ROKG OFFICIALS DISCUSS DPRK MISSILES, KIC,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002227 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR CHA E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 TAGS: PREL MNUC ETRD KS KN SUBJECT: ROKG OFFICIALS DISCUSS DPRK MISSILES, KIC, ALLIANCE WITH SENATE STAFFER JANNUZI Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a series of meetings on June 28, SFRC Professional Staff Member Frank Jannuzi told officials from the Ministry of Unification (MOU),Ministry of National Defense (MND),and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) that the ROK should seek to dissuade a DPRK missile launch. Seoul could announce that a DPRK missile launch would compel the ROK to review its engagement policies, implement security measures, expand multilateral coordination, and support UNSC discussions. Providing his impressions from his June 26 visit to the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC),he encouraged Seoul not to seek KIC inclusion in a U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement. He also emphasized that differences of the threat perception of North Korea should not become the focus of the bilateral alliance. The ROKG officials emphasized that Seoul opposed a possible DPRK missile launch, expressed concerns over the controversy surrounding KIC in the context of the FTA, and agreed that the alliance transcended the DPRK threat. Jannuzi also met with progressive NGO representatives to discuss the alliance. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On June 28, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Professional Staff Member Frank Jannuzi met with ROK officials in three separate meetings to discuss North Korea, the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and the U.S.-ROK alliance. The ROKG officials included: - Park Chan-bong, Assistant Minister for Unification (MOU); - Kim Kyou-hyun, Director General, International Policy Bureau, Ministry of National Defense (MND); and - Cho Byung-jae, Deputy Director General, North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). . EFFORTS TO STOP DPRK MISSILE LAUNCH -------------- ¶3. (C) Jannuzi suggested Seoul take the occasion to create a strategy to influence Pyongyang to cease launch preparations and demonstrate a strong allied response. Prior to a launch, President Roh Moo-hyun should announce that Seoul took the matter seriously and would review all aspects of the North-South relationship after a launch. Some force adjustments should be implemented. Multilateral efforts should be strengthened, perhaps Six Party Talks even without North Korea. Finally, Seoul should support UNSC discussions. Together, these steps would signal that Seoul would not conduct business as usual, that security was the priority, and that Seoul supported multilateral cooperation. After a DPRK launch, Seoul should issue the statement that the ROK was working with its friends and allies on next steps. Seoul and Washington should fully share intelligence to avoid any differences in assessments and reassure markets. Jannuzi said that on June 27 he had shared these ideas with Moon Chung-in, a close adviser to President Roh, and had received a positive response. ¶4. (C) MOU Assistant Minister Park noted that Seoul was growing increasingly frustrated with North Korean antics and the May 31 local election results indicated that the South Korean public was as well. The North had failed to follow through on commitments to allow the trail runs of trains on the inter-Korean railroad, provide flexibility on a proposed visit to North Korea by former President Kim Dae-jung, nor extend cooperation for flood control measures for the Imjin River. Excuses citing DPRK military objections raised doubts whether DPRK negotiators could deliver on their agreements. ¶5. (C) MND DG Kim responded that Seoul had been sending the message in inter-Korean talks that it would not be business as usual following a launch. President Roh would find it hard to stay on the same course after a launch, especially after the May local elections that were a setback for the ruling party. Raising the DEFCON status would probably be too extreme, but limited force posture adjustments would be appropriate. Asked about missile defense, he said that the ROKG considered DPRK artillery more of an immediate threat, however the strategic implication of a stronger DPRK missile force, for example on the allied ability to respond to any DPRK provocation, was not lost on more forward-looking planners. ¶6. (C) MOFAT DDG Cho also emphasized that Seoul had delivered warnings to North Korea about a missile test. Seoul had also recently announced that NSA Song Min-soon would visit Washington in July for discussions on a September summit. High-level bilateral U.S.-ROK talks, including a possible July visit by Secretary Rice, would reinforce the bilateral cooperation and coordination. . YOU CAN'T SPELL FTA WITH KIC -------------- ¶7. (C) Jannuzi told the ROKG officials that Congress would not bless a U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that included the Kaseong Industrial Complex (KIC). Neither Democrats nor Republicans were willing to extend trade benefits to goods manufactured in North Korea, even if existing questions about workers' pay were resolved. The ROK should not put itself in a situation where it judged the FTA's success on whether it included the KIC because that would not be achieved. Insistence on the KIC could jeopardize the FTA. ¶8. (C) Jannuzi reassured the ROKG officials that he had a positive impression of the KIC from his June 26 visit and from the views of other U.S. visitors to the KIC. The KIC provided real skills, modern facilities, and a take-home monthly wage of 6,000 North Korean won, according to information provided to Jannuzi. Regardless of the exchange rate, the pay was still double that of a North Korean professor. The KIC would have a positive influence on North Korean lives. One could argue that Seoul was liberating North Korea one industrial complex at a time. Once the North Korean nuclear situation was resolved the environment would change, and the September 19 Joint Statement contained the path for improved relations and a lifting of sanctions. For now, however, the ROK should keep its eyes on the prize, a U.S.-ROK FTA. ¶9. (C) MOFAT DDG Cho responded that this was the strongest negative message he had heard. If South Korea could not export KIC items, this would hurt the prospects of the complex. KIC should be viewed as planting the seed of capitalism in North Korean soil. He undertook to report Jannuzi's sobering assessment to his government. (COMMENT: While inclusion of KIC in a KORUS FTA may never have been described explicitly as a "poison pill," various USG officials--in a number of venues--have explained this impossibility to many senior ROKG officials. END COMMENT) ALLIANCE IS GREATER THAN DPRK THREAT -------------- ¶10. (C) Jannuzi and the ROKG officials shared the view that the U.S.-ROK alliance stems from shared values, interests, and institutions. Jannuzi said that we should not allow the perceived differences on the threat perception from North Korea becoming portrayed as the defining element of the alliance. Seoul and Washington are cooperating in the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. They both wanted democracy, prosperity, and stability in Northeast Asia. These values would remain the same even after Korean unification. It would be beneficial if current issues, such as USFK base realignment could be realized to promote smoother relations. If would be helpful for the U.S.-ROK alliance to help solidify the U.S. role in the region and compliment the U.S. alliance with Japan, and this needed better ROK-Japanese relations. ¶11. (C) MND DG Kim remarked that President Roh had passed out a book, loosely translated as "Korea Again Stands At a Crossroads of Survival," written by Bae Ki-chan, to his advisers and urged them to consider the future role of Korea. Kim said that the book discussed the need for multilateralism in a world influenced by balances-of-power relationships, including the United States and a rising China. Kim opined that Seoul would continue to value the alliance with the United States in part because Seoul lived in a dangerous neighborhood. He added his hope that current USFK-related issues, such as environmental remediation, would be quickly resolved to facilitate USFK realignment on the Peninsula and strengthen the alliance. ¶12. (C) MOFAT DDG Cho emphasized that the alliance was in good shape, despite the perception otherwise. Earlier misunderstandings about the "balancer" concept caused some discomfort. Seoul did not seek to balance between the United States and China. Based on a strong relationship with Washington, Seoul would be able to work closely to prevent tension between China and Japan from upsetting the future of the region. Seoul understood that current ROK-Japan problems were adding to U.S. problems, and Seoul hoped a change in Japanese leadership later this year would prove helpful. MOFAT also sought a speedy solution to the issue of environmental remediation of USFK areas to allow base returns. Cho agreed that South Korean environmental NGOs were missing the point in creating excessive controversy because the sooner the land was returned to the ROKG, the sooner the land could be cleaned up and put to better use. Cho counseled more flexibility from both sides would prevent further delays. . REACHING OUT TO NGOS -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Jannuzi discussed a wide range of issues with representatives from five progressive NGOs. Yoo Young-jae, from the Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea, asked about USFK's "strategic flexibility"; Lee Tae-ho, from the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, asked about Iraq and U.S. draft legislation on North Korea; Jung Gyung-lan, from Women Making Peace, asked about Iran, North Korea, and the North Korea policy coordinator draft legislation; Park Sung-youg, from Nonviolent Peaceforce Korea, asked about USFK; and, Cho Hee-yeon, from the Korean Alliance Against Korea-U.S. FTA, asked about FTA negotiations. VERSHBOW