REACTION TO DPRK TEST: ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES

UNCLAS SEOUL 003492 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MNUC PREL PGOV KS KN SUBJECT: REACTION TO DPRK TEST: ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Local academic observers in South Korea provided the Embassy on October 10 and 11 with their takes on the DPRK nuclear test. Professor of Korean Studies and DPRK cultural analyst Brian Myers argued that the DPRK conducted the test primarily for internal reasons to recover from failed missile launches in July. University of North Korean Studies Professor Ryoo Kihl-jae thought that the North's desire for bilateral talks with the USG was the key factor. Historian Andrei Lankov had expected the North to wait longer before testing in order to ratchet up tensions, but assessed that UNSC sanctions would be relatively short lived because China, South Korea, and Russia would look for reasons to return to non-confrontational policies. END SUMMARY. PROFESSOR MYERS: NUKE TEST TO RECOUP FROM MISSILE FAILURE -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Dr. Brian Myers, Professor of Korean Studies at Busan's Dongseo University, on October 10 opined that the DPRK probably conducted a nuclear test to remedy a loss of face suffered from a less-than-impressive missile launch display in July. For the DPRK, a failure often provided the impetus for an even bigger provocation. The 1968 DPRK seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, for example, shortly followed a failed DPRK commando raid on the Blue House. The nuclear test, Myers argued, was not a DPRK negotiating ploy because North Korean leader Kim Jong-il (KJI) did not seek talks with the USG as much as he sought to bolster his own cult by being seen as intimidating the USG. The North's quick test shortly after its announcement of its intention to test underscored that the DPRK was not seriously interested in trading a test for negotiations. (NOTE: An occasional contributor to the Atlantic Monthly and the New York Times, Myers teaches courses on North Korea propaganda, media, and culture. An American, Myers received his Ph.D. in Korean Studies from the University of Tuebingen in Germany. END NOTE.) ¶3. (SBU) Myers speculated that KJI would be discouraged that the USG made statements after the test indicating it was more worried about DPRK proliferation than the danger posed by North Korea to United States. This would signal that the USG did not take the North Korean threat seriously. The North, Myers postulated, would not sell nuclear technology to others and lose the credit to someone else for attacking the United States. ¶4. (SBU) Myers was not surprised China was unable to prevent a DPRK nuclear test because North Korean propaganda consistently argued that Koreans were the superior race and therefore had little reason to listen to the Chinese. China, he said, always had limited influence, even during the Korean War when a beleaguered DPRK refused PRC efforts to control train station operations in North Korea to reinforce troops fighting UN forces. USG officials should pay more attention to DPRK propaganda because it reflected official DPRK culture and was not just a cynical tool used by the DPRK leadership, Myers said. ¶5. (SBU) Asked about ROK perceptions, Myers thought the nuclear test would be a "turning point" for South Koreans who were becoming tired of North Korean provocations. His students indicated to him over the past few days that South Korean patience would end as soon as the North acted in a way that negatively affected the ROK economy. (See Myers' NYT piece.) PROFESSOR RYOO: DPRK FOCUSED ON USG -------------- ¶6. (SBU) University of North Korean Studies professor Ryoo Kihl-jae told poloff on October 10 what he thought of the possible nuclear test by the North. (NOTE: Ryoo is an expert on North Korea and particularly specializes in the study of the regime. END NOTE.) He said that while there were internal factors that contributed to the North,s decision to test a nuclear device, the relationship with the U.S. was the most important factor. ¶7. (SBU) According to a recent defector Ryoo had talked to, the test was an extreme measure intended to improve relations with USG by ending the Six Party Talks and moving to direct talks with the United States. According to the defector, unless the USG accepted the DPRK as a nuclear state, the North could move further toward a policy of extreme brinksmanship that could lead all the way to war. The recent defector said that if the USG accepted the North as a nuclear state, the DPRK could give the USG all it wanted in strategic terms. ¶8. (SBU) Professor Ryoo thought there was room for negotiation but not through the Six Party Talks format. He said during multilateral talks the DPRK felt it could not be open and frank. He said he hoped that the USG and DPRK would find a way to move beyond the current stalemate and that he thought the North wanted better relations with the USG. HISTORIAN LANKOV: UNSC SANCTIONS UNLIKELY TO ENDURE -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Russian historian and author Andrei Lankov, who has focused on Korea for over two decades and writes a column for the Korea Times, on October 11 said he was not surprised that the DPRK announced its intention to test on October 3, but he was surprised that the test came so soon, expecting the DPRK to wait one or two years, all the while ratcheting up the tension. As for the changes brought by the test, Lankov said the fundamental situation had not changed, given the DPRK's clear prior determination to possess nuclear weapons. Lankov dismissed the chances that UNSC sanctions would have much effect. The sanctions will be in place for one or two years, he estimated, and then China, Russia and the ROK will find a reason to return to non-confrontational and aid policies. VERSHBOW