C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 003378

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MNUC ETRD KS KN LY
SUBJECT: ROK PRIME MINISTER AND LIBYAN LEADER DISCUSS DPRK
NUCLEAR ISSUE

Classified By: A/POL Brian McFeeters. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On September 26, Ma Young-sam, MOFAT's
Director-General of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs
Bureau, requested a meeting with POL M/C to provide a
read-out of Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook's September 19-21
trip to Libya. In addition to a discussion on bilateral
economic matters, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi told PM Han
that he would try to persuade North Korea to give up its
nuclear weapons programs. However, Gaddafi said that unless
Libya received more compensation for its own decision to
abandon its WMD programs, he would have a weaker argument to
make on the benefits for DPRK denuclearization. DG Ma opined
that he did not expect much from any potential Libyan effort
to try to persuade North Korea. END SUMMARY.
.
NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE
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2. (C) In a September 26 meeting with POL M/C, Ma Young-sam,
Director-General of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs
Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
explained that Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook met with Libyan
leader Muammar Gaddafi during her September 19-21 trip to
Libya. The Libya visit was part of a larger 10-day tour of
four countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Libya,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. PM Han had intended to discuss
bilateral trade and economic cooperation with Libyan
officials, but Ma said the Libyan leader also raised the
North Korean nuclear issue.


3. (C) Ma indicated that Gaddafi said that when Libya
decided to give up its WMD programs, it expected to receive
significant international compensation. However, it had not
received as much as Gaddafi had wanted. In particular,
Gaddafi hoped a compensation plan could be implemented
following discussions with "developed" countries like the EU,
particularly Germany, as well as Japan and South Korea.
(NOTE: Ma confirmed that the ROK had not pledged any
compensation tied to Libya's decision to abandon its WMD
programs. END NOTE.)


4. (C) Gaddafi also offered his assistance to help persuade
Iran and North Korea to give up their nuclear programs. He
emphasized, however, that if they asked how he had fared with
a similar decision, he would not be able to deliver a
powerful argument unless Libya received more compensation.
Gaddafi not only sought more compensation for Libya, but he
suggested that to convince the DPRK, Pyongyang should also
receive significant economic assistance, Ma said.


5. (C) In response, Prime Minister Han told Gaddafi that
Seoul was focused on developing a peaceful, diplomatic
solution to the North Korean nuclear issue through the Six
Party Talks. Han thanked Libya for its efforts to play a
role in the North Korean issue in order to persuade the DPRK
to abandon its nuclear program and open up its economic
system. Ma added that he personally did not expect much from
any Libyan effort to try to persuade North Korea, but Seoul
welcomed complementary messages to North Korea.
.
BILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
--------------


6. (C) Touching briefly on the economic element, Ma said
that the sides signed a couple of trade cooperation and
investment agreements. Seoul was continuing work on the
man-made river project in Libya, and the first and second
stages of the project were nearly done. The ROK contractor,
formerly Dong-A Construction, was now Daehan Transportation.
Ma said that the ROK would play less of a role in the third,
fourth, and fifth stages of the project.


7. (C) Ma noted that Libyan officials also mentioned their
intention to build an oil pipeline to transport Libyan oil to
the Red Sea via Chad and Sudan. Currently, Libyan oil must
travel via the Mediterranean Sea and around Africa before
reaching Asia. Libya was seeking South Korean and Japanese

SEOUL 00003378 002 OF 002


investment in the project.
STANTON