ROH-ABE SUMMIT DOMINATED BY HISTORY AND NORTH KOREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003465 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KS KN JN SUBJECT: ROH-ABE SUMMIT DOMINATED BY HISTORY AND NORTH KOREA Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) MOFAT Asia Bureau DG Lee Hyuk told POL M/C on October 11 that Japanese Prime Minister Abe's summit with President Roh in Seoul on October 9 provided momentum for an improvement in the strained bilateral relationship. The summit meeting, conducted in a frank and sincere manner, was dominated by history issues, which took up 80 minutes in the two-hour encounter. The North Korean nuclear test, which occurred earlier on October 9, was the other major issue discussed. The two leaders tentatively agreed to meet on the sidelines of APEC next month in Hanoi, but Roh was noncommittal on an invitation to visit Japan in 2007. Lee commented that Abe, and especially his wife, who speaks good Korean and is a fan of Korean TV dramas, made good impressions in Seoul and encouraged hope that an ABE administration would contribute to improved ties. A Japanese Embassy official separately confirmed that the GOJ viewed the summit favorably, and said that the surprise DPRK nuclear test had highlighted the ROK-Japan common regional security interests. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On October 11, Lee Hyuk, Director General of the Asia and Pacific Affairs Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) provided POL M/C with a detailed readout of President Roh Moo-hyun's October 9 summit with Japanese Prime Minister SHINZO Abe. Lee characterized the ABE visit as a good trip that was conducted in a frank and respectful manner. The summit, originally planned for 90 minutes, ran for two hours with about 80 minutes devoted to history issues and the remaining time spent on other bilateral topics and the North Korean nuclear test. A 30-minute small group meeting was followed by a larger plenary session. . OPENING POSITIONS -------------- ¶3. (C) In the opening small group session, Prime Minister Abe commented that the ROK-Japanese relationship was important but irritants needed to be overcome to develop a future-orientated partnership that benefited not only Korea and Japan but the rest of Asia. Korea and Japan shared a common view on democracy, freedom, and human rights and both countries had contributed to international peace and stability. Over the past sixty years, Japan was deeply remorseful over the suffering and damage caused by its actions in WWII. Since then, Japan had championed freedom, democracy, and human rights and this policy would remain. Japan also took seriously the views of Korea, and ABE would do his best to build a more future-oriented partnership based on trust and understanding. ¶4. (C) President Roh agreed that the bilateral relationship was important, so the two leaders should build a future-oriented partnership to influence the political and economic landscape of Asia. It was regrettable that political difficulties had become an impediment for the further promotion of the bilateral partnership. Japanese leaders should understand how Koreans feel and show a correct perception of history. Korea suffered from Japanese colonial rule and would remain concerned about Japanese actions for the foreseeable future until these history issues were resolved. Roh expected Abe's visit would create a breakthrough in the relationship and expressed hope that both sides would reinvigorate cooperation for a sustainable relationship. . YASUKUNI, JOINT HISTORY COMMISSION, COMFORT WOMEN -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) In the large group session, Roh brought up the Yasukuni Shrine emphasizing that in 2001 President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Koizumi, on the margins of the APEC meeting in Shanghai, explored the option of Japan building a memorial separate from the Yasukuni Shrine. Koizumi at the time reportedly undertook to look into it. However, five years later there was little movement. Roh urged ABE to pay more attention to the matter. ¶6. (C) ABE replied that his own visits in the past to Yasukuni were meant to pay respect to those who sacrificed their lives for Japan and pray for eternal peace. His intent was not to glorify militarism. ABE said that he was mindful that visits by Japanese leaders could be viewed differently, and they had become political and diplomatic issues. Now that he was a leader he preferred not to mention possible visits to Yasukuni. He undertook to properly deal with this issue to overcome policy problems. He would look carefully at the issue of separate memorial sites, noting that such a move was not easy because there were diverse opinions in Japan, especially among the families of Japanese whose ancestors suffered during WWII. ¶7. (C) Roh and ABE agreed to launch a second Joint History Commission by the end of the year. According to DG Lee, the first scholarly meeting of the Joint History Commission ran from 2002-2005. When then Prime Minister Koizumi visited Korea in 2005 both sides agreed to launch a second commission but it got delayed by Japan's inability to appoint members to its panel; Lee said the ROK had already decided on its own contingent. ¶8. (C) Roh insisted that a perception existed in Korea that conservative Japanese politicians were now denying Japanese military involvement in the wartime "comfort women" issue. In 1993, however, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono announced that Japanese government authorities indeed had been involved. Roh urged Japan to clarify its position. ABE responded that there was no change in the Japanese Government's position since Kono's 1993 statement. . SUMMITS, TRADE -------------- ¶9. (C) ABE invited Roh to visit Japan in early 2007 and said the two capitals should revive shuttle diplomacy. Roh remained noncommittal about visiting Japan in 2007, saying he would need to consider the wisdom of shuttle diplomacy, but stated that he would like to go to Japan at an "appropriate time." Roh and ABE tentatively agreed to meet again on the sidelines of APEC in Hanoi in November and possibly at the EAS meeting in the Philippines in December. ¶10. (C) ABE noted that the Japanese and Korean economies accounted for about one-eighth of the world economy. The two leaders should now accelerate discussions for a ROK-Japanese Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). Roh supported EPA negotiations in principle, but said a big difference remained on rates of concessions for agricultural and fisheries products. Roh urged Japan to change its position on concession rates to revive joint negotiations. . DPRK NUCLEAR ISSUE -------------- ¶11. (C) Turning to North Korea, ABE said the DPRK missile tests in July and the day's nuclear test sharply changed the security landscape in the region and nuclear proliferation would become a bigger threat to Northeast Asian and global security. The international community had to send a strong message to North Korea that if it failed to abandon its nuclear programs, the situation for North Korea would only worsen. The United Nations and concerned nations should consult more closely, and Korea-Japan-U.S. coordination was more key than ever. ABE also raised the abduction issue, indicating ROK-Japanese cooperation could help to resolve the matter with North Korea. ¶12. (C) Roh agreed that the DPRK nuclear issue was a serious threat to both Korea and Japan and to global nonproliferation efforts. What was needed was a focused response that would get North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambition. The message must be firm, cool, and strategic. Roh added that Seoul and Beijing, which had placed a greater importance on dialogue, now had no other choice but to get firmer on North Korea. For a strong response to be effective, the United States and other Six Party members needed to respond in a well-coordinated manner. Roh also said that Seoul would help Tokyo to resolve the abduction issue, and recommended that Tokyo not separate nuclear, missile, and abduction matters. . ATMOSPHERICS -------------- ¶13. (C) DG Lee Hyuk concluded by saying that Roh was not totally satisfied on the history issue, but the important thing was that ABE appeared sincere and gave the impression that he wanted a positive change in the relationship. Abe, for example, said a few sentences in Korean during a dinner speech, and Mrs. ABE visited a Korean primary school where she read a textbook in Korean and spoke Korean to some of the children. This kind of approach played well with Korean audiences, Lee said. . EMBASSY JAPAN CONCURS -------------- ¶14. (C) Japanese Embassy Political Officer Asahaki Sunami also described the summit as successful from the GOJ point of view, saying that the surprise nuclear test, which Prime Minister ABE learned about just before his aircraft landed in Seoul, had actually improved the atmosphere by throwing into relief that common regional security interests that Japan and the ROK share. He said PM Abe, when the subject of him visiting Yasukuni came up, had been careful not to say yes or no, but that the GOJ understood that Roh could not visit Japan if such a visit were to occur. Sunami also said that the GOJ noted Roh's coolness toward EPA negotiations, and pressed for increased access to defectors as a means of learning more about the fate of abducted Japanese citizens. Summing up, Sunami said the two sides remained well aware of landmines in their relationship, but had agreed to tiptoe around them. . COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Not surprising, history again took up so much of the meeting between the leaders of South Korea and Japan. We understand that in the pre-meeting negotiations, the ROK side agreed not to dwell at length on these history issues, but to no avail. By all accounts, ABE took it well, remaining calm and respectful during Roh's long monologues. Roh did not get any commitments, yet he apparently came away satisfied that he had been heard. The Japanese side could not agree to a press statement which included references to history issues, which was why there was no joint press statement. ¶16. (C) Also helpful to their frank but friendly exchanges was the sobering announcement by North Korea that it had tested a nuclear device. We understand that President Bush's phone calls to Roh and ABE just after their dinner left a deep impression on the two Asian leaders. DG Lee remarked to us that he believed U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral consultations could be resumed soon at the highest level, perhaps in Vietnam on the margins of APEC meetings. VERSHBOW