ISN DAS SEMMEL'S MAY 4 MEETING WITH ROK DEPUTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001620 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR CHA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016 TAGS: PREL MNUC MARR IR KS SUBJECT: ISN DAS SEMMEL'S MAY 4 MEETING WITH ROK DEPUTY MINISTER FOR POLICY PLANNING PARK IN-KOOK Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b, d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a May 4 meeting with Park In-kook, MOFAT Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations, ISN DAS Andrew Semmel said the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was likely to present a draft text of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMTC) later in the month. Responding to Park's question on whether a new bilateral Agreement for Cooperation on Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between Seoul and Washington would embody new obligations for the ROK, DAS Semmel said the general idea was that the current agreement was outdated given South Korea's current technological capacity as a potential major nuclear supplier. Park said the ROK supported the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP),but cautioned that many countries would be wary of India taking a leading role in implementing the program. The ROK generally supported the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, and the technical questions raised by the ROK delegation to the March 22-23 Nuclear Suppliers Group Consultative Group meeting in Vienna merely echoed those of other middle powers. In response to Park's query, DAS Semmel emphasized that the U.S. strategy on the Iranian nuclear problem was to continue to pressure Iran to cooperate with the IAEA, including seeking a UNSC resolution based on Chapter 7. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On May 4, ISN DAS Andrew Semmel met with Park In-kook, Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). Park was accompanied by MOFAT Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division Director Kwon Hee-seog and Deputy Director Lee Jeong-woo. HOPE TO HAVE FMTC TREATY TEXT AT NEXT CD IN GENEVA -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) DM Park stated that it was "high time" to reinforce bilateral cooperation between the United States and the ROK on nonproliferation issues, which meant working closely with Washington counterparts was one of his top priorities in his new position. DAS Semmel expressed appreciation for Park's interest in closer bilateral consultations, adding that the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) might be ready to present an inter-agency-approved draft text of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMTC) when the CD reconvened in May. The State Department and other relevant agencies worked extensively to come up with the current short text, which appeared to please all agencies so far. NEW AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION: ADD'L OBLIGATIONS FOR ROK? -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Park asked DAS Semmel to elaborate on his remarks at the May 1-4 meeting of the U.S.-ROK Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear Energy Cooperation, which touched upon the need to negotiate a new bilateral Agreement for Cooperation on Civil Uses of Atomic Energy that was reciprocal and covered two-way trade (the current agreement will expire in 2014). In particular, Park queried whether a new agreement would impose new obligations on the ROK to adhere to particular standards as a nuclear supplier. DAS Semmel responded that he had made a general comment on the need to move from the historically one-way nuclear trade between the United States and the ROK in light of South Korea's current level of technology. South Korea had moved away from depending on imported nuclear components and was now supplying steam generators and major reactor components to the United States, China, and other countries. With Korea's potential to be a major nuclear supplier, the current arrangement was no longer realistic. ROK SUPPORTS GNEP, WARY OF INDIA'S LEADING ROLE -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Park stated that the ROK's basic position toward the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) was that the idea was future-oriented, and should be developed and expanded for worldwide implementation. He asked what the USG had in mind regarding the implementation of GNEP -- i.e., whether to create an international organization for overseeing implementation or to focus on a series of bilateral negotiations, for example. He also asked how many countries the United States envisioned as "key partners" in the initiative, expressing concern about rumors of India being considered a "leading counterpart." Some member states might be wary of India taking on a leading role, Park cautioned. ¶6. (C) DAS Semmel responded that GNEP was a long-term strategy and that the idea was still in its infancy. The United States would, for the time being, concentrate on extensive outreach to potentially interested countries with nuclear technology -- such as the ROK and the P5 countries -- and assess the extent to which they supported the idea. The United States generally preferred informal arrangements over the creation of a new international organization and would first seek to maximize informal consultations and information sharing. There might be a need in the future, however, to institutionalize the dialogue to reduce overlap and redundancy, Semmel said. The G8 could provide a convenient mechanism for coordinating dialogue and activities. Although the GNEP would be a global partnership, the G8 could provide a convenient vehicle for all parties to come together. On the issue of India, Semmel stated that Washington had not approached India formally about taking a leading role in GNEP. He opined, however, that the United States probably would not dampen enthusiasm for the GNEP early in the process by raising potential partners' concerns. ROK GENERALLY SUPPORTS U.S.-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Responding to Park's point that President Roh Moo-hyun had commented positively on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, DAS Semmel asked him to clarify the ROK's stated position on the initiative from the March 22-23 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Consultative Group meeting in Vienna. The ROK delegation had, in Vienna, raised some difficult questions even though it expressed general agreement with the United States of overall objectives for the initiative. Director Kwon, reminding Semmel that he had made the presentation at the consultative group meeting, said he had raised the same technical questions that Ireland, Sweden, New Zealand, and other middle powers had raised before he had taken the floor. More importantly, however, former Deputy Minister Chun Yung-woo had expressed general support for the initiative in his late-January meeting with U/S Robert Joseph in Washington. Park said he would consult with ROKG inter-agency counterparts to refine the Seoul's position further on the initiative. IRAN -------------- ¶8. (C) Park asked whether the United States had a final strategy for resolving Iran's nuclear problem. Noting that the Western Group had circulated a draft UNSC resolution on May 4, which explicitly stated that Iran's nuclear program was subject to UN action under Chapter 7, Park expressed concern that the DPRK nuclear problem demonstrated the shortcomings of setting red lines if the parties repeatedly "moved the goal post" in a concessionary manner. The problem with the DPRK, said Park, was that Pyongyang had been spoiled by concessions from the international community. ¶9. (C) Semmel responded that the U.S. strategy was to continue pressuring Tehran. Washington had stated consistently to its friends and allies that: (1) the international community had to maintain pressure on Iran; (2) only through pressure would Iran cooperate with the IAEA; and, (3) delaying serious action on Iran gave it more time to conduct experiments and gain greater knowledge of fuel cycle technology. Because the Iranians believed that time was on their side, it was important to bring the issue to the UNSC and try to get a UNSC resolution based on Chapter 7. Washington would work towards including a deadline in the resolution for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and stop its uranium enrichment activities, since the Western Group's draft resolution did not call for sanctions or set deadlines. ¶10. (C) Park, recalling his meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki last month in Geneva, said Mottaki had proposed an international consortium (regional, including Asian countries) to complete Iran's fuel cycle. He thought perhaps Mottaki was responding to the Russian proposal for establishing an international fuel cycle center, which, to Park, suggested Iran's desire to keep some of its nuclear facilities. Semmel said this appeared to be another example of Iran's tactic of diverting the international community's attention from the real issue -- Tehran's disregard for the IAEA -- as it figured out how to improve its fuel cycle. The Russian proposal envisioned a joint program with Russia to develop low enriched uranium for power reactors. The Iranians rejected the proposal, likely because it wanted to control the full fuel cycle. CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS CTR MODEL APPLICABILITY TO DPRK -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Park said Seoul would host an international conference on nuclear nonproliferation June 6 covering a variety of issues, including GNEP and the applicability of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) models to countries like the DPRK. Semmel remarked that this was a worthwhile concept to explore early, as it would better prepare the United States and the ROK for retraining potentially thousands of North Korean scientists, engineers, and technicians to work in a commercial economy if the DPRK were to denuclearize. ¶12. (U) DAS Semmel has cleared this message. MINTON