ROKG CAUTIOUS ON USG VIEW OF UNSCR 1695

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002850 SIPDIS SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO EAP/K AND ISN/CPI E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 TAGS: MNUC PARM PREL PTER KNNP KPAO WMD CT KS KN SUBJECT: ROKG CAUTIOUS ON USG VIEW OF UNSCR 1695 REF: STATE 136495 Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On August 21, political and economic officers delivered reftel points on USG thinking concerning UNSCR 1695 implementation to officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). The officials gave initial responses claiming that ROKG policy was already largely in line with the USG recommendations but expressing concern about next steps, especially the relationship between the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and interdiction options. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) MOFAT Director of North America Division I Hahn Choong-hee on August 21 thanked A/POL for the non-paper and said that his office would be the coordination point for the ROKG response. After a quick review of the paper, he said that he thought the ROKG policy was already largely in line with the recommendations since the ROK has no banking relationships with the DPRK, and because the ROKG had already taken steps to enforce export controls. He understood that the USG would be interested in further ROKG steps on PSI. Hahn promised to coordinate a ROKG response soon, asked if that responses along with response from the other addressee countries could affect the USG approach to enforcing UNSC 1695, and asked for any available information about USG implementation of UNSC 1695, including timing. ¶3. (C) Separately, A/POL delivered reftel points to Cho Koo-rae, MOFAT's Director of North Korean Nuclear Affairs Division II. Cho undertook to obtain guidance from higher authorities but informally raised questions about the proposed approach. He wondered whether the non-paper went beyond the scope of UNSCR 1695 by suggesting measures to interdict proliferation-related goods and suggested there might be other options than endorsement of the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. Looking at Section C of the USG-provided non-paper titled "Land, Air and Other International Transit of Proliferation-Related Goods," Cho wondered under what legal authority the USG and others would interdict planes and ships bound to or from North Korea. Who would decide whether the information was solid enough to block the suspected transit? Cho was concerned that countries would be enlisted to block third-party exports or imports. ¶4. (C) In addition, econoff delivered relevant financial portions of reftel to Oh Young-ju, Director of MOFAT's United Nations Division. Econoff received no substantive reply. STANTON