UNIFICATION MINISTER ON SIX PARTY TALKS, S/E

S E C R E T SEOUL 001470 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR CHA E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION TAGS: PREL PHUM MNUC EAID KN KS SUBJECT: UNIFICATION MINISTER ON SIX PARTY TALKS, S/E LEFKOWITZ'S APR 28 WALL STREET JOURNAL OP-ED ON NORTH KOREA Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b, d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a May 1 meeting with the Ambassador, Minister of Unification Lee Jong-seok said he believed, from his meetings with North Korean counterparts at the April 21-24 inter-Korean ministerial in Pyongyang, that the DPRK would return to the Six Party Talks if given a face-saving way to do so. Lee strongly objected to Special Envoy Jay Lefkowitz's April 28 Wall Street Journal op-ed on North Korean human rights, asserting that the Special Envoy's remarks on South Korea's economic cooperation and humanitarian assistance were distorted, inaccurate, and unbefitting a high-ranking official of an allied country. Characterizing the op-ed as interfering in South Korea's domestic affairs, Lee called on U.S. officials to exercise restraint. The Ambassador told Lee that the Special Envoy reflected the strong feeling among many Americans about the DPRK's human rights situation, and stressed the importance of transparency in the ROK's economic and humanitarian dealings with the North. Lee said he expected former President Kim Dae-jung to visit North Korea sometime in late June, adding that Seoul hoped the former president could directly persuade Kim Jong-il that the DPRK should return to the Six Party Talks. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) The Ambassador met on May 1 with Minister of Unification Lee Jong-seok to discuss general North Korean issues prior to departing for the KEI Road Show and consultations in Washington. Minister Lee was accompanied by Senior Advisor to the Minister Kim Sungbae and Policy Advisor Kim Hyun Jung. DPRK NEEDS FACE-SAVING WAY TO RETURN TO 6PT -------------- ¶3. (S) Lee told the Ambassador that, during the April 21-24 inter-Korean ministerial, he had strongly urged the DPRK to return to the Six Party Talks without preconditions. He had the impression from his North Korean counterpart that the DPRK would return if given a "face-saving" way. Lee assessed that, while North Korean officials responsible for foreign affairs, economic planning, and inter-Korean relations seemed to recognize the need for the DPRK to return to the negotiating table, the military was skeptical whether the Talks would benefit North Korea due to their belief that the United States would continually make new demands on the DPRK for nothing in return. The North Korean military was gravely suspicious of Washington's intentions toward Pyongyang, which was why Washington's unrelenting focus on human rights and illicit activities reinforced the military's conviction that the United States sought regime change. Lee said Washington, by focusing on these other issues rather than denuclearization, was making it difficult for the ROK to persuade the DPRK to return to the Six Party Talks. AMB: DELAY IN 6PT RAISES PROFILE OF OTHER ISSUES -------------- --- ¶4. (S) The Ambassador reminded Lee that human rights and other issues were bound to receive more attention in Washington and in the public debate as long as the Six Party Talks were stalled. The United States and the other parties were not asking the DPRK for anything extra beyond the obligations stipulated in the September 19 Joint Statement. Stressing that President Bush, during his April 20 summit meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, had stated categorically that the United States remained committed to the Six Party process, the Ambassador asked what else the United States could do to help convince the DPRK of the U.S. commitment. Lee said a high-level public statement of U.S. policy might be helpful in moving the DPRK. STRONG REACTION TO SENK LEFKOWITZ'S WSJ OP-ED -------------- ¶5. (C) Reading from prepared points, Minister Lee conveyed the ROKG's "serious concern" about Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights (SENK) Jay Lefkowitz's April 28 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal. Lee, noting that he did not believe Lefkowitz's article reflected the official position of the USG, said Seoul was concerned that a senior U.S. official had openly criticized the ROK's policies toward the DPRK, its human rights practices, and Seoul's strategy of North-South engagement including the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) in a widely-read publication. Lee argued that: (1) Lefkowitz had seriously distorted the truth about the labor conditions at KIC and the wages paid to North Korean workers; (2) the Special Envoy based his criticism of the ROK's economic assistance policy toward the DPRK on his own subjective point of view without regard to Seoul's efforts to monitor all humanitarian assistance to North Korea (efforts that were improving steadily); and (3) the public criticism was unwarranted, especially between two allies, as it amounted to interfering in South Korean domestic affairs. LEE: CALL FOR EXERCISE IN RESTRAINT, TRUST ROK EXPERIENCE -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Reminding the Ambassador that the ROKG had never criticized the USG for its failure to accept North Korean refugees despite the strong desire among many North Koreans to seek asylum in the United States, Lee regretted that the Special Envoy continually made disparaging remarks about South Korea's policies on assistance to North Korea and North Korean human rights. Seoul accepted 1,500 North Korean refugees annually, and it was hypocritical of the United States to criticize the ROK's policies when it had yet to receive even one. Lee called for U.S. officials to exercise restraint in openly questioning the ROK's policies, urging the USG to have faith in the ROK's decades-long experience dealing with North Korea. SENK OP-ED REFLECTS FEELING AMONG MANY AMERICANS RE DPRK -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador told Lee that he would convey his points to Washington, adding that the SENK reflected the strong feeling among many Americans (including President Bush) about the DPRK's human rights situation. The Special Envoy's point was to try to find ways to improve the human rights situation in North Korea and he was not engaging in a rhetorical exercise. The United States understood the ROK desire for providing humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, especially since Washington believed that humanitarian assistance should not be used as a political weapon. Monitoring where the assistance goes is important, however, and the ROK should share more information on its own monitoring efforts. As KIC and other aspects of North-South economic cooperation raised questions, such as the issue of whether the North Korean workers received all their pay, it would be helpful if the ROK increased transparency on its economic and humanitarian dealings with the North, the Ambassador said. KDJ LIKELY TO VISIT DPRK LATE JUNE -------------- ¶8. (C) Lee said he expected former President Kim Dae-jung to visit North Korea sometime in late June. The ROK's biggest expectation for the visit, said Lee, was for the former president to meet Kim Jong-il and directly persuade him that the DPRK should return to the Six Party Talks. The most effective way to overcome resistance to talks within the DPRK was by communicating directly with Kim Jong-il. Seoul believed that Kim Dae-jung was in the best position to be able to convince the North Korean leader of the benefit of denuclearization, as well as to convey the concerns of the international community. The ROKG believed that a successful meeting between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il could lead to a "significant momentum" in both North-South relations and the DPRK's interaction with the outside world, Lee said. VERSHBOW