AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW DISCUSSES OPCON WITH GNP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003249

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ABLD KS KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW DISCUSSES OPCON WITH GNP
PARLIAMENTARY VICE SPEAKER LEE SANG-DEUK


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: GNP National Assembly Vice Speaker Lee
Sang-deuk told the Ambassador on September 19 that the Grand
National Party (GNP) was opposed to OPCON transfer. Lee
emphasized that the purpose of his planned September 20-23
visit to the United States was to ask that OPCON talks be
suspended and to tell members of the U.S. Congress and
representatives from the State Department and the Pentagon
that most Korean people were against the discussion of
wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer while President
Roh was in office. Lee also asked for help arranging
appropriate meetings in Washington. We recommend that
appropriate State and DoD officials meet with the Vice
Speaker and his delegation, so that opponents of OPCON
transfer are assured we have taken their concerns seriously.
END SUMMARY.

GNP'S VIEW ON OPCON
--------------


2. (C) In the September 19 meeting with the Vice Speaker and
five GNP leaders, Vice Speaker Lee Sang-deuk outlined the
GNP's official position on OPCON transfer. Lee said the
four points he made to the press earlier on September 19
were: (1) Talks on OPCON transfer should be suspended; (2)
current alliance structure and the CFC command should be
maintained; (3) OPCON transfer at this time would not be in
the U.S. interest; and (4) there was a need to strengthen
overall U.S.-ROK cooperation.


3. (C) Lee emphasized that the Korean people were against
the transfer of wartime OPCON and that those against the
transfer outnumber those for the transfer by a 2 to 1 margin.
In addition, Roh's term was almost over, therefore, Roh does
not have the right to carry out talks on OPCON transfer, Lee
noted. If the transfer happened during Roh's tenure, it
could cause problems in the U.S.-ROK relationship because so
many Koreans were against the transfer. He added that the
opposition to the transfer extended far beyond the GNP and
included 20 members of the ruling Uri Party and even former
members of the Roh administration.

AMBASSADOR EXPLAINS U.S. POSITION
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador said he appreciated the many concerns
regarding OPCON transfer among Koreans and added he would
prefer there was more consensus on OPCON in Korea so that
after the transfer, Koreans would feel safer and better about
their security and their security relationship with the
United States. When we decide on the timing of transfer of
wartime OPCON transfer, we would like as much common
understanding as possible and widespread agreement, the
Ambassador said.


5. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. believed that
Korea was militarily capable and ready to take full control
of wartime OPCON. The transfer of wartime OPCON was part of
a natural evolution and, in the long term, will make the
relationship more balanced and make Koreans feel better about
the relationship with the United States. The most important
issue was that deterrence of North Korea and our collective
military capability to defend the Peninsula were not
diminished through the transfer process. The U.S wanted the
DPRK to be "just as deterred" at the end of the transfer
process. The U.S. goal was that the U.S.-ROK alliance and
combined military capability stay as strong after the
transfer as they are now, the Ambassador said.

SEPTEMBER 14 SUMMIT - DISCUSSION OF OPCON
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador said the September 14 summit proceeded
from the assumption that the transfer of OPCON was a common
goal. He said President Roh acknowledged the controversy
regarding transfer of wartime OPCON in Korea. The conclusion
at the September 14 summit was that the issue not be
politicized, and that military experts should be responsible
for consulatations to determine the most suitable timing of
the transfer. The final decision could be made by Defense
Ministers after military experts agreed on a roadmap

outlining steps to transfer wartime OPCON adn the timing.
One of President Bush's goals at the September 14 U.S.-ROK
summit was to reassure the Korean people that despite changes
in the structure of the alliance, the U.S. maintained its
strong commitment to Korea. In addition, despite the
reduction in U.S. troops stationed in Korea from 37,000 to
25,000, the U.S. capability was just as strong and just as
lethal today as it was when there were more troops stationed
here.


7. (C) On the issue of timing, the Ambassador assured Lee
that at each stage of implementation of the roadmap, there
would be evaluations of progress and adjustments, if
necessary. This process should reassure those who have
doubts about the transfer, the Ambassador said.

QUESTIONS ON SUMMIT
--------------


8. (C) Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee member Park
Jin asked the Ambassador about the statement Presidents Bush
and Roh made pledging OPCON would not politicized, noting
President Roh's frequent description of the issue as a
recovery of Korean sovereignty. The Ambassador said it was
not appropriate to define OPCON as an issue of sovereignty
since Korea already shared sovereignty. The U.S. position
was that the goal of OPCON transfer had been agreed upon, and
now military experts should handle the consultations
regarding the roadmap and timing of the transfer. The
discussion should focus on what measures and processes
ensured effective deterrence rather than political issues.


9. (C) Park also asked about the "common and broad" approach
to North Korea and its nuclear program. The Ambassador
explained that there were wide discussions on this important
issue during the meeting between Secretary Rice and NSA
Hadley and their Korean counterparts FM Ban and NSA Song. He
said during the summit meeting the two leaders did not
discuss specifics of the "common and broad" approach but that
VFM Chun Young-woo would discuss ways to bring North Korea
back to the Six Party Talks when he meets EAP A/S Hill on
September 20. The comprehensive approach wreferred to the
September 19 Beijing declaration - the challenge now was to
formulate an implementation strategy.


10. (C) GNP Supreme Council member Chun Yu-ok said she
believed the process leading to OPCON transfer should be
reversed - instead of a summit and then military experts
working out the details, experts should consult, public
support should be obtained, and only then the leaders should
decide on OPCON transfer. Deciding now, when the North
Koreans were threatening to conduct a nuclear test, was
inappropriate. The Ambassador said again that the roadmap
would ensure that the alliance would remain strong after the
transfer, and that experts would address the issue of timing.
He said Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had a very high
estimation of the ROK military and that was why he supported
the transfer of OPCON.

OPCON TRANSFER - TIMING, TIMING, TIMING
--------------


11. (C) Vice Speaker Lee said he agreed the U.S. and ROK
should plan the transfer of OPCON, but he remained concerned
about the timing of the actual transfer. Defense officials
should decide on the right time for the transfer and not
politicians like President Roh. Roh was pushing the
transfer, and many people in the ROK were worried about the
future of the security situation in Korea. Lee said 2009 and
2012 were both dates produced for political reasons in the
U.S. and the ROK; a new date should be decided upon based on
defense and security concerns, including the continued North
Korean threat. The Ambassador said the most desirable
outcome was one that the majority of Korean people could
understand and support.


12. (C) There was one month left before the Defense
Ministers' meeting, the Ambassador said, so Lee's visit to
Washington was a timely opportunity to contribute to the
discussion of OPCON transfer. He added there was value in
people in Washington hearing the GNP's concerns directly.
Lee asked again for support in arranging appropriate meetings

with counterparts in the State and Defense Departments.
VERSHBOW