A/MOU EXPLAINS ROK ENGAGEMENT WITH DPRK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002254 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR CHA E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KS KN SUBJECT: A/MOU EXPLAINS ROK ENGAGEMENT WITH DPRK REF: SECSTATE 111144 Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The A/DCM called on Assistant Minister of Unification Park Chan-bong on July 6 to verify that the ROKG planned to proceed with a final portion of an earlier pledge of fertilizer assistance to the DPRK and intended to hold an inter-Korean ministerial next week as scheduled despite the North Korean missile launches. Park explained that after considerable internal discussions, Seoul concluded that breaking off North-South dialogue was not wise because restarting talks later would be too costly and difficult. Instead, the ROKG would use the ministerial to deliver a stern message to the North, including the point that the DPRK demand for an additional 500,000 tons of rice and 100,000 tons of fertilizer was threatened. (Subsequently, Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok told the Ambassador that the only agenda items in the ministerials would be missiles and Six Party Talks; septel follows.) The ROK was also taking quiet steps to increase pressure on the North without unnecessarily playing into the hand of DPRK hardliners. END SUMMARY. . USG: NEED FOR A TOUGHER MESSAGE TO DPRK -------------- ¶2. (C) On July 6, the A/DCM requested a meeting with the Assistant Minister of Unification Park Chan-bong to deliver reftel points that stressed the importance of international pressure on North Korea in response to the missile launches. The A/DCM emphasized that Washington wanted to avoid escalation, demonstrate international concern about bad DPRK behavior, and pursue a diplomatic track that included the Six Party Talks. However, there was a perception that Seoul was not doing enough to show that it was not business as usual in its policies towards North Korea. Public statements by the Unification Minister that Seoul would complete the remaining shipments of fertilizer aid this week and that inter-Korean talks set for July 11-14 would be held as planned raised questions. . ROKG: BETTER TO AVOID ESCALATION -------------- ¶3. (C) Park responded that prior to the launch Seoul had delivered the message to Pyongyang that missile tests could not but hinder inter-Korean relations. Park noted that Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok earlier in the day had reiterated to the National Assembly that Seoul would withhold additional assistance to the North. As to the question of continued fertilizer aid this week, Park insisted that the South had almost completed delivery on the latest pledge of 200,000 tons, with only 24,000 tons remaining. With the biggest chunk already sent, Seoul wanted to lead by example and fulfill its own commitment rather than cancel something at the last minute like the North sometimes does. At next week's inter-Korean talks, however, Seoul would explain that in the wake of the missile launches the ROKG would not be able to accept an expected North Korean demand for an additional 500,000 tons of rice and 100,000 tons of fertilizer. This would provide the North with an immediate consequence to its action. ¶4. (C) The ROK would hold the next round of inter-Korean ministerial talks July 11-14 in Busan, South Korea because it was better to have a communication channel with North Korea, Park said. The ROK intended, however, to deliver a different message than had the North not fired its missiles. Specifically it would impress on the North that it made a very bad move. Park added that the North would be made to feel it not just to hear it. Seoul would also urge Pyongyang to rejoin Six Party Talks. ¶5. (C) Moreover, Park said, the North-South talks in of themselves were not that beneficial to the DPRK and suggested that canceling talks would hurt the South more than the North. With Seoul intending to interrupt humanitarian assistance, the North did not stand to gain much. However, were Seoul to cancel the talks, the South might have to pay something to eventually get them restarted. It was cheaper for the South to use the talks to deliver a message of dissatisfaction directly to the North Koreans. . QUIET INITIAL STEPS -------------- ¶6. (C) After the missile launches, the South had decided to postpone military liaison talks planned for the following day (July 7),Park noted. The North on July 3, prior to the launch, had proposed liaison talks to focus on scheduling another round of General Officer meetings. ROKG officials were also holding back on approving new investor permits for the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The South was not heavily publicizing these actions, which, unfortunately, led to the perception that Seoul had not taken any steps. ¶7. (C) Speculating on other steps, Park mentioned that the North was preparing for its annual Arirang Festival that last year attracted tens of thousand of South Korean visitors that resulted in perhaps tens of millions of dollars worth of revenue. If South Korean and other international visitors chose not to attend the festival, that might have an economic affect on the North. (COMMENT: Park stopped short of saying that Seoul would seek to ban such travel to North, but seemed to imply that a voluntary decision not to visit the North might have the desired affect of hurting the North without leaving ROK fingerprints. END COMMENT). Asked what the Seoul was giving up if it did not deliver additional rice and fertilizer aid, Park opined that it might be harder for the South to get more family reunions in the near future. VERSHBOW