UNSCR ON DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES: ROK RESPONSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002296 SIPDIS SIPDIS BEIJING PASS TO A/S HILL E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION TAGS: PREL PARM MARR UNSC KN KS SUBJECT: UNSCR ON DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES: ROK RESPONSE REF: STATE 113389 Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met on July 11 with Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon to urge Seoul to reconsider its opposition to the Japanese draft UNSCR on DPRK missile launches. This was in follow-up to a series of exchanges on July 10 with National Security Advisor Song Min-soon. Ban, like Song the previous day, was insistent that the ROK was opposed to the Chapter 7 reference in the Japanese draft UNSCR, since it implied the possibility of military action. Moreover, Ban reiterated that Japanese Cabinet Secretary Abe's remarks that Japan could consider conducting preemptive strikes against the missile launch sites had left Seoul no choice but to go public in opposing any references to Chapter ¶7. On July 11, A/DCM also contacted MOFAT DG Cho Tae-yong. His response was along the same lines as Song and Ban. END SUMMARY. . NSA SONG'S JULY 10 DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR -------------- - ¶2. (C) On July 10, the Ambassador told NSA Song Min-soon that it would be unfortunate, especially after Assistant Secretary Hill's successful visit, to project an image of SIPDIS U.S.-ROK disagreement over the UNSCR. The Ambassador noted that the resolution did not specifically authorize the use of force, and the operational paragraphs related to blocking missile technology transfers to and from the DPRK -- something the South Koreans were already committed to support. The ROKs should wait and see how the resolution evolves before criticizing it publicly and creating the appearance of a Seoul-Washington rift. It would be good if they could express their support for the counter-proliferation goals of the draft resolution. ¶3. (C) NSA Song responded that the UNSCR had direct consequences for South Korea, yet the ROK had not been consulted prior to the resolution being "put in blue." Moreover, regarding timing, Song said Seoul was concerned that the resolution may be voted on before we could all take stock of the results of the stiff message the ROK will convey to the North Koreans at the July 11 inter-Korean ministerial talks in Busan, as well as Wu Dawei's visit to Pyongyang that was just beginning. ¶4. (C) Subsequently, the Ambassador contacted Song again to stress that going public with their objections would go down badly in Washington. Even if technically the Koreans were criticizing the Japanese, the U.S. supported the resolution as it stood and was urging UNSC members to vote for it. Therefore, this would be seen as a rebuke to the USG. Substantively, the resolution had to contain references to Chapter 7 because of the serious threats of North Korean WMD programs and proliferation risks. The UNSC action must have teeth, the Ambassador underlined. ¶5. (C) Going through Seoul's concerns, which he attributed to President Roh himself, who only learned about the resolution Monday morning, Song said that the remarks by Japanese Cabinet Secretary Abe had significantly inflamed the ROKG views. Abe was essentially saying that Japan could consider preemptively attacking North Korean missile sites. Therefore, any reference to Chapter 7 could be interpreted as a threat to use force. . MINISTER BAN POINTS TO JAPAN -------------- ¶6. (C) On July 11, the Ambassador informed Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon that A/S Hill was returning to Beijing to stress that Washington agreed to delay a vote on the Japanese draft UNSC resolution but would look to Chinese diplomatic efforts in considering next steps. Washington wanted Beijing to persuade North Korea to return to the Six Party Talks, reaffirm its missile moratorium, and begin implementing the September 19 Joint Statement. We would review the situation day by day. If the DPRK did not deliver on all three points, we would seek a vote on the UNSCR. A Presidential Statement was not an acceptable alternative. The Ambassador reiterated the concerns expressed to NSA Song regarding Seoul's opposition to the UNSCR. ¶7. (C) Foreign Minister Ban responded by emphasizing ROK concerns over the DPRK missile launches and said Seoul fully supported the necessity of UNSC member countries sending a strong message to North Korea about its provocative steps. At the North-South ministerial talks in Busan, Unification Minister Lee would convey ROK, U.S., and international concerns directly to North Korean officials to give them a full picture of the international environment. Ban insisted that South Korean diplomacy related to the Japanese resolution was not an effort to impede U.S. and international efforts to find a peaceful and diplomatic resolution, and he sought to reassure Washington that Seoul did not want any misunderstandings. ¶8. (C) Ban said, however, that alarming and surprising Japanese leaders' statements, including remarks about preemptive military actions, as well as a lack of prior consultations from Tokyo, forced Seoul to look again at the Chapter 7 references. The Japanese draft resolution did not contain specific military elements, as the Ambassador had pointed out, but by referring to Chapter 7 it gave the impression that as the situation developed it might be easier for the UNSC to invoke another tougher Chapter 7 action. UNSC decisions should be unanimous or we risked creating gaps that North Korea could exploit. Japanese statements created apprehensions and suspicions that might cause others, like China, to have their own doubts. Those doubts combined with the Chapter 7 references might make a UNSC resolution unfeasible by seeming out of proportion to the DPRK actions. Ban added that he hoped the Chinese diplomatic mission to Pyongyang would produce positive results. . A/DCM SEPARATELY SPEAKS TO MOFAT -------------- ¶9. (C) On July 11, A/DCM separately conveyed USG concerns to MOFAT DG Cho Tae-yong that South Koreans were now actively working to oppose the UNSC resolution on DPRK missiles. A/DCM stressed that such activity negated the outcome of A/S Hill's recent meetings in Seoul during which we had agreed on the critical importance of providing a unified diplomatic response to the recent North Korean missile launches. ¶10. (C) Cho also said that Seoul's main concern was over the Chapter 7 reference in the resolution. Alarm bells went off in Seoul, Cho said, because of Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe's remarks on July 10 that Japan could SIPDIS preemptively attack the launch base in North Korea. Such views were unacceptable to the ROKG. Cho said that Abe's remarks were entirely inappropriate, recalling that various communications between Seoul and Washington in the wake of the recent North Korean missile launches, including those between the two Presidents and FM Ban and Secretary Rice, were centered around diplomatic responses. The draft resolution should not make references to Chapter 7, because that could justify Abe's views, Cho said. ¶11. (C) A/DCM said that Washington was committed to Chapter 7 reference because of the dangers posed by the North Korean WMD program. North Korea was a self-declared nuclear power; its recent missile launches had threatened peace in the region; it was a known proliferator. Cho said he would convey Washington's position to higher authorities. VERSHBOW