TRAVELING GNP LAWMAKERS SEEK TO REAFFIRM US TIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000394 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2014 TAGS: PREL PNUC KS KN SUBJECT: TRAVELING GNP LAWMAKERS SEEK TO REAFFIRM US TIES Classified By: Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Rep. Kim Deog-ryong, ONE of the opposition Grand National Party's (GNP) most senior lawmakers, told the Ambassador on February 1 that he and five other GNP Assembly Members intended to travel to Washington February 7 to 10 to emphasize the strength of the bilateral U.S.-ROK relationship. The discussion with the Ambassador covered topics that could arise during their trip, including strategic flexibility and the transfer of wartime operational control, free trade agreement negotiations, and counterfeiting. END SUMMARY. FRIENDSHIP MISSION TO WASHINGTON -------------- ¶2. (C) During a February 1 breakfast meeting with the Ambassador, GNP Assembly Members Kim Deog-ryong, Nam Kyung-pil, Chun Yu-ok, Hwang Jin-ha and Park Hyung-joon outlined their February 7 to 10 trip to Washington. The purpose of the trip would be to affirm the strength of the relationship, "restore trust," and clarify misperceptions about Korean sentiment toward the U.S. According to Kim, the group was trying to schedule meetings with Sen. George Allen, Sen. Hillary Clinton, Sen. Richard Lugar and Sen. John Warner, Rep. Henry Hyde, and Speaker Dennis Hastert. The group also hoped to meet with Deputy White House Chief of Staff Karl Rove and Vice President Dick Cheney. Several think tanks would also be on the schedule. The Ambassador offered to convey requests for meetings with State Department officials, if the group desired. ¶3. (C) The GNP lawmakers planned to use their meetings to convey to USG leaders and opinion-makers that Korea remained committed to its friendship and to the U.S.-ROK alliance. Rep. Kim expressed concern that statements by President Roh had confused both Koreans and Americans about the state and importance of the U.S.-ROK relationship. He and his colleagues hoped to help clear the air of confusion. The Ambassador agreed that there were some misunderstandings and misperceptions about the relationship in both countries, but he noted the reality was better than it seemed. Despite media fretting about the HEALTH of the relationship, the Ambassador observed that the two countries had achieved much recently, including the strategic flexibility agreement and other measures designed to modernize the alliance. 
STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY AND WARTIME OPERATIONAL CONTROL -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Pointing to the recent agreement on strategic flexibility, the Ambassador said that the defense and security relationship was extremely strong. This was a development from which both countries would benefit. Strategic flexibility encompassed the notion that the Korean people should have a say in their country's participation in a regional crisis. Also, Korea would benefit from strategic flexibility because U.S. Forces stationed elsewhere could quickly be mobilized to assist Korea in a time of crisis. ¶5. (C) However, the Ambassador continued, some sensitive issues were still outstanding, such as the transfer of operational control and ROK forces during wartime. When Secretary Rumsfeld was in Korea last year, he said that the SIPDIS U.S. was prepared to work on the proposal in the spirit of giving responsibility to the ROK commensurate with its growing strength. The Ambassador noted that some false expectations about when this transfer would happen might have arisen. The U.S. was ready to develop a roadmap with the Korean government, but implementation could take some years. This would be a momentous step that should be taken carefully, with full consideration of the existing threats on the Peninsula and the modernization of Korea's military capabilities. ¶6. (C) Rep. Hwang (a retired general and member of the Defense Committee) agreed that it would be prudent to be cautious regarding transfer of wartime operational control. The process of modernizing Korea's military would be extremely expensive and take many years. Hwang stressed that the ROK should consider the threat and its capabilities before discussing the assumption of wartime control. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador noted that the trip to Washington would be well-timed to discuss the start of FTA negotiations, which would have just been announced. The Ambassador anticipated "lively" public hearings in the ROK on the issue, but was pleased that the government was committed to moving ahead. All the studies indicated that the U.S. and ROK would be very suitable partners in an FTA. Issues such as agriculture would be sensitive, but any transition periods that might be negotiated should be used to help Korean farmers adapt to a more open market. In today's world, it was very expensive to subsidize sectors that were not competitive in world markets. The U.S. struggled with these issues also, and had found that sometimes the least protected products ended up being the most competitive in the world market. The Ambassador encouraged the Assembly Members to discuss these issues with their counterparts in the Congress. ¶8. (C) Rep. Nam Kyung-pil said that it would take courage for Assembly Members to resist the farmers. To date, lawmakers had been afraid of the farmers, and instead of addressing the real issues had just given out subsidies. Lawmakers needed to explain why continuing these subsidies would be harmful and to prepare the Korean people not just for an FTA with the U.S., but also eventually ONE with China. He believed an FTA with China was inevitable and would spark even more resistance than a U.S. FTA. Rep. Chun Yu-ok said that there was a perception among Koreans that any FTA signed with a stronger party would serve the interest of the more advanced economy. MISUNDERSTANDING ON COUNTERFEITING -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador said there was a misperception in the ROK that U.S efforts to deal with North Korean illicit activities were efforts to overthrow the regime. In fact, law enforcement efforts to protect U.S. currency were compatible with pursuit of a diplomatic solution to the nuclear problem through the Six Party Talks. Both aimed at encouraging a change in North Korean behavior. ¶10. (C) Rep. Park Hyung-joon said that many Koreans were concerned that the U.S. had shifted from a moderate to a harsh stance in dealing with the counterfeit issue. If the law enforcement efforts were viewed in conjunction with PSI intercepts, they could have a "messy impact" on the Six Party Talks. The Ambassador replied that, in the end, North Korea needs to understand that it has more to gain by returning to the Six Party Talks than by insisting on a linkage between U.S. law enforcement actions and the Six Party process. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador also pointed out that the law enforcement actions were merely the continuation of efforts going back many years. Investigations involving Asian criminal groups and an Irish Workers' Party radical activist all reached the indictment stage last year, which was the time conclusions could be drawn regarding the Banco Delta Asia in Macau. In fact, all these investigations began several years ago. ¶12. (C) In addition, U.S. concerns about proliferation and WMD were not limited solely to North Korea, the Ambassador noted. This was a global effort. PSI intercepts involving Libya, for example, were instrumental in persuading Qadhafi to give up his nuclear program and make a strategic change in policy. Qadhafi was once demonized in the U.S. Now relations between the countries had normalized and U.S. investors were increasingly visiting Libya. It was thus possible for the U.S. to change very quickly if the other side changed its behavior. We hoped that Kim Jong-il would follow the same logic, he said, even if the odds were slim. ¶13. (C) Rep. Chun attributed some of the tension over the counterfeiting issue to a "cultural misunderstanding." She advised that if the U.S. had framed the issue in more personal terms to Koreans -- "How would you feel if another country was printing and distributing your currency?" -- Koreans would have better understood the nature of the problem and the justification for American actions. TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS -------------- ¶14. (C) We understand that, contrary to what Rep. Kim and his delegation have told reporters (and the Ambassador),the group was not invited by the Korea Caucus or any other Congressional person or entity. The program is being arranged by the Asia America Initiative, headed by former Rep. Dana Rohrabacher staffer Albert Santoli. VERSHBOW