Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL2460
2006-07-21 10:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
UNIFICATION MINISTRY DISCUSSES DPRK RESTRICTIONS
VZCZCXYZ0045 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #2460/01 2021002 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 211002Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9241 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0976 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7424 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1053 RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1296 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002460
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR CHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: UNIFICATION MINISTRY DISCUSSES DPRK RESTRICTIONS
ON KAESONG AND FAMILY REUNIONS
REF: SEOUL 2254
Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002460
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR CHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: UNIFICATION MINISTRY DISCUSSES DPRK RESTRICTIONS
ON KAESONG AND FAMILY REUNIONS
REF: SEOUL 2254
Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Unification Ministry officials on July 21 told the
A/DCM that the North seemed to be showing its anger with the
ROKG decision to halt food and fertilizer assistance by
cutting inter-Korean governmental contact at the Kaesong
Industrial Complex and suspending family reunion projects.
The ROKG still sought to maintain a minimal amount of
inter-Korean dialogue, but assessed that the latest
North-South stalemate would take time, and perhaps a
high-level ROKG emissary, to overcome. END SUMMARY.
.
DPRK RESPONDS TO ROKG AID CURTAILMENT
--------------
2. (C) During a July 21 luncheon, Um Jeong-sik, Director
General for Unification Policy Planning at the Ministry of
Unification (MOU),and his colleagues told the A/DCM that the
North earlier that day demanded that ROKG officials vacate a
joint economic cooperation liaison office located in the
Kaesong Industrial Complex, the only ROKG presence in North
Korea. This followed the DPRK decision this week to suspend
humanitarian projects, including a plan for videoconferenced
family reunions that was set for August and construction on a
13-story family reunion facility at Mt. Kumgang, North Korea.
3. (C) Um explained that at the 19th round of inter-Korean
ministerials last week in Busan, the DPRK delegation was
unusually forceful in its demand for more food and fertilizer
assistance. In the past, the DPRK would generally request
humanitarian aid in a quieter manner, such as on the last day
of ministerials or in a pull-aside with South Korean
delegates. When the South refused to accommodate the DPRK
demands and instead expressed regret over the missile
launches and called on the DPRK to return to the Six Party
Talks, the North Koreans warned that Seoul would have to pay
for its decision. Um said the recent expulsions and
cancellations were part of the "North Korean bill." (NOTE:
Assistant Unification Minister Park Chan-bong on July 6
opined to the A/DCM that if the ROK refused food and
fertilizer aid the North might respond by halting family
reunions (reftel). END NOTE.)
.
STALEMATE NOT NEW FOR NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE
--------------
4. (C) Um mentioned that the DPRK response was unfortunate,
but it was not unusual. Inter-Korean talks had broken down
before, most notably in 2001 after the South raised its alert
status after the September 11 attacks, and again in 2004
after the airlift of some 450 North Korean refugees to South
Korea from Vietnam. Both times North-South ministerials were
delayed for about a year, only to be resumed after the South
sent a high-level emissary, then Special Presidential
Security Adviser Lim Dong-won in 2002 and then Unification
Minister Chung Dong-young in 2005, to see North Korean leader
Kim Jong-il. (COMMENT: Um did not say that a visit by
Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok was being considered.
However, some press have speculated that when the next round
of ministerials, yet to be scheduled, are held in the North,
it would provide a natural occasion for Minister Lee, in his
role as chief ROKG delegate, to seek a meeting with Kim
Jong-il. END COMMENT.)
5. (C) Asked whether the ROKG had experienced any public
pressure to restore humanitarian aid to salvage family
reunions, Um said that it was too soon for that kind of
pressure to mount, but over time it would be expected to
rise. Um said that military exercises scheduled for this
summer, including Rim of the Pacific Exercises (RIMPAC) in
July and the U.S.-ROK Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) in August, would
probably delay inter-Korean talks regardless of the current
situation. The ROKG was likely to adopt a wait-and-see
attitude to ascertain how upset the North was this time and
inter-Korean relations would probably worsen before they
improved.
6. (C) Um speculated that it was relatively painless for
North Korea to stop inter-Korean governmental contacts at the
Kaesong Industrial Complex, to suspend family reunions, and
to postpone construction on the family reunion center because
none of these things really cost the North anything. Echoing
what A/MOU Park said on July 6, it would probably cost the
South something to eventually turn these things back on.
Still, the North might feel some pressure to get fertilizer
restarted because it would not want to miss the planting
season.
.
NEXT STEPS
--------------
7. (C) Um opined that he thought it unlikely that the North
would seek to enflame inter-Korean and international tension
by doing anything as significant as a nuclear test. Um also
thought it unlikely that the North would conduct another long
range missile test in the near future.
8. (C) Um commented that he was unsure whether North Korean
Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun would agree to meet with the
foreign ministers of the Six Party Talks member countries on
the sidelines of next week's meetings at the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF). FM Paek's background was on inter-Korean
affairs, so he might have less confidence or even less
authority to conduct a meeting with the Secretary because he
lacked experience on U.S.-DPRK matters, Um said.
9. (C) In discussing the Arirang Festival, Um stated that
the ROKG was not planning to send a government delegation,
but it was unlikely to stop South Korean citizens from
attending the event. Um noted that a better term for the
event might be the "Arirang Performance," adding that it was
more of a Broadway musical than a celebration of North Korean
ideology. He emphasized that UNSCR 1695 was targeted against
DPRK WMD programs and there was no direct link to the Arirang
events. The A/DCM suggested that the optics of South Korean
officials going to Pyongyang to view a homage to Kim Il-Sung
would not be welcomed in many capitals. Especially in the
aftermath of the missile launches, the ROKG might want to
consider issuing some kind of travel advisory or at least
state Seoul's view of the event, even if it would not ban
civilian travel to the North, the A/DCM said.
10. (C) Um remarked that the ROKG had yet to decide whether
it would send a ROKG delegation to the August 15 Liberation
Day or the Arirang events in North Korea. He noted that ROKG
participation in the Liberation Day events was a reciprocal
commitment and a follow-up to a DPRK delegation that visited
Seoul last year. The head of the 200-person DPRK delegation
last year visited the National Cemetery in Seoul and met with
President Roh Moo-hyun.
VERSHBOW
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR CHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: UNIFICATION MINISTRY DISCUSSES DPRK RESTRICTIONS
ON KAESONG AND FAMILY REUNIONS
REF: SEOUL 2254
Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Unification Ministry officials on July 21 told the
A/DCM that the North seemed to be showing its anger with the
ROKG decision to halt food and fertilizer assistance by
cutting inter-Korean governmental contact at the Kaesong
Industrial Complex and suspending family reunion projects.
The ROKG still sought to maintain a minimal amount of
inter-Korean dialogue, but assessed that the latest
North-South stalemate would take time, and perhaps a
high-level ROKG emissary, to overcome. END SUMMARY.
.
DPRK RESPONDS TO ROKG AID CURTAILMENT
--------------
2. (C) During a July 21 luncheon, Um Jeong-sik, Director
General for Unification Policy Planning at the Ministry of
Unification (MOU),and his colleagues told the A/DCM that the
North earlier that day demanded that ROKG officials vacate a
joint economic cooperation liaison office located in the
Kaesong Industrial Complex, the only ROKG presence in North
Korea. This followed the DPRK decision this week to suspend
humanitarian projects, including a plan for videoconferenced
family reunions that was set for August and construction on a
13-story family reunion facility at Mt. Kumgang, North Korea.
3. (C) Um explained that at the 19th round of inter-Korean
ministerials last week in Busan, the DPRK delegation was
unusually forceful in its demand for more food and fertilizer
assistance. In the past, the DPRK would generally request
humanitarian aid in a quieter manner, such as on the last day
of ministerials or in a pull-aside with South Korean
delegates. When the South refused to accommodate the DPRK
demands and instead expressed regret over the missile
launches and called on the DPRK to return to the Six Party
Talks, the North Koreans warned that Seoul would have to pay
for its decision. Um said the recent expulsions and
cancellations were part of the "North Korean bill." (NOTE:
Assistant Unification Minister Park Chan-bong on July 6
opined to the A/DCM that if the ROK refused food and
fertilizer aid the North might respond by halting family
reunions (reftel). END NOTE.)
.
STALEMATE NOT NEW FOR NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE
--------------
4. (C) Um mentioned that the DPRK response was unfortunate,
but it was not unusual. Inter-Korean talks had broken down
before, most notably in 2001 after the South raised its alert
status after the September 11 attacks, and again in 2004
after the airlift of some 450 North Korean refugees to South
Korea from Vietnam. Both times North-South ministerials were
delayed for about a year, only to be resumed after the South
sent a high-level emissary, then Special Presidential
Security Adviser Lim Dong-won in 2002 and then Unification
Minister Chung Dong-young in 2005, to see North Korean leader
Kim Jong-il. (COMMENT: Um did not say that a visit by
Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok was being considered.
However, some press have speculated that when the next round
of ministerials, yet to be scheduled, are held in the North,
it would provide a natural occasion for Minister Lee, in his
role as chief ROKG delegate, to seek a meeting with Kim
Jong-il. END COMMENT.)
5. (C) Asked whether the ROKG had experienced any public
pressure to restore humanitarian aid to salvage family
reunions, Um said that it was too soon for that kind of
pressure to mount, but over time it would be expected to
rise. Um said that military exercises scheduled for this
summer, including Rim of the Pacific Exercises (RIMPAC) in
July and the U.S.-ROK Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) in August, would
probably delay inter-Korean talks regardless of the current
situation. The ROKG was likely to adopt a wait-and-see
attitude to ascertain how upset the North was this time and
inter-Korean relations would probably worsen before they
improved.
6. (C) Um speculated that it was relatively painless for
North Korea to stop inter-Korean governmental contacts at the
Kaesong Industrial Complex, to suspend family reunions, and
to postpone construction on the family reunion center because
none of these things really cost the North anything. Echoing
what A/MOU Park said on July 6, it would probably cost the
South something to eventually turn these things back on.
Still, the North might feel some pressure to get fertilizer
restarted because it would not want to miss the planting
season.
.
NEXT STEPS
--------------
7. (C) Um opined that he thought it unlikely that the North
would seek to enflame inter-Korean and international tension
by doing anything as significant as a nuclear test. Um also
thought it unlikely that the North would conduct another long
range missile test in the near future.
8. (C) Um commented that he was unsure whether North Korean
Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun would agree to meet with the
foreign ministers of the Six Party Talks member countries on
the sidelines of next week's meetings at the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF). FM Paek's background was on inter-Korean
affairs, so he might have less confidence or even less
authority to conduct a meeting with the Secretary because he
lacked experience on U.S.-DPRK matters, Um said.
9. (C) In discussing the Arirang Festival, Um stated that
the ROKG was not planning to send a government delegation,
but it was unlikely to stop South Korean citizens from
attending the event. Um noted that a better term for the
event might be the "Arirang Performance," adding that it was
more of a Broadway musical than a celebration of North Korean
ideology. He emphasized that UNSCR 1695 was targeted against
DPRK WMD programs and there was no direct link to the Arirang
events. The A/DCM suggested that the optics of South Korean
officials going to Pyongyang to view a homage to Kim Il-Sung
would not be welcomed in many capitals. Especially in the
aftermath of the missile launches, the ROKG might want to
consider issuing some kind of travel advisory or at least
state Seoul's view of the event, even if it would not ban
civilian travel to the North, the A/DCM said.
10. (C) Um remarked that the ROKG had yet to decide whether
it would send a ROKG delegation to the August 15 Liberation
Day or the Arirang events in North Korea. He noted that ROKG
participation in the Liberation Day events was a reciprocal
commitment and a follow-up to a DPRK delegation that visited
Seoul last year. The head of the 200-person DPRK delegation
last year visited the National Cemetery in Seoul and met with
President Roh Moo-hyun.
VERSHBOW