GNP PARLIAMENTARY VICE SPEAKER LEE SANG-DEUK ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003684 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ABLD KS KN SUBJECT: GNP PARLIAMENTARY VICE SPEAKER LEE SANG-DEUK ON NORTH KOREA AND ALLIANCE ISSUES Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a lunch meeting on October 25 with the Ambassador, GNP National Assembly Vice Speaker Lee expressed concern over the Roh administration's handling of the U.S.-ROK alliance, OPCON transfer, North Korea and expressed general dissatisfatction with Roh. Lee's clear message was that the GNP was the best partner for the U.S., and the point unstated was that if the GNP came to power in 2008, many of the current frictions between the U.S. and Korea would disappear. The discussions were friendly. Accompanying the Vice Speaker were two pro-U.S. GNP lawmakers Chung Hyung-keun and Chun Yu-ok. POL Internal Chief accompanied the Ambassador. END SUMMARY. SECRETARY RICE'S VISIT TO SEOUL SIPDIS -------------- ¶2. (C) During a lunch meeting on October 25, the Ambassador said we were still working with the ROKG to come to a common approach on how to respond to the October 9 nuclear test by the DPRK and said Secretary Rice's visit to Korea went well. The Secretary did not visit to request specific measures that the ROKG should take toward North Korea. The Secretary's message was that we need to send a strong signal of resolve to North Korea, making clear that its provocative actions were not acceptable to the international community. During her October 19-20 visit to Korea she said that the U.S. would stand by its allies, Korea and Japan, in the wake of the nuclear test by North Korea on October 9 and meet fully our security commitments. UNSCR 1718 -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador said we understood that the ROK needed to complete a review on ways to implement UNSCR 1718. In addition, he noted it would be some time before the UN Sanctions Committee spelled out the specific actions required to implement UNSCR 1718, including the list of North Korean companies that will be sanctioned. The U.S. goal remains to denuclearize the Peninsula through diplomacy and the door remains open for North Korea to come back to the Six Party Talks if they are ready to denuclearize. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador said he appreciated the strong Grand National Party (GNP) stance and the many National Assembly members who have spoken out in favor of full implementation of UNSCR 1718. At the same time, he was surprised by the mixed signals sent by the ruling Uri party and by the visit to Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) by the leader and some members of the ruling party on October 20. ¶5. (C) However, despite the mixed signals, the Ambassador said he was confident that the ROKG understood they needed to make a strong response to the nuclear test. It was too early and inappropriate to highlight differences between the U.S. and the ROK, since at the end of the day the U.S. and the ROK are and will be together. The Ambassador noted that the perception of the U.S.-ROK relationship was often worse than the reality. KIC AND MT. KUMGANG -------------- ¶6. (C) GNP Supreme Council Member Chung Hyung-keun said that the GNP thought both KIC and Mt. Kumgang projects should be suspended until North Korea stopped its nuclear program. It was a travesty that $2 billion had been given to the DPRK and this cash had likely been used to develop missile and nuclear programs. A/S Hill's statements about KIC and Mt. Kumgang sent a mixed signal and Chung asked if Hill's message meant that the United States supported KIC. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador said that the U.S. did not endorse KIC, but rather acknowledged that there was a positive rationale for this project relative to the Mt. Kumgang tourism project. The ROK should review all of its forms of leverage and ways that indirectly or directly fund the DPRK's missile and nuclear programs. He reiterated that Hill's comments were not a stamp of approval of the project but rather a comparison of the two inter-Korean projects. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. supported whatever changes the ROKG decided to make regarding the inter-Korean projects, and that the changes were up to the ROK. We have not asked the ROK to terminate either of its projects, but even if the money going North does not go directly into missile development, the ROK should be mindful of any possibility that the money could go indirectly to support these programs. UNSCR 1718: KIC AND MT. KUMGANG INCLUDED? -------------- ¶9. (C) Rep. Chung said that the ROKG's interpretation of UNSCR 1718 was that KIC and Mt. Kumgang were not specifically mentioned and therefore the ROK could continue with both inter-Korean economic projects. He said this was regrettable since both projects provided cash to the North Korean regime. He added the Roh administration was trying to convince people that if the two inter-Korean projects were ended, it would lead to confrontation on the Peninsula. From this, Roh has said that the GNP wanted war and the Uri Party represented peace. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador asserted that it might be true that UNSCR 1718 did not specifically address KIC or Mt. Kumgang and that it did not technically require any action by the ROK. That said, he hoped the ROK would decide, at a minimum, to make adjustments in their policy toward the projects that were consistent with the spirit of UNSCR 1718. NORTH KOREA-SIX PARTY TALKS -------------- ¶11. (C) The Ambassador said there was still a chance that North Korea will return to the Six Party Talks. There should be a step-by-step character to our approach to North Korea and diplomacy was still the best way to solve the North Korea problem. The Ambassador remarked that according to polls and pundits, most GNP members were not against engagement, but had different ideas on how to pursue it. Lee agreed that this was an accurate perception and that engagement, in some form, was the way forward with North Korea. ¶12. (C) The Ambassador mentioned that some people think our push for change in North Korea equaled a desire for regime change. The reality was that the U.S. wants internal changes in North Korea and that if negotiations restarted we would push for internal reforms in North Korea so that there could be more durable peace on the Peninsula. MILITARY DEVELOPMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Lee asked if the U.S. could accept the North as a nuclear power and the Ambassador said that the U.S. could not accept a nuclear-armed North Korea at any time. Lee expressed concern that the ROKG had announced a successful test of a 1000km cruise missile October 25 and questioned the ROKG's motivation for making the announcement during a time of tension. Supreme Council Member Chun Yu-ok said that the ROKG was using the announcement to make people think that the ROKG was doing something in response to the October 9 nuclear test. ¶14. (C) The Ambassador said that the cruise missile program was part of an impressive set of efforts to modernize the ROK military. The cruise missile capability highlighted the fact that the ROK had a stronger technical capability than North Korea and a commanding technological edge over the DPRK. FORMER ROK PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG -------------- ¶15. (C) Chun said she felt that former President Kim Dae-jung's recent statements blaming the lack of U.S.-DPRK dialogue on the current impasse were regrettable and asked the Ambassador what he thought Kim's real views were. ¶16. (C) The Ambassador said that last time he met with former President Kim in July he did not ask Kim to cancel his planned visit to North Korea. They spoke about how to solve the North Korea problem and he told Kim the U.S. was serious about diplomacy and was ready to make many positive steps to help the North Korean people if North Korea denuclearized. Kim was skeptical of the U.S. approach, but made his own decision to cancel his trip in the aftermath of the missile launches. ¶17. (C) The Ambassador said the cancellation was likely due to the fact that there were logistical difficulties and North Korea did not seem interested in Kim's visit. He said that Kim's private views were more similar to the U.S. views than his public statements, and he was encouraged that Kim said that North Korea should be opened, like the former Soviet Union, through a gradual process that involved internal change and reform. ¶18. (C) The Ambassador concluded that Kim's philosophy, tactics and principles regarding North Korea were similar to those of the USG but the question of how to implement the policy was where there were some differences. Diplomacy, to be effective, had to be backed by force and we had to convince North Korea that there will be costs if they did not fulfill their commitments. PARK GEUN-HYE TO PYONGYANG? -------------- ¶19. (C) Rep. Chun said that there were reports that North Korea invited Park Geun-hye to visit Pyongyang. The reports came from Uri Party Rep. Choi Song and it was not an official invitation. Chun said that Park had said the invitation was absurd. Park had a hotline with Kim Jong-il but had not used it. ISOLATION -------------- ¶20. (C) In terms of isolating North Korea, the North's leaders should understand that if they continued on their path of provocative behavior, they will become more isolated, the Ambassador said. China was doing its part by tightening its controls on the flow of goods and money into North Korea and imposing tighter restrictions on banking. Firmness was the best way to achieve peace; President Bush did not want a war on the Korean Peninsula and wanted to work closely with our South Korean allies to ensure North Korea was deterred and the Peninsula remained safe, the Ambassador said. OPCON -------------- ¶21. (C) Lee brought up the October 20 agreement at the SCM between the U.S. and ROK Defense Ministers and said that the 2009-2012 time period for the transfer of wartime OPCON control was too soon. He said there should have been more time to discuss the agreement and that the agreement had been made too quickly. ¶22. (C) The Ambassador said the October 20 SCM agreement on command relations was a good compromise on the timing issue regarding OPCON transfer. There would be more detailed work on the roadmap to OPCON transfer to be completed by spring ¶2007. Despite the transfer, the alliance, the U.S. commitment and U.S. power will remain integral elements in deterring North Korean threats. The agreement on OPCON transfer presented a realistic roadmap to a natural transition and the alliance will be stronger after the transition. The Ambassador said that the trip by Vice Speaker Lee to Washington D.C. and the concerns the GNP leadership voiced to U.S. leaders had made an impact and helped convince the U.S. to be more flexible regarding the timing of the transfer. ¶23. (C) Lee said the Roh government would use the transfer of OPCON as a political issue during the 2007 campaign and claim they wrested "sovereignty" from the U.S. He said he thought the U.S. agreed to the transfer of OPCON to limit anti-American sentiment in Korea but in fact he said that almost 80 percent of Korean people believe in a strong U.S.-ROK alliance, as evidenced by ROK commitment of troops in Vietnam and Iraq and support for U.S. global initiatives. Lee looked forward to building on this strong alliance during the next ROK administration. ¶24. (C) The Ambassador said that the concern over anti-American sentiment was not the driving consideration that led to the transfer of OPCON but rather that we would have a healthier alliance if the ROK carried more responsibility. We now had an agreement; the focus should be on safe implementation of the transfer. 2007 ELECTIONS -------------- ¶25. (C) As the lunch finished, the Ambassador asked how Lee felt about the political prospects of his brother, former Seoul Mayor and GNP Presidential candidate Lee Myung-bak. Lee said that in Korea, for cultural reasons, he must stay out of his brother's political race. He noted that the 2002 GNP candidate, Lee Hoi-chang, had a strong lead over all challengers for a long time and lost, so therefore no one in the GNP attached any particular meaning to the latest poll data. VERSHBOW