PSI: ROKG NEEDS MORE TIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003558 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016 TAGS: MNUC PARM PREL PHSA KNNP EWWT KS KN SUBJECT: PSI: ROKG NEEDS MORE TIME REF: STATE 172682 Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (U) This is an action message. Please see para 10. SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (C) In response to reftel request, the Ambassador on October 15 raised PSI with National Security Advisor Song Min-soon. Separately, DCM also conveyed reftel points on October 16 to Park In-kook, Deputy Foreign Minister for Policy Planning and Public Affairs. While both Song and Park expressed appreciation for the non-paper that addressed many of their questions, they noted that significant public misunderstandings remained as to whether PSI entailed a virtual blockade of North Korea and would lead to a military confrontation. These misunderstandings had politicized the PSI debate in the ROK. For now, both Song and Park believed, the ROKG needed more time before it could fully endorse PSI, pending further developments in the nuclear situation in North Korea. The Ambassador and DCM emphasized that PSI did not involve sovereignty issues because all participation and decisions were made based on national laws and interests. They also stressed the urgent need to send a strong political message to North Korea at this time. DFM Park even suggested that it might be helpful if Secretary Rice during her visit clarified that PSI need not be linked to military action and that the ROKG would not be forced to do anything it did not want to do. Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok was also negative on PSI in an October 16 meeting (septel). END SUMMARY. . NSA SONG MIN-SOON -------------- ¶3. (C) During a previously scheduled breakfast meeting on October 15, the Ambassador conveyed to ROK National Security Advisor the reftel points on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),emphasizing the flexible nature of the initiative and highlighting the need to send a strong political message to North Korea. Song said that while internal ROKG deliberations continued, the debate had become more heated. The South Korean public, media, and politicians had the impression that PSI was an aggressive program, involving stopping North Korea vessels on the high seas by force. Therefore, the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) was very much in favor, while the ruling Uri Party was adamantly opposed. Song said that the ROKG would not "actively oppose" full participation in PSI, but, for now, it was caught in the political crossfire. Seoul would need some more time to come to a decision, which would in turn depend on further developments in North Korea and the international community's response. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador said that, on PSI and other measures relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1718, South Korea must avoid the perception that it was only doing the minimum. The international community had to show a unified reaction; there was no other way to halt the DPRK's provocative behavior and get back to diplomatic solutions. . DFM PARK IN-KOOK -------------- ¶5. (C) During an October 16 meeting with Park In-kook, Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and Public Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the DCM delivered reftel points requesting that the ROKG endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles and its full participation in the PSI during the visit of Secretary Rice to Seoul on October 19. The DCM informed Park that as the Ambassador had explained the previous day to National Security Advisor Song Min-soon, PSI endorsement required no minimal involvement and that the ROKG would still be able to determine its participation. In instances where maritime interdiction was appropriate, the decision on the use of military or maritime police depended on a country's legal authorities and the ROKG would make its own determination based on its national laws and interests. The key was that the ROKG should send the important political message that it was actively cooperating with international efforts to combat proliferation. ¶6. (C) After a close reading of the non-paper, DFM Park expressed appreciation for the answers to many of the questions on PSI that he personally had submitted to the Department last week through the Korean Embassy. He said he had briefed ROK media outlets after a four-hour interagency meeting the previous day that: (1) UN Security Council Resolution 1718 had no direct relationship with PSI; (2) the ROKG was actively involved in participating in the global non-proliferation effort; and (3) in consideration of North Korea's apparent nuclear test and in the wake of UNSCR 1718, the ROKG would seriously consider further cooperation. ¶7. (C) Park added that what he did not tell the press was his view that the biggest remaining obstacle was public misunderstanding that PSI entailed a blockade of North Korea. This had overly politicized the issue in South Korea. The ruling Uri Party objected to ROKG participation because it saw PSI as tantamount to a military blockade of North Korea that could invite military confrontation. The more conservative opposition GNP, on the other hand, also misconstrued PSI as a blockade but one that was needed to respond to North Korean provocations. North Korea, for its part, said that any blockade was a violation of the Armistice Agreement. Park did not know if the DPRK understood what PSI really was or just wanted to stoke the debate, but he noted that the DPRK probably was unclear as well. The DCM interjected that many in the ROK seemed not to realize that inter-Korean maritime agreements already allowed for mutual inspection of vessels, so PSI could fit current ROKG legal practices. Park replied that the ROKG leadership understood the realities of PSI, but in light of ROK political polarization, needed more time to conduct a public diplomacy effort to explain PSI. ¶8. (C) Park said a related problem was to find a way to address concerns that PSI would trigger military confrontation. Speaking off the record, he suggested it would be helpful if during the visit of Secretary Rice that her delegation find a way to reemphasize that PSI need not be linked to military action and that the ROKG would not be forced to do anything it did not want to do. ¶9. (C) Finally, Park asked the DCM to follow-up on one more PSI question he had related to ROK sovereignty. PSI involved a global network to interdict WMD-related materials, but some countries had more developed assets and capabilities than others. Park said his lingering question was whether some countries might provide assistance even if unwanted by the potential recipient. In other words, would the ROK need to accept training or regulations that it was not ready to receive. The DCM said he would report the question, but it was his understanding that, again, the ROKG would have the discretion to determine the level and nature of its involvement in any PSI exercise or operation. The ROK already had procedures on the books to inspect cargo sent along inter-Korean roads to the Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang projects, and this might be a good opportunity for greater enforcement of ROKG laws. ¶10. (C) ACTION REQUEST: The Deputy Foreign Minister asked whether countries would be provided unrequested assistance. Post requests guidance on how to respond to this ROK inquiry. END ACTION REQUEST. VERSHBOW