INR A/S FORT'S MEETING WITH MOFAT DM OF FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003447 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KS KN SUBJECT: INR A/S FORT'S MEETING WITH MOFAT DM OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YUN BYUNG-SE Classified By: DCM Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 27 meeting with visiting INR Assistant Secretary Randall Fort, Yun Byung-se, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT),assessed that the U.S.-ROK alliance was healthy, citing the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations as a sign of its growing breadth. DM Yun remarked that North Korea might have wanted to shift the focus from nuclear testing to reprocessing when it recently announced, through Selig Harrison, plans to extract plutonium from fuel rods. He said that North Korea was currently in a holding pattern, waiting for the U.S. and ROK's "common and broad" approach to develop and for the ROK-China summit in October. DM Yun asked whether Treasury had analyzed the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) sanctions to determine their effectiveness. END SUMMARY. A HEALTHY U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE -------------- ¶2. (C) DM Yun started the September 27 meeting by noting that the U.S.-ROK alliance -- which used to be primarily a military alliance -- was developing into a comprehensive relationship. He said the FTA was a good example of how much closer the two countries were becoming. A/S Fort agreed, adding that the fact that the ROK and U.S. were negotiating was as important as the substance of the FTA itself. DM Yun replied that the U.S. and ROK stood for common values, and that he hoped this extended to Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, "our very able candidate for the next UN Secretary General." (NOTE: This meeting occurred one and a half weeks before FM Ban was formally nominated. END NOTE.) ¶3. (C) DM Yun observed that the most recent presidential summit represented a new turning point in the relationship. "Your colleagues in Washington think it was the best of all six summits since 2003, and we share that analysis," he said. He added that it was time for us to have a balanced approach on the North Korean nuclear issue. Even though we had to be stern in response to North Korean bad behavior, DM Yun said, we both wanted to return the Six-Party Talks (6PT) using the "common and broad" approach on which our Presidents had agreed. Once we had agreement on the specifics of that approach, we could share our approach with the other 6PT partners. ARE YOU A BETTING MAN? POSSIBLE DPRK NUCLEAR TEST -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) A/S Fort commented that no one seemed to have confident insight into the North Korean regime, which prompted DM Yun to ask for an assessment of whether the DPRK would test a nuclear weapon. (NOTE: This meeting took place nearly one week before North Korea's Oct. 3 announcement that it would test a nuclear weapon. END NOTE.) John Merrill, INR Northeast Asia Division Chief, who accompanied A/S Fort, replied that the odds were constantly changing. A few weeks ago, he would have bet 50/50, but today he would be inclined to think that the chance North Korea would actually test had receded a bit. But this could change. Ultimately, Merrill commented, it all came down to whether Kim Jong-il's "heart" or "head" ruled his behavior. On the one hand, some of Kim's recent actions seemed "personal" against the United States: the missile tests in July were an example. Kim Jong-il appeared to have been surprised at the intensity and breadth of the world's reaction, especially that of China. Merrill brought up DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan's remarks (reported by scholar Selig Harrison) that North Korea planned to extract plutonium from fuel rods, and said he interpreted those as North Korea wanting to get on the U.S.'s nerves and use this threat as a new bargaining chip. DM Yun commented that these remarks had been interpreted by some as a change in tactics and may have been intended to divert the focus from nuclear testing to reprocessing, which was relatively less risky. Merrill replied that this was an interesting analysis, but noted that even if North Korea were moving away from the nuclear-test track, one had to assume that it could always get back on it again. DM Yun commented that North Korea had the option of conducting a "virtual" nuclear test by inviting former Los Alamos director Sig Hecker to visit again and showing him an actual nuclear device; they had previously handed him a glass bottle containing plutonium metal. The North Koreans knew from previous experience that Hecker would be able to say whether any device they might display to him would actually work. (NOTE: Hecker had been slated to visit China and North Korea with a group led by Stanford University professor John Lewis toward the end of October; it is not clear if the North Korea leg of the trip is still on in the wake of Pyongyang's nuclear test. END NOTE.) DPRK PLAYING THE WAITING GAME -------------- ¶5. (C) Merrill remarked upon the increase in "invitational diplomacy" by North Korea, which had recently invited Selig Harrison, Ambassador Donald Gregg, former Rice University president Malcolm Gillis, and Korean-American scholars to visit. DM Yun commented that the increase in invitational diplomacy only served to highlight the lack of true diplomacy between North Korea and the senior leaders of its neighboring countries. Merrill wondered if North Korea was waiting things out until the next U.S. Administration. He noted, however, that the hard-line stance Bill Perry/Ash Carter adopted in their late-June op-ed in the Washington Post advocating a strike on North Korea's missile-test facility should have disabused Pyongyang of the notion that it would necessarily have an easier time of it with a future U.S. administration. DM Yun said that if he were North Korea, he would wait and see what came of the U.S. and ROK's "common and broad" approach first, as well as the outcome of the upcoming ROK-China summit in October. He said he thought North Korea had played its "reactor card" via Selig Harrison, and now was simply waiting. Merrill agreed that while the situation was deteriorating, a "wait and see" approach might be a logical thing for North Korea to do. ¶6. (C) DM Yun said he understood A/S Fort had met with Ambassador Lee, the ROK's envoy to the U.S., and discussed our governments' shared view on North Korean nuclear testing. Noting that the September 19 anniversary of the Joint Statement had recently passed, DM Yun said that MOFAT was focused on accelerating our "common and broad" approach. A/S Fort observed that Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph would probably have a lot to say on non-proliferation issues during his upcoming visit. (NOTE: U/S Joseph had planned to visit Seoul in Oct., but the trip has since been cancelled. END NOTE.) DM Yun predicted that the Korean media would likely focus on U/S Joseph's "stick" messages rather than any "carrot" comments, adding that the nuclear issue remained "explosive" in the Korean press. DPRK-CHINA RELATIONS -------------- ¶7. (C) Asked by DM Yun for his view of DPRK-China relations, A/S Fort replied that he had seen indications that China was not pleased with North Korea after the July missile launches. He speculated that possibly China had warned the DPRK not to test any missiles beforehand. A/S Fort noted that China had to be concerned that its neighbor was jeopardizing all it had achieved economically, especially in anticipation of the 2008 Olympics. He also cited the problem of North Korean refugees in ROK. North Korea was acting "truly independently" in its belligerence, doing things it knew China would not like. DM Yun commented that since the missile tests, trust between China and the DPRK had decreased. This was not public knowledge, he said, but the Chinese had told the ROK as much, adding that Wu Da-wei, China's envoy to the 6PT, must be frustrated. BANCO DELTA ASIA (BDA) SANCTIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) Noting that it was the anniversary of the BDA sanctions, DM Yun asked whether Treasury had analyzed its sanctions to determine if there were any actual changes as a result in North Korea and other countries. A/S Fort replied that he was not aware of any assessments or whether Treasury had conducted any. Merrill added he would check and see if there was anything we could provide the ROK Embassy in Washington. ¶9. (C) Merrill said that he had seen reports of North Koreans trying to do business at banks but being refused. If one considered the totality of the DPRK's banking relations, including BDA sanctions and sanctions against bank remittances from Japan, the pipe was getting squeezed tighter. He wondered whether this would render North Korea more or less likely to negotiate. DM Yun responded that unlike the USG's previous stance of mostly rhetorical measures ("outpost of tyranny," "Axis of Evil"),the BDA measures were "real, painful actions." He said that North Korea probably viewed these as a significantly "hostile policy" and would not return to 6PT until they were lifted. ¶10. (C) DM Yun said that North Korea wanted to eat its cake and have it too: it wanted to save face and wanted the possibility of bank transactions with other banks. Kim Jong-il also wanted his $24 million back as well, adding that this was not an insignificant amount for the DPRK leader. Merrill responded that EAP A/S Hill often pointed out the opportunity costs that North Korea imposed upon itself by staying away from the 6PT were much more than $24 million. ROK DE FACTO SANCTIONS AGAINST DPRK -------------- ¶11. (C) DM Yun said that the ROK currently had no dialogue with the DPRK and that President Roh had imposed de facto sanctions in the wake of the July missile tests. The National Assembly, however, had criticized the President for suspending aid, because lawmakers could not understand why he was linking policy and humanitarian aid. DM Yun said that opportunities for visits to Mt. Gumgang were increasing, and that the more they had exchanges, the better the environment would be for resolving problems. ¶12. (C) In closing, DM Yun suggested that the ROK and the U.S. should pool their information, relying on Ambassador Chun Yung-woo. Sometimes, he said, North Korea sent signals through the inter-Korean dialogue channel, and the ROK could piece them together, which could be useful. A/S Fort proposed that they continue their dialogue the next time DM Yun visited Washington. ¶13. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Fort. VERSHBOW