AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW DISCUSSES OPCON WITH GNP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003369 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ABLD KS KN SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW DISCUSSES OPCON WITH GNP LAWMAKERS Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 26 over lunch, Ambassador Vershbow discussed OPCON transfer with three National Assembly members from the main opposition Grand National Party (GNP). The members gave the Ambassador feedback from their September 19-25 trip to the United States and explained in detail their many reasons why they were against discussion of transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) at this time. They stated they were not against the transfer of OPCON in principle, but they strongly requested that timing not be discussed at the October SCM and DefMin meetings given the high level of tension on the Korean Peninsula and the unreliability of the Roh Moo-hyun administration. The lawmakers expressed satisfaction that there were many in Washington who shared their views on OPCON and said they appreciated the frank assessment of the situation by State Department officials. Also, they agreed that there was a real chance that the GNP would form an alliance with the opposition Democratic Party (DP). END SUMMARY OPCON TRANSFER -------------- ¶2. (C) The three opposition lawmakers, Park Jin, Hwang Jin-ha and Chung Moon-hun, had accompanied Vice Speaker Lee Sang-deuk to Washington September 19-25 and are experts on defense and foreign affairs. Representative Hwang Jin-ha said that the Combined Forces Command (CFC) should not be dismantled. Park suggested that instead of working toward transfer of OPCON and the dismantlement of CFC, wartime OPCON be transferred transitionally to the UN Command. The Ambassador said that the place of UNC in the new arrangement would be a sensitive issue, noting that UNC was key to implementing the current war plan that relied on support from U.S. forces based in Japan. ¶3. (C) Representative Hwang Jin-ha raised the strongest voice against the transfer and against the Roh government. He said multiple times that there should not be a fixed date for the transfer. As a former military officer, he felt that after DPRK missile launches and with the threat of a nuclear test, this was not the right time to discuss the transfer of OPCON. He insisted that the Roh government's intentions were not to be trusted. TIMING OF OPCON TRANSFER -------------- ¶4. (C) The lawmakers said that no one they met in Washington emphasized 2009 as the date when OPCON transfer had to take place. They were very much encouraged by this. The Ambassador said that, timing aside, his perception was that Koreans wanted a more balanced alliance relationship and the United States was trying to accommodate this desire by agreeing to a change in the U.S.-ROK command relationships. Representative Park Jin said the GNP did not have a problem with the CFC or wartime OPCON transfer, simply a problem with President Roh. The Ambassador acknowledged there were questions to address in order to transfer wartime OPCON, such as agreeing on common war aims when new OPLANS are written. But we were confident that by carefully implementing the steps set forth in the roadmap, we could ensure that deterrence was maintained and the alliance would be ready to respond to any contingency after transfer of OPCON. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador said that based on the results of the September 14 summit, we were committed to further consultations at the level of military experts on the timing of OPCON transfer, with a view toward sending a consensus recommendation to the Defense Ministers. But the U.S. was confident the ROK had the capabilities to assume wartime OPCON. The United States position was that the transfer of OPCON would make the U.S. presence in Korea less politically burdensome in the long run, without diminishing our ability to deter or defeat North Korea. He emphasized that the transfer was requested by the South Korean government and that, while the pace could be measured, this was now a process that would be difficult to stop. NORTH KOREA -------------- ¶6. (C) Representative Park said there might be a lot of DPRK refugees wanting to go to the United States in the future, especially if North Koreans in South Korea were allowed to enter the United States. The Ambassador said the U.S. position was not to grant asylum to North Korean refugees who had already settled in South Korea. The North Korean Human Rights Act was not meant to apply to South Korean citizens, and the two court decisions that had taken place were anomalies, not precedent-setting cases. Park also said that during the lawmakers' meeting at the Hudson Institute, former Bulgarian FM Mikhaylova told them that Bulgaria could serve as a model for North Korea if it were to open. Park also said that a staffer from Senator Lugar's office told them that the U.S. and ROK should work together to find more creative ways to "expand the scope of freedom" in North Korea in return for the aid we provided. For example, in return for aid, we could demand prisoners be released from North Korean jails. The Ambassador noted that reciprocity for aid might be more easily obtained if ROK's aid went through the World Food Program. ¶7. (C) Park raised the concern that should the North collapse, it was unclear how we would deal with the situation in the North. In particular, it should be made clear that PRC troops should not enter North Korea. His view was that maintaining UN Command would give legitimacy to any U.S. troops in North Korea. Hwang worried that if Roh continued to stress sovereignty as the rationale for OPCON transfer, the ROK would be left to deal alone with a crisis. They both stressed that the U.S. and the ROK should work together to prevent PRC involvement in the North in the event of a collapse. ¶8. (C) The lawmakers said they had discussed the North Korean nuclear issue with U/S Joseph and agreed with Joseph that the North was undertaking various criminal activities. Representative Chung Moon-hun asked what the likely reaction would be to a nuclear test by the North and agreed with the Ambassador that UN's Chapter 7 would need to be invoked. ¶9. (C) The lawmakers additionally stressed the difficult position the ROK and Japanese governments would be in if the DPRK tested a nuclear device and suggested that it could lead the GOJ and the ROK to go nuclear as well. The Ambassador said this would not be necessary since both Japan and Korea were protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶10. (C) Heritage Foundation's Balbina Hwang had told the GNP delegation that she felt Roh wanted to end the alliance and that she feared the future would be that the U.S.-Korea alliance would become like the U.S.-Philippines alliance. Representative Park said that if the GNP won the presidential election in 2007, they would seek to renegotiate the transfer of OPCON and the new Korean administration would work to build a strong U.S.-ROK alliance based on security, common values and common goals. VERSHBOW