SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TO DPRK DISCUSSES INTERNAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001434

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL MNUC EAID SW KN KS
SUBJECT: SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TO DPRK DISCUSSES INTERNAL
CONDITIONS IN APRIL 24 CALL ON THE AMBASSADOR

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b, d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In an April 24 call on the Ambassador, Swedish
Ambassador to the DPRK Mats Foyer confirmed that last year's
bumper harvest was not sufficient to overcome the food
shortage in North Korea caused by systemic failures in
central food distribution. Foyer saw, however, little sign
of political unrest despite overall displeasure among the
North Korean population from adverse living conditions.
North Koreans' actual knowledge of the outside world was hard
to ascertain, given the tight internal controls and
restrictions on domestic travel for Koreans and foreigners
alike. Foyer also reported that the DPRK had surprised EU
mission diplomats in September, when MFA North American
Affairs DG Li Gun personally briefed them on the fourth round
of the Six Party Talks. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On April 24, Swedish Ambassador to the DPRK Mats
Foyer called on the Ambassador while visiting from Pyongyang
for consultations in Seoul. Foyer was accompanied by
Karl-Olof Andersson, Swedish MFA Deputy Director for Asia and
the Pacific, and Sophie Olsson, First Secretary at the
Swedish Embassy in Seoul.

FOOD SITUATION BAD DESPITE INCREASE IN HARVEST
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3. (C) Foyer said the food situation was not good in North
Korea despite last year's bumper harvest, largely due to
failures in the DPRK's central distribution system. Despite
government estimates of a 30 to 50 percent increase in
harvest from the previous year, the World Food Program
believed, based on information from multiple sources, that
the crop yield for 2005 was only about 15 percent above 2004
figures. Few parts of the country received full daily
rations, with most provinces receiving only about 500 grams
of food for each citizen per day. Moreover, agents of the
State Security Department reportedly stopped cracking down on
black market trade in rice and other foodstuffs because
ordinary North Korean people could not otherwise obtain
enough food to survive. Foyer also reported that many North
Koreans had sought second jobs outside normal working hours
and scavenged the countryside for tree sprouts, edible grass,
and other items to supplement their diet.

INSTABILITY UNLIKELY DESPITE DISCONTENT
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4. (C) Foyer noted that political movement to change the
status quo was unlikely despite the clear discontent among
ordinary citizens. He said there were no signs of major
unrest or any other form of political threat to the Kim
Jong-il regime. The DPRK appeared to have tightened social
and political control in the past several months by keeping
working-class civilians preoccupied with political studies,
social activities, mass mobilization of labor for public
works, and preparations for major public celebrations such as
the 60th anniversary of the Korea Workers Party.


5. (C) Foyer believed efforts to tighten control suggested
that the regime feared the possibility of changes to the
status quo. Pyongyang's recent move to drive out foreign
NGOs and international aid workers should be seen in this
context. Foyer opined that the regime was not as concerned
about external influence on civilians or low-level officials
as it was about the effect on mid-ranking officials who
engage well with foreigners. As a result of tightened
internal controls, the Swedish Embassy and other EU missions
in Pyongyang had not been able to conduct field visits for
their various assistance projects outside Pyongyang since
December. Foyer noted, however, that DPRK authorities had
recently told EU chiefs of mission to "postpone" their
proposed April visit to Hamhung instead of rejecting their
travel request. Foyer said they now sought approval for a
visit to Hamhung from May 11 to 12.

NORTH KOREANS' KNOWLEDGE OF OUTSIDE WORLD

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6. (C) Foyer said it was difficult to ascertain the extent
to which ordinary North Korean people knew about the outside
world. Noting that public propaganda had presented the ROK
as having worse conditions than the DPRK during the famine in
the 1990s, Foyer hypothesized that North Koreans could
attempt to initiate change in their own society if they
realized the world beyond North Korea was not as portrayed by
the regime's propaganda. He cautioned, however, that
restrictions on domestic travel had stymied the spread of
media that offered a window to the outside world, such as
bootlegged videos of South Korean television shows and tales
of visits across the border into China. At the Swedish
Embassy, however, the situation was quite different, as local
staff had access to uncensored internet and foreign news
outlets, such as BBC World, Foyer added.

DPRK MFA SURPRISINGLY INFORMATIVE ON OCCASION
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7. (C) Foyer said the Swedish Embassy currently sought to
get a briefing on the April 11 session of the Supreme
People's Assembly. While he did not expect a detailed or
candid read-out, Foyer pointed out that the North Koreans
could, on occasion, reveal more information than expected.
As an example, he recalled that MFA North American Affairs DG
Li Gun, the deputy head of delegation to the Six Party Talks,
had provided resident foreign diplomats a briefing on the
September 19 Joint Statement shortly after the conclusion of
the fourth round of the Six Party Talks. The briefing was
unusual because: (1) the DG for European Affairs would
normally provide the briefing; and (2) Li, having personally
participated in the Talks, could not prevent himself from
stating "a bit more" than his talking points might have
allowed.

QUESTIONS TO AMBASSADOR ON 6PT, U.S-ROK RELATIONS, JAPAN
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8. (C) Deputy Director Karl-Olof Andersson asked the
Ambassador about the status of the Six Party process, as well
as his views on Washington's relationship with the ROK and
Japan. The Ambassador said the DPRK continued to condition
its return to the Six Party Talks on unfreezing DPRK accounts
at Banco Delta Asia (BDA). U.S. law enforcement measures
were not, however, subject to negotiation. Nevertheless, the
Ambassador stressed, the Six Party Talks remained the most
sensible way to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue and the United
States was ready to return at any time.


9. (C) On U.S.-ROK relations, the Ambassador stated that the
bilateral relationship was in good shape, although some
difficult issues remained. The difference in the two
governments' viewpoints on certain policy issues -- such as
the North Korea problem -- was, however, often exaggerated in
the Korean press. On ROK-Japan relations, the Ambassador
stressed that the relationship between Seoul and Tokyo
appeared stable despite occasional political skirmishes on
territorial and historical issues.


10. (C) The Ambassador expressed appreciation for the
Swedish Embassy's assistance in Pyongyang in assisting
American citizens and representing U.S. interests.
VERSHBOW