ISN DAS SEMMEL'S MAY 4 MEETING WITH ROK DEPUTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001620

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016
TAGS: PREL MNUC MARR IR KS
SUBJECT: ISN DAS SEMMEL'S MAY 4 MEETING WITH ROK DEPUTY
MINISTER FOR POLICY PLANNING PARK IN-KOOK

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b, d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a May 4 meeting with Park In-kook, MOFAT Deputy
Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations,
ISN DAS Andrew Semmel said the U.S. delegation to the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) was likely to present a draft
text of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMTC) later in
the month. Responding to Park's question on whether a new
bilateral Agreement for Cooperation on Civil Uses of Atomic
Energy between Seoul and Washington would embody new
obligations for the ROK, DAS Semmel said the general idea was
that the current agreement was outdated given South Korea's
current technological capacity as a potential major nuclear
supplier. Park said the ROK supported the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership (GNEP),but cautioned that many countries
would be wary of India taking a leading role in implementing
the program. The ROK generally supported the U.S.-India
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, and the technical
questions raised by the ROK delegation to the March 22-23
Nuclear Suppliers Group Consultative Group meeting in Vienna
merely echoed those of other middle powers. In response to
Park's query, DAS Semmel emphasized that the U.S. strategy on
the Iranian nuclear problem was to continue to pressure Iran
to cooperate with the IAEA, including seeking a UNSC
resolution based on Chapter 7. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On May 4, ISN DAS Andrew Semmel met with Park
In-kook, Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and
International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (MOFAT). Park was accompanied by MOFAT Disarmament and
Nonproliferation Division Director Kwon Hee-seog and Deputy
Director Lee Jeong-woo.

HOPE TO HAVE FMTC TREATY TEXT AT NEXT CD IN GENEVA
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3. (C) DM Park stated that it was "high time" to reinforce
bilateral cooperation between the United States and the ROK
on nonproliferation issues, which meant working closely with
Washington counterparts was one of his top priorities in his
new position. DAS Semmel expressed appreciation for Park's
interest in closer bilateral consultations, adding that the
U.S. delegation to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) might
be ready to present an inter-agency-approved draft text of
the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMTC) when the CD
reconvened in May. The State Department and other relevant
agencies worked extensively to come up with the current short
text, which appeared to please all agencies so far.

NEW AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION: ADD'L OBLIGATIONS FOR ROK?
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4. (C) Park asked DAS Semmel to elaborate on his remarks at
the May 1-4 meeting of the U.S.-ROK Joint Standing Committee
on Nuclear Energy Cooperation, which touched upon the need to
negotiate a new bilateral Agreement for Cooperation on Civil
Uses of Atomic Energy that was reciprocal and covered two-way
trade (the current agreement will expire in 2014). In
particular, Park queried whether a new agreement would impose
new obligations on the ROK to adhere to particular standards
as a nuclear supplier. DAS Semmel responded that he had made
a general comment on the need to move from the historically
one-way nuclear trade between the United States and the ROK
in light of South Korea's current level of technology. South
Korea had moved away from depending on imported nuclear
components and was now supplying steam generators and major
reactor components to the United States, China, and other
countries. With Korea's potential to be a major nuclear
supplier, the current arrangement was no longer realistic.

ROK SUPPORTS GNEP, WARY OF INDIA'S LEADING ROLE
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5. (C) Park stated that the ROK's basic position toward the
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) was that the idea

was future-oriented, and should be developed and expanded for
worldwide implementation. He asked what the USG had in mind
regarding the implementation of GNEP -- i.e., whether to
create an international organization for overseeing
implementation or to focus on a series of bilateral
negotiations, for example. He also asked how many countries
the United States envisioned as "key partners" in the
initiative, expressing concern about rumors of India being
considered a "leading counterpart." Some member states might
be wary of India taking on a leading role, Park cautioned.


6. (C) DAS Semmel responded that GNEP was a long-term
strategy and that the idea was still in its infancy. The
United States would, for the time being, concentrate on
extensive outreach to potentially interested countries with
nuclear technology -- such as the ROK and the P5 countries --
and assess the extent to which they supported the idea. The
United States generally preferred informal arrangements over
the creation of a new international organization and would
first seek to maximize informal consultations and information
sharing. There might be a need in the future, however, to
institutionalize the dialogue to reduce overlap and
redundancy, Semmel said. The G8 could provide a convenient
mechanism for coordinating dialogue and activities. Although
the GNEP would be a global partnership, the G8 could provide
a convenient vehicle for all parties to come together. On
the issue of India, Semmel stated that Washington had not
approached India formally about taking a leading role in
GNEP. He opined, however, that the United States probably
would not dampen enthusiasm for the GNEP early in the process
by raising potential partners' concerns.

ROK GENERALLY SUPPORTS U.S.-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION
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7. (C) Responding to Park's point that President Roh
Moo-hyun had commented positively on the U.S.-India Civil
Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, DAS Semmel asked him to
clarify the ROK's stated position on the initiative from the
March 22-23 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Consultative Group
meeting in Vienna. The ROK delegation had, in Vienna, raised
some difficult questions even though it expressed general
agreement with the United States of overall objectives for
the initiative. Director Kwon, reminding Semmel that he had
made the presentation at the consultative group meeting, said
he had raised the same technical questions that Ireland,
Sweden, New Zealand, and other middle powers had raised
before he had taken the floor. More importantly, however,
former Deputy Minister Chun Yung-woo had expressed general
support for the initiative in his late-January meeting with
U/S Robert Joseph in Washington. Park said he would consult
with ROKG inter-agency counterparts to refine the Seoul's
position further on the initiative.

IRAN
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8. (C) Park asked whether the United States had a final
strategy for resolving Iran's nuclear problem. Noting that
the Western Group had circulated a draft UNSC resolution on
May 4, which explicitly stated that Iran's nuclear program
was subject to UN action under Chapter 7, Park expressed
concern that the DPRK nuclear problem demonstrated the
shortcomings of setting red lines if the parties repeatedly
"moved the goal post" in a concessionary manner. The problem
with the DPRK, said Park, was that Pyongyang had been spoiled
by concessions from the international community.


9. (C) Semmel responded that the U.S. strategy was to
continue pressuring Tehran. Washington had stated
consistently to its friends and allies that: (1) the
international community had to maintain pressure on Iran; (2)
only through pressure would Iran cooperate with the IAEA;
and, (3) delaying serious action on Iran gave it more time to
conduct experiments and gain greater knowledge of fuel cycle
technology. Because the Iranians believed that time was on
their side, it was important to bring the issue to the UNSC
and try to get a UNSC resolution based on Chapter 7.

Washington would work towards including a deadline in the
resolution for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and stop its
uranium enrichment activities, since the Western Group's
draft resolution did not call for sanctions or set deadlines.



10. (C) Park, recalling his meeting with the Iranian Foreign
Minister Mottaki last month in Geneva, said Mottaki had
proposed an international consortium (regional, including
Asian countries) to complete Iran's fuel cycle. He thought
perhaps Mottaki was responding to the Russian proposal for
establishing an international fuel cycle center, which, to
Park, suggested Iran's desire to keep some of its nuclear
facilities. Semmel said this appeared to be another example
of Iran's tactic of diverting the international community's
attention from the real issue -- Tehran's disregard for the
IAEA -- as it figured out how to improve its fuel cycle. The
Russian proposal envisioned a joint program with Russia to
develop low enriched uranium for power reactors. The
Iranians rejected the proposal, likely because it wanted to
control the full fuel cycle.

CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS CTR MODEL APPLICABILITY TO DPRK
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11. (C) Park said Seoul would host an international
conference on nuclear nonproliferation June 6 covering a
variety of issues, including GNEP and the applicability of
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) models to countries like
the DPRK. Semmel remarked that this was a worthwhile concept
to explore early, as it would better prepare the United
States and the ROK for retraining potentially thousands of
North Korean scientists, engineers, and technicians to work
in a commercial economy if the DPRK were to denuclearize.


12. (U) DAS Semmel has cleared this message.
MINTON