SMA NEGOTIATIONS ROUND IV: MOVEMENT, BUT STILL FAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003468 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO PM SENIOR ADVISOR LOFTIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016 TAGS: MARR PREL KS SUBJECT: SMA NEGOTIATIONS ROUND IV: MOVEMENT, BUT STILL FAR APART Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR JOSEPH Y. YUN. REASONS 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: October 10 and 11 negotiations in Seoul on funding levels for the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) moved the two sides closer together, but substantial differences remain. The U.S. proposed a three year agreement, under which the ROK share would rise to 800 billion won in 2007 (43% of Non-Personnel Stationing Costs - NPSC),910 bn won in 2008 (44%) and 1022 bn won in 2009 (45%). The Koreans countered with an offer of 630 bn won, a 7.3% decrease from the current agreement. However, in a small group meeting, Ambassador Cho hinted strongly that the Korean offer could be increased to 680 bn won - essentially rolling over the current agreement. He did not, however, repeat that offer in the plenary sessions. In both the negotiating sessions with Cho, and a separate meeting at the Blue House with Deputy National Security Advisor Suh Choo-suk, ROK officials did not respond to U.S. arguments that USFK could not and would not continue to absorb SMA shortfalls and would make whatever adjustments necessary to remain fully operational, including the possibility of moving (unspecified) units or assets off the peninsula. A further round of negotiations will be scheduled after the upcoming SCM. End Summary. OCTOBER 10 PLENARY SESSION -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador Cho Tae-yong, head of the Korean delegation and Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's North American Affairs Bureau, started the first plenary session of this fourth round of Special Measures Agreement (SMA) talks by stating that North Korea's nuclear test on October 9 reinforced the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Ambassador Robert Loftis, head of the U.S. delegation and Senior Advisor in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, echoed this sentiment and noted that now especially was not the time to create any impression of strain in the alliance. Loftis pointed out that USFK had absorbed 80 billion won of SMA shortfalls over the past two years, through a variety of cost-cutting measures. However, it has now reached a point where belt-tightening measures were not enough. Future cuts would require different measures, as the U.S. would not sacrifice operational capabilities or create a hollow force. This could lead to a situation where the U.S. removed certain assets or units from Korea in order to ensure that those that remained were fully capable. This was not a situation the U.S. wants to see come to pass. Loftis stated that the original goal of the U.S. was to reach a 50%-50% arrangement over three years. The U.S. goal remains a 50/50 split, but that as a compromise the U.S. was willing to take longer to reach that goal. Consequently, the U.S. proposed a three year agreement that sees the Korean share of Non-Personnel Stationing Costs (NPSC) increasing to 800 billion won (43% of total NPSC) in 2007, 910 billion won (44% of total NPSC) in 2008, and 1022 billion won (45% of total NPSC) in 2009. Loftis reminded the Koreans that this formula did not get the U.S. where it wants to be, but represented a step in the right direction and a way for the ROK to contribute to its own national defense. ¶3. (C) Cho responded by stating that although he had hoped that a long-term approach to SMA funding would help remove it as an irritant in bilateral relations, the ROK could not conclude such deliberations by the end of this year. Instead, he proposed that both parties focus their efforts on finding a short-term solution to cover the next two to three years, using in the framework of four categories (labor, logistics, and the two construction funds - ROKFC and CDIP). The "needs-based" ROK proposal would freeze current levels of ROK funding in labor and logistics, and reduce construction funding. Cho argued that because the U.S. military construction budget has actually decreased from 1999 to 2001 and USFK construction needs should be decreasing in the next two to three years, the ROK was justified in reducing its current level of funding in construction. Cho expressed his hope that its inability to accept increases in SMA funding not be interpreted as the ROKG's lack of commitment to the bilateral alliance. Cho's numbers: 630 billion won (a decrease of 50 million won, or 7.3%, from the current funding level). OCTOBER 10 SMALL GROUP MEETING -------------- ¶4. (C) Moving into a small "3 3" meeting, Ambassador Cho said he sensed it would be a difficult negotiation because he could not work with the numbers proposed by the U.S. side. Ambassador Loftis explained that the ROK assumption that reduced troops translated into reduced costs was premature and in many ways very inaccurate. He said USFK's costs are not going down, citing the example of utility costs that have increased significantly in recent years. Because of our military transformation efforts, some cost will actually increase over the next few years before leveling off and eventually dropping. Addressing Cho's argument that the ROK contribution be "needs based" the Ambassador explained that the four categories in SMA do not act independently of each other, of other non-personnel stationing costs. Shortfalls in one area affect others, and would have an effect on operational readiness. The U.S. is determined that all of its units and assets in Korea be fully operationally capable. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Cho argued in response that given U.S. troop reductions on the Peninsula, he had no basis for explaining the need for a sudden and substantial increase. Ambassador Loftis rebutted by pointing out that the current ROK proposal asks the U.S. to accept a further reduction when costs are still increasing. Moreover, we do not consider the current levels of ROK support to be equitable. He pointed out that the much of the ROK burdensharing contribution flows back into the South Korean economy and cautioned that U.S. fiscal and military realities were such that the USFK Commander would likely need to remove some military assets from the Peninsula to where they could be supported properly. That would lead to bad optics of more U.S. troops leaving the Peninsula because the ROK would not share equitably in the cost of keeping them here. ¶6. (C) Cho's next move was to provide some context for his predicament by pointing out that because of widespread public interest generated by the OPCON transfer issue, even most high school students in Korea now knew that the ROK 2020 military modernization plan will cost Korean taxpayers around 621 trillion won. (Loftis noted that the ROKG has a responsibility to educate its people on the benefits of the alliance.) Cho then argued that ROK calculations indicate they are currently paying around 41 percent of the cost-sharing burden, not 38 percent as claimed by the USG. While electricity is the most costly of the utilities, Cho claimed that USFK is in actuality receiving a cheaper rate than that paid by MND. He also argued that the inflation rate is not as high as it used to be, and said USFK should use monies it has reserved for construction because USFK does not need to undertake construction this year, or next. No, Ambassador Loftis replied, that money is already earmarked for use as a part of our U.S. forces relocation plan. In order for forces to remain on the peninsula, they must have the facilities in which to live, work and train. Spending those funds now for other purposes would invite further delays in our effort to consolidate most of the U.S. forces on Peninsula in the expansion of Camp Humphreys at Pyongtaek. ¶7. (C) Getting down to business, Cho revealed that his proposal is, in fact, not his final proposal, but stated that an increase (over the last SMA) is not in his mandate. The heart of the question, Cho said, is that you want a big increase and the ROKG does not, leaving a current gap of 120 billion won. ¶8. (C) NOTE: In the plenary session Cho referred to the actual gap between their current proposal and ours totaling 170 billion won. However in both the first and second small group meeting, he stated that the gap was 120 billion, indicating the ROK is willing to adjust its proposal upwards by 50 billion won from 630 billion to 680 billion. END NOTE. OCTOBER 11 SMALL GROUP MEETING -------------- ¶9. (C) Negotiations were reconvened on the morning of October 11 with a one hour small group meeting constituting the same 3 3 participants as the day before. Ambassador Cho began the second and final small group meeting by noting that the U.S. side had never answered his question as to whether or not its proposal was, in fact, its final offer. Ambassador Loftis replied that he had some room to negotiate but very little, pointing out that even a straight line proposal by the ROK would amount to a decrease when the current inflation rate was added to the calculation. "We are looking for an increase, he said, and we want that to get us to an equitable 50/50 split." He further pointed out that even if the ROK were to agree to that, it would not come close to actually covering 50 percent of all of the U.S. expenditures in Korea, nor did we expect them to. Ambassador Loftis pointed out that the emotional debate in Korean society over the OPCON issue had demonstrated a widespread feeling of insecurity; a concern that would now be aggravated by the October 9 announcement of a DPRK nuclear test. It was apparent that the ROKG needed to take appropriate steps to reassure its populace that the U.S.-ROK alliance remained strong and a true partnership. An agreement to split the burdensharing cost equally would send such a message to the Korean people and reassure Washington that the ROKG shares the belief of its people that the alliance is both needed and valued by South Korea. "We are looking for a statement from you that this is a valued alliance," Loftis concluded. ¶10. (C) Ambassador Cho presented two primary arguments in the second small group meeting. First, he said the baseline for this negotiation should be the bottom line of the last negotiation. That logic, he claimed, is universally accepted. Second, he again argued that it was proper to negotiate from a "needs-based" approach, rather than what he described as the U.S. "holistic" approach. Ambassador Cho explained that Korean ministries were required to provide very detailed information to the National Assembly not only on the SMA but across the entire range of government expenditures. He proposed the formation of a working group to discuss what additional information MOFAT and MND need to fulfill their responsibilities to answer the Assembly's questions. The U.S. agreed. ¶11. (C) Cho asked Ambassador Loftis if he would say if USFK's funding realities had worsened in recent years. The Ambassador and General Thiessen both responded that fighting the Global War on Terror has made the U.S. military both less willing and less able to make up for any shortfall in SMA funding provided by the ROK. ¶12. (C) Using the same figure he had mentioned in the previous day's small group meeting, Cho stated that the remaining task for both sides was to close the gap between 680 and 800 billion won. "I now fully understand your point of view and hope you better understand the ROK's position," Cho added. He noted that because of developments such as the DPRK announcement of a nuclear test, the OPCON issue, the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and Land Partnership Plan (LPP),and U.S. troop reductions on the Peninsula, it seemed that the whole alliance picture was changing. Cho said that to date, the ROK approach has been more in line with the way it had negotiated past agreements, but concluded that "what I am hearing is that the United States is asking us for a change in our thinking." OCTOBER 11 PLENARY SESSION -------------- ¶13. (C) Upon conclusion of the small group meeting, Cho began the second plenary session by stating that although these small group meetings have been productive, the contrasting ways the two sides approach the SMA issue as well as the large gap in proposed funding amounts (630 billion won for the Koreans, 800 billion won for the Americans) show that the negotiations have reached a difficult stage. On a more positive note, the head of the ROK delegation made the point that there was now a better understanding of each other's positions, both countries were looking towards the same direction, and the value of the alliance was more clear now than it was last week. Cho proposed that the next round of negotiations to be held in Washington possibly at the end of October or early November after the Security Consultative Meeting. Because the ROK fiscal year begins on January 1 and the National Assembly requires one and a half months to process all budget requests, Cho stated that it would be preferable for negotiations to be completed by early November. Cho moved to the question of how to portray the outcome of this round of discussions to the press. He stated that the ROK side has made it consistent policy to admit to the Korean press that the U.S. and Korea have very different positions (without going into specific figures) but that they hoped to bridge that gap in the spirit of the alliance. ¶14. (C) Ambassador Loftis responded that even though the two parties were unable to close this gap, they had now--thanks to previous rounds of talks--reached the point where they could make progress and agreed with the ROK approach not to conduct negotiations 'through the press,' Loftis closed the session by wholeheartedly agreeing with the strength of our alliance and stating that although we have not reached a conclusion yet, we have made progress in the spirit of the alliance and friendship. BLUE HOUSE MEETING WITH DNSA SUH -------------- ¶15. (C) Ambassador Loftis concluded his visit to Seoul with an October 11 meeting at the Blue House with Deputy National Security Advisor (DNSA) Suh Choo-suk, rehearsing in broad terms the points he had made with Ambassador Cho and asking Suh to consider the political ramifications of yet another contentious issue in the Alliance. Suh introduced himself as a former academic specializing in U.S.-ROK military relations. Because of his research in that area, Suh claimed he was familiar with the cost sharing issue and knew how important it was. He noted that the SMA talks had never been easy, going back to their beginnings in the 1980s, and commented that this negotiation also appeared to be a very difficult one. ¶16. (C) DNSA Suh stated that just as the USG had to be responsive to the will of the U.S. Congress, so too does the ROKG have to think about its own National Assembly where, Suh said, "the situation is not easy at all." OPCON transfer, the Yongsan Relocation Plan, and the Defense Reform 2020 plan all require financial resources, making it difficult to persuade people to pay more for SMA, Suh explained. The Korean people have a simple view of this. They think they are paying for relocation of USFK and that USFK is reducing its forces. Paying more for SMA therefore doesn't make sense to them, Suh said. He nonetheless pledged to work hard to come up with a more creative solution. "I thought our proposal was reasonable and balanced, but given the great differences that remain between our two positions I will now reassess the situation and find a way to readjust," Suh told Loftis. He urged the U.S. side to work with their Korean counterparts to develop objective data that would allow people on both sides to view the process as a transparent one. "We need to come up with a plan that will make both your Congress and our National Assembly happy," Suh advised. PARTICIPANTS: -------------- ¶17. (SBU) U.S. Delegation: Ambassador Robert Loftis, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) Major General Duane Thiessen, Assistant Chief of Staff J5, USFK Mr. Joseph Yun, Political Minister Counselor, U.S. Embassy Seoul, DOS Commander Thomas Herold, Judge Advocate General's Corps Mr. David Wolff, Political Military Chief, U.S. Embassy Seoul, DOS Colonel Christopher Dinenna, Chief of J5 Strategy and Policy Division, USFK Mr. Mark Shoemaker, International Relations Officer, US SOFA Secretariat, USFK SIPDIS Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Janzen, Military Advisor, PM, DOS Lieutenant Colonel William Conwell, Chief of J5 Policy Analysis Branch, USFK Dr. Warren Switzer, International Relations Officer, J5 Policy Analysis Branch, USFK Mr. Andrew Ou, Foreign Affairs Officer, East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau/Korea, DOS Ms. Shawn Duncan, Pol-Mil Officer, U.S. Embassy Seoul, DOS ¶18. (SBU) ROK Delegation: Ambassador Cho Tae-yong, Director General, North American Affairs Bureau, MOFAT Mr. Kim Hong-kyun, Sr. Coord. for ROK-US Security Cooperation, MOFAT Mr. Lee Jeong-kyu, Director, North America Division (NAD) III, MOFAT Mr. Chun Young-hee, First Secretary, NAD III, MOFAT Lieutenant Colonel Seo Young-kwang, Advisor, NAD III, MOFAT Mr. Nam Dae-hyun, Advisor, NAD III, MOFAT Mr. Kim Jung-han, First Secretary, Bilateral Treaties Division, MOFAT Colonel Chun In-bum, Director, U.S. Policy Division, MND Ms. Kim Sin-sook, Deputy Director, U.S. Policy Division, MND Colonel Lee Jong-sik, Assist. Secretary to the President for National Security Policy ¶19. (SBU) Small Group Participants: Ambassador Robert Loftis, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, DOS Ambassador Cho Tae-yong, Director General North American Affairs Bureau, MOFAT Major General Duane Thiessen, Assistant Chief of Staff J5, USFK Colonel Chun In-bum, Director, U.S. Policy Division, MND Mr. David Jonathan Wolff, Political-Military Affairs Chief, Embassy Seoul Mr. Lee Jeong-kyu, Director, North America Division III, MOFAT ¶20. (U) Ambassador Loftis has cleared this cable. VERSHBOW