatives. In a meeting and working lunch with DFM Park, U/S Joseph and his delegation urged close ROK cooperation on implementation of UNSCR 1718, South Korea's full participation in PSI, and ROK support for strengthening nonproliferation inspection architecture worldwide. Park indicated that the South Korean government broadly supported U.S. actions and would fully implement 1718, noting that the ROKG had created an interagency task force that would produce a report to the UNSC by November 13. ¶2. (S) Pressed for specifics, Park said the ROK was still considering what to include in its response, and was constrained by domestic political concerns about sparking conflict with Pyongyang. He said the ROK was moving toward participation in PSI, but worried that interdiction of DPRK vessels in Korean waters might rupture the Armistice Agreement. Park indicated the ROK had no problem with the Container Security Initiative, but does have some concern over the scope of the International Container Scanning Network (ICSN) program. He nonetheless welcomed the ICSN technical team's planned November 13 visit to Pusan. He also indicated the ROKG was considering better ways to monitor shipments moving to/from the North through the DMZ transportation corridors, and briefed on the limitations of the South-North Agreement on Maritime Transportation. Acknowledging that his government was still "studying" many of these issues, Park agreed the United States and ROK should consult again on implementation of UNSCR 1718 after each side had finished preparing its report to the UN Security Council. END SUMMARY -------------- -- U/S Joseph's Nonproliferation Meetings in Seoul -------------- -- ¶3. (S) Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph met with Ambassador Park In-kook, Deputy Foreign Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations, on November 7, 2006 to discuss implementation of UNSCR 1718, PSI, and other counterproliferation initiatives. DFM Park told U/S Joseph he had been doing his "homework" on these issues following their previous discussions and in response to North Korea's nuclear test. The ROK had created an interagency task force, co-chaired by himself and Assistant Minister for Unification Lee Kwan-sei, Park explained. The task force, which had met several times, including the previous day, was drafting the ROK's report to the UN Security Council on measures to implement UNSCR 1718, as required by the resolution. ¶4. (S) U/S Joseph informed DFM Park that the Secretary's meetings in Beijing that followed the October 9 DPRK nuclear test had been encouraging, and that China appeared committed to full implementation of UNSCR 1718. In addition, he said he had just held productive trilateral discussions in Tokyo with nonproliferation officials from Japan and Australia. U/S Joseph described the steps the U.S. Government was taking in support of UNSCR 1718. Stressing that the USG highly valued close cooperation with the ROK on 1718, PSI, and in strengthening counterproliferation inspection architecture worldwide, U/S Joseph asked Park to describe current ROK thinking, and planned actions, in support of these important counterproliferation measures. -------------- Implementation of UNSCR 1718 -------------- ¶5. (S) "Broadly speaking, I think that U.S. actions are headed in the right direction," Park said, while quickly adding that as he understood it, the 1718 Sanctions Committee was leaving it up to individual countries to decide what North Korean individuals, entities and goods to sanction. He thanked U/S Joseph for the USG listing of items we would like to see banned as exports to the North, calling it "instructive," but made it clear the ROK was developing its own list, which he promised to share with the USG. Park said a list that was "shorter was better," while U/S Joseph encouraged the ROK officials in the room to embrace the spirit, and not merely follow the letter, of the resolution, and to make every effort to ensure close compatibility between our respective lists. -------------- Enhancing Inspection Architecture -------------- ¶6. (S) U.S. delegation member, ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney, briefed DFM Park and his colleagues on the need for increased scrutiny of North Korean shipping through enhancements to inspection architecture in the region. She explained that the USG would like to see expanded and strengthened inspections at ROK ports and within its territorial waters, as well as keener scrutiny of overflights, road and rail transportation. The USG also thinks that ROK participation in PSI could be an important counterproliferation tool, while also contributing to implementation of UNSCR 1718. DFM Park asked where we anticipated any required boarding of suspect DPRK vessels would take place: "On the high seas?" PDAS McNerney explained that would only occur as a last resort. An example of the preferred method, she noted, was to ask a PSI partner state to inspect the vessel when it reached its next port of call. Noting public misperceptions to the contrary, she emphasized that PSI member states worked within their own national legal authorities, and preferred to take action where they had the maximum domestic legal authority to do so. U/S Joseph rejected DFM Park's contention that "some elements of PSI appear to exceed UNSCR 1718," pointing out that actions taken by PSI member states were entirely voluntary and consistent with international law. ¶7. (S) Asked to describe how the ROK's observance of PSI exercises had affected its thinking about endorsing the statement of interdiction principles, Park replied that the matter was currently under study within the ROKG. Pressed further, Park explained that while the ROK viewed PSI as "helpful" and was "moving toward participation," a key domestic political factor -- sensitivity regarding how North Korea would respond -- had so far kept ROK leaders from fully and openly endorsing PSI. Because North Korea was a major domestic political issue for South Korea, ROK bureaucrats had to "wait until the dust settles," Park said. Complicating the issue was the fact that there were serious public misunderstandings about PSI within Korean society, he added, explaining that in the minds of many on the Korean Peninsula, interdiction was tantamount to a blockade, giving rise to worries that actions taken under PSI would rupture the Armistice Agreement. -------------- Deterring Proliferation of Nuclear Materials -------------- ¶8. (S) Delegation member William Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the Department of Energy, briefed the ROK representatives on the $1.7 billion U.S. effort to detect, secure and dispose of nuclear materials. Tobey describe our primary mission as deterrence through a combination of measures, including increased use of various detection mechanisms. In particular, he said the USG wanted to expand the following initiatives: -- Megaports -- Second Line of Defense -- Container Security Initiative (CSI) -- Aircraft Inspections -- Opportunistic Inspections -- Commodity Identification Training While the United States was mindful the DPRK was unlikely to proliferate through the ROK, we welcomed ROK support to deter any proliferation from happening, Tobey concluded. ¶9. (S) Responding to Mr. Tobey's presentation, DFM Park pointed out that while CSI only entailed random document inspections, it would be far more difficult for the ROK to participate in the International Container Scanning Network (ICSN) because it would require the ROKG to check approximately 16,000 shipping containers a day. Park nonetheless said he welcomed the upcoming November 13 visit to Seoul by the ICSN technical team, adding that he would urge his staff to work closely with them to address all concerns. -------------- Better Monitoring of N-S Shipments -------------- ¶10. (S) Refocusing the discussion on concerns about North Korea, U/S Joseph pointed out that the overall amount of DPRK shipping was relatively small, and thus far more easily monitored. DCM Stanton raised concerns over the reported cursory inspections currently taking place along the east and west transportation corridors between North and South Korea. He asked whether, in light of UNSCR 1718, the ROK was considering strengthening its monitoring of goods flowing to and from the North. DFM Park replied that the ROKG was giving the matter some thought, adding that new restrictive measures would likely be included in the ROKG's November 13 report to the UN Security Council. Calling the current N-S inspection regime a "terrible system," Park explained that vehicles heading either North or South entered a joint inspection area, after passing through their respective Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) areas. He said the gates leading into and out of the joint inspection area opened and closed every 30 minutes during regular work hours to allow the vehicles to pass between the North and South Korea. ¶11. (S) Asked about luxury goods going to the North, Park told U/S Joseph that the ROK Ministry of Unification was in the process of making its own "exhaustive list" of items to be banned. NSC Director for Counterproliferation Strategy David Stephens cautioned on the need for the United States and ROK to work together on the list to prevent it from becoming a bilateral issue between our two countries. DFM Park agreed, but jokingly fretted about what would happen to whisky currently being sent to the North for consumption by South Korean workers there "who otherwise would not volunteer to work in the DPRK." -------------- --- South-North Agreement on Maritime Transportation -------------- --- ¶12. (S) During a follow-on working lunch, DFM Park briefed the delegation on the content of the South-North Agreement on Maritime Transportation that came into force on August 1, ¶2005. Asked if the agreement allowed the ROK to interdict a North Korean vessel carrying WMD in ROK territorial waters, Park replied that it did not, since the language in the agreement specified that permission had to be asked and granted by either side. He added, however, that in light of UNSCR 1718, the ROK was now re-thinking how it would choose to exercise the agreement. He said 70 DPRK vessels had been granted permission so far this year to transit the waters between Cheju Island and the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula, pointing out that this saved the DPRK captains 4.5 hours at sea when navigating between eastern and western DPRK ports. Park further pointed out that if the DPRK wanted to move WMD clandestinely from one of its coasts to the other, it could simply move it overland or take a longer international route and therefore did not need to sail it through ROK territorial waters. To date, the ROK had never denied a DPRK vessels' request to transit the area, Park said. He added that the DPRK did not transship through ROK ports and that its ships had passed through ROK territorial waters 140 times over the past year. On 40 of those occasions, the DPRK vessels had stopped at a ROK port to pick up needed shipments of humanitarian aid. -------------- - Other Issues Requiring Continued Consultations -------------- - ¶13. (S) DFM Park and U/S Joseph agreed the United States and ROK should consult again on implementation of UNSCR 1718 after each side had finished preparing its respective reports to the UN Security Council. Park inquired about automatic sanctions under the Glenn Amendment and asked when this might come into effect. U/S Joseph replied that the President would make the final decision on that. Whatever sanctions the U.S. chose to implement would send an important symbolic message, he added. ¶14. (S) Asked about ROK banking activities with the DPRK, Park said that the ROKG has taken a close look, but had found no transactions with suspect DPRK entities. That was because South Korean banks were very cautious about dealing with the DPRK since "they do not wish to be branded," Park explained. He said he did not believe the DPRK would conduct a second nuclear test "because the USG had already confirmed to the world that the DPRK is, in fact, a nuclear power." He claimed a second test would result in a significant change in ROKG policy toward the North. U/S Joseph indirectly contested Park's judgment, noting the most significant threshold had been crossed with the first test. ¶15. (S) DFM Park expressed doubt about the capability of the DPRK's longer range missiles, noting that a Chinese official had told him the PRC had tested its ICBM missiles at the rate of one a month for 15 years before perfecting that capability. He encouraged the United States to work closely with China on implementation of UNSCR 1718, pointing out that the 1,400 km border between the PRC and DPRK was a large vulnerability within the global nonproliferation regime. Turning to the Six-Party Talks, Park argued that blocking the DPRK's proliferation of nuclear materials was subordinate to our primary task of convincing Pyongyang to give up those materials in the first place. In making this point Park employed phrasing our Blue House contacts have attributed directly to President Roh -- that we need to deal with the nuclear issue both vertically (through the 6PT) as well as horizontally (through nonproliferation efforts). U/S Joseph pointed out that the USG had made a tremendous diplomatic effort through its participation in the Six-Party Talks, but that pressure resulting from UNSCR 1718 was clearly key to Pyongyang's decision to return to the talks. Continued pressure was the only way the talks would have a chance of succeeding, he told Park. ¶16. (S) At the conclusion of their working lunch, DFM Park briefly raised the issue of Iran's nuclear program, asking for U/S Joseph's views on Iran's ultimate goals, and expressing concern that the nuclear nonproliferation regime -- Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) -- did not appear up to the task of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Both agreed Iran sought to use nuclear status to become the leading country in the Middle East. If the DPRK, Iran and other countries continue on the road toward the development of nuclear weapons, perhaps we need to look at changing the modalities of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, Park suggested. ¶17. (SBU) U/S Joseph has cleared this message. VERSHBOW