AID SUSPENSION MAY FULFILL UNSCR 1695, SAYS NSC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002852 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2014 TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV KS KN SUBJECT: AID SUSPENSION MAY FULFILL UNSCR 1695, SAYS NSC Classified By: CDA Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4(b/d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In an August 21 courtesy call by the CDA, Senior Secretary to the President for National Security Suh Choo-suk SIPDIS said that the ROKG's suspension of rice and fertilizer shipments would likely fulfill the ROKG's obligation under UNSCR 1695. Suh also explained the ROKG's one-time shipment of humanitarian relief to the DPRK; said that a nuclear test was probably not imminent but that additional monitoring would be prudent; and expressed hope that the September Summit would reaffirm the regional importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance, and facilitate the final resolution of remaining alliance issues, including OPCON. END SUMMARY. SUSPENDING AID SHIPMENTS MAY FULFILL UNSCR 1695 -------------- -- ¶2. (C) Responding to the CDA's question about the ROKG's response to UNSCR 1695, Suh said that the ROKG took very strong action following the July 5 missile launches by suspending shipments of rice and fertilizer to the DPRK. He said that this action had had more impact on the DPRK than any measure taken by any other country. Suh did not believe that that UNSCR 1695 required additional measures. Although the rice and fertilizer curtailment was not initiated in direct response to the Resolution, it should be interpreted as part of the ROK's response. Asked about the August 20 announcement that the ROKG was about to send 100,000 tons of rice and other aid to North Korea, Suh explained that this was a one-time emergency shipment in response to severe monsoon flooding and was entirely separate from the suspension of rice and fertilizer shipments. Further, Suh expressed concern that the value of this shipment was being overstated. He explained that rice accounted for USD 200 million of the shipment's total value, but rice in the ROK traded for five times the global market price. Thus, in terms of the international price, the ROKG would only ship about USD 40 million worth of rice. He also said that the Red Cross had come to an agreement that distribution of this aid would "to some extent" be monitored. MORE NUCLEAR MONITORING NECESSARY -------------- ¶3. (C) The CDA asked how the ROKG would respond should the DPRK test a nuclear device. Suh replied that a test was improbable because the DPRK would have to take a number of preliminary steps and, as far as the ROKG knew, the DPRK "had not completed the checklist." Suh did not discount the possibility, however, that the DPRK had secretly made preparations. As a result, the ROKG had strengthened its monitoring activities. A nuclear test would result in a significant change in North-South relations and would be much more serious than the missile tests, he added. SUMMIT SHOULD REAFFIRM ALLIANCE'S LEADING REGIONAL ROLE -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Asked about ROKG priorities for the September Presidential Summit, Suh said that the Summit should include security, bilateral, and regional issues. It would be an opportunity to reaffirm the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance and demonstrate that our leaders were of like mind on the transfer of operational control. He also said that the leaders should underscore their commitment to resolving DPRK issues peacefully and diplomatically. Observing that the Six Party Talks have not progressed since the September 19 Joint Statement, and that the general situation has ground to a stalemate since the July 5 missile launches, Suh said that it was now time to tackle these challenges. At a minimum, Suh hoped that Presidents Bush and Roh would agree on general principles, encourage continuing military consultations and identify a cooperative framework to resolve any remaining alliance issues. Discussion of military issues could continue at the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October and be concluded in early 2007. ALLIANCE ISSUES -------------- ¶5. (C) Suh noted that the U.S. and ROK were currently facing a number of difficult issues, including USFK troop realignment, base consolidation, strategic flexibility and transfer of operational control. These issues were all being worked out through "smooth and close" consultations between the two governments. ¶6. (C) The CDA agreed that there has been significant progress on specific military issues and that changes in the alliance represented a natural evolution of the U.S.-ROK relationship. Remaining differences appeared to be tactical rather than strategic. Most important, he said, was that the two allies shared many of the same goals. With regard to the transfer of operational control, one of the challenges would be for the USG and ROKG to present the transfer as a positive development and counter those who wanted to cast it in a negative light. STANTON