KORUS FTA: SENIOR BLUE HOUSE OFFICIALS PLEDGE

UNCLAS SEOUL 001963 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS PASS USTR FOR BHATIA, CUTLER, AUGEROT AND KI STATE FOR E, EB, EB/TPP AND EAP/K COMMERCE FOR 4431/MAC/OPB/EAP/DUTTON TREASURY FOR IA/ISA/DOHNER AND BUCKLEY USDA ALSO FOR FAS/ITP/CLAUS AND GRUNENFELDER NSC FOR SHIRZAD, HUNTER, CHA AND COLLINS GENEVA FOR USTR E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD PGOV KS SUBJECT: KORUS FTA: SENIOR BLUE HOUSE OFFICIALS PLEDGE SUPPORT FOR THE FTA Ref: Seoul 1858 SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) A troika of key senior Blue House officials told the Ambassador that they are paying very close attention to the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). The Chief Secretary to the President for National Policy outlined the SIPDIS Korean government's plans for internal coordination among ministries and outreach to private business and the media. The Ambassador stressed the need for continued positive messaging, and emphasized our concerns over the negative direction taken on pharmaceuticals pricing policy. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador met June 7-9 with Chief Secretary to the President for National Policy Kwon O-kyu, Minister for Policy Coordination Kim Young-ju, and Presidential Economic Advisor Chung Moon-soo, to discuss progress under the ongoing KORUS FTA negotiations. CONCERNS OVER MESSAGING AND PHARMACEUTICALS -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In each of these meetings, as he did in his June 2 meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Han Duck-soo (reftel), the Ambassador stressed the need for continued positive messaging about the KORUS FTA. It is not useful for Korean officials to portray the agreement as a "necessary evil" imposed by the United States, the Ambassador explained. Rather, officials should stick to more positive "win-win" themes, especially given Korea's own role in persuading the United States to negotiate an FTA. The Ambassador explained that the U.S. negotiating team has been pleased with the degree of preparation and quality of their Korean counterparts. ¶4. (SBU) Concerning pharmaceuticals trade issues, the Ambassador stressed the United States' displeasure at the Ministry of Health and Welfare's sudden move to adopt a "positive list" system for reimbursement under the national health care plan. The prices of foreign drugs are not the crux of Korea's healthcare financing problems, the Ambassador noted, and it is unfair for innovative pharmaceuticals prices to be singled out for containment. Furthermore, the Ambassador stressed that we saw the sudden policy shift -- despite previous assurances to the contrary -- as a breach of faith that undermines U.S. confidence that Korea will sincerely address pharmaceuticals issues in the course of the FTA talks, which is the appropriate forum. KOREAN GOVERNMENT INTERNALLY ALIGNED TO SUPPORT FTA -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Chief Secretary Kwon emphasized that President Roh remains sincerely dedicated to the goal of negotiating and ratifying the KORUS FTA, "without deviation." The KORUS FTA is Korea's "most important single initiative to boost future development," Kwon declared. The Chief Secretary downplayed the importance of the May 31 election results on Roh Administration policy. Even after that setback at the polls, Kwon said, the Uri Party is still stronger than it was at the start of the Roh Administration, and holds sufficient policy and parliamentary levers to get things done. Meanwhile, the opposition Grand National Party cannot overplay its hand in obstructing President Roh, for fear of alienating voters. ¶6. (SBU) Kwon admitted that domestic opposition to the KORUS FTA is well organized; in his opinion, the national coalition to fight the FTA is stronger than movements opposed to nuclear power or the move of U.S. military bases to Pyongtaek. The conjoining of real economic concerns with general civic group activism and anti-American ideology is proving to be a potent mix, Kwon noted, adding that anti-FTA forces have the sympathy of the broadcast media and have even organized provincial branch groups. In this context, he said, the government and pro-FTA forces need to stay "on message" and be careful to avoid missteps. ¶7. (SBU) Kwon then briefed the Ambassador on the Korean government's internal organization to support the FTA. There are four tasks, Kwon said: -- First, the negotiations themselves must be successfully completed. This effort will be led by "experts" at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). -- Second, the government must coordinate closely with private sector interests, particularly in the services sector but also in other industries. The Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) is in charge of this endeavor. -- Third, there is the matter of "handling the FTA politically," which "is something bureaucrats are less skilled at," Kwon said. This means meeting with opposition groups and mollifying them and solving problems created by their opposition. At the Cabinet level, this effort will primarily involve the Blue House Senior Secretary for Civil Affairs, as well as Minister for Policy Coordination Kim Young-ju, who reports to the Prime Minister. -- Finally, there is the matter of public relations. Outreach efforts are to be managed and coordinated by the Blue House Senior Secretary for Public Affairs, Kwon said. The Blue House, for example, is planning public forums involving both pro-FTA and anti-FTA representatives, Kwon said, in order to draw out the anti-FTA forces and undermine the legitimacy of their emotional arguments. ¶8. (SBU) All four teams, Chief Secretary Kwon said, are to be managed by Kwon himself. To facilitate internal communication, Kwon said that he will chair a weekly meeting each Monday to review progress and reach decisions. ¶9. (SBU) Kwon said that he anticipates that the anti-FTA forces will exert their maximum efforts in the late summer, prior to the third round of negotiations. In anticipation of that development, Kwon said that he is planning to recommend that a special Presidential Committee chaired by the Prime Minister be established in August to handle the issues. Kwon said that he understood the Ambassador's points on the need for positive public messaging, and promised that the Blue House would continue to do its part. Kwon recalled his positive relationships in previous positions with USTR officials such as Nancy Adams, Sandy Kristoff and Dorothy Dwoskin, and explained that he understood the importance of a "win-win" spirit in negotiations. PHARMACEUTICALS: HEALTH MINISTRY "WAS CONVINCING" -------------- -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Regarding the pharmaceuticals issue, Kwon said that although he usually favors the position of trade officials over those of domestic regulators, "when the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) made a presentation about their 'positive list' plan, their logic was very compelling." That is why all the Korean economic Cabinet ministers decided to go along with the change to a positive list system, in consideration of the need to bring expanding health care expenditures under control. Kwon noted that a number of other advanced nations also use a positive list approach. ¶11. (SBU) Still, Kwon said that he realizes that this issue will need to be sorted out at the negotiating table. When doing so, Kwon said, both sides need to use logic and refer to global standards. In response, the Ambassador again emphasized our concern that the playing field for drug reimbursement and pricing is already not level, and that we are seriously worried that the positive list plan will skew things further. PUBLIC OUTREACH EFFORTS ARE IMPORTANT -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Presidential Economic Advisor Chung told the Ambassador that his office would be active in supporting the Blue House's public outreach efforts on the KORUS FTA, providing supportive research results and other arguments for use in public events. Chung noted that, to date, mainstream newspapers have been somewhat ambivalent about the FTA, while "progressive" news outlets have been highly critical. The Blue House will work hard to get out a more balanced view. Chung mentioned an upcoming July forum to be organized by the Korea Development Institute as one important opportunity. ¶13. (SBU) Asked for advice as to how the Embassy should approach public outreach, Chung said that we were on the right track in using speeches, published editorials and media interviews to get out our message. Chung cautioned against direct U.S. Government interaction with anti-FTA forces, for fear that such events might only make them stronger. ¶14. (SBU) Chung noted that the issue of whether goods produced in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) are included in the KORUS FTA could be an important political "hot potato," since it may be viewed as a litmus test of U.S.-ROK relations and our handling of North Korea. The Ambassador and EconMinCouns explained why Korea's proposal on this matter will be very difficult for the United States to accept, since it could prove to be a "poison pill" that would jeopardize Congressional support for the KORUS FTA. PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ALSO ENGAGED -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Minister for Policy Coordination Kim Young-ju confirmed that the Prime Minister's role in the KORUS FTA project is primarily that of an "enforcer" and "cheerleader," who will work with opposing groups to try to bring them around, and also participate in more general public affairs efforts. Kim said that he believes the two most difficult issues will be agriculture and Kaesong, and noted that the Prime Minister's Office would be closely engaged in the resolution of these issues. The Ambassador noted that given the Prime Minister's background and prior affiliation with civic groups, she will have a special credibility on FTA issues. ¶16. (SBU) Concerning the pharmaceuticals issue, Minister Kim said that he was aware of our concerns, and said that he supported further discussion of the issue within the FTA negotiations. Kim added that he was "sorry about the way the issue transpired." ¶17. (SBU) The Ambassador related that the U.S. negotiating team was appreciative of how well the Korean team had prepared for the first round; as a result, talks were going well. Minister Kim noted that the Korean government's resolve to follow through with the KORUS FTA should be clear from the "decisive action" it took on the screen quota to get the talks started. ¶18. (SBU) Minister Kim asked about the possibility of an extension of Trade Promotion Authority, and the Ambassador responded that at this juncture the prospect appears unlikely. Kim noted that faster progress under the Doha Round would make the KORUS FTA agricultural talks easier; absent that multilateral "cover," the FTA talks will be that much harder, Kim said. VERSHBOW