DFM YUN PROVIDES UPDATE ON LIANCOURT ROCKS ISSUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001433 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR CHA E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 TAGS: PBTS PHSA PREL EFIS MOPS KS JA SUBJECT: DFM YUN PROVIDES UPDATE ON LIANCOURT ROCKS ISSUE REF: A. SEOUL 1349 ¶B. SEOUL 1379 Classified By: DCM Mark Minton. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In an April 28 meeting with the DCM, DFM Yun Byung-se offered an update on the ROKG approach to its maritime dispute with Japan. Seoul was (1) preparing for the next round of EEZ talks with Tokyo that would be held by the end of June; (2) providing foreign diplomats with Seoul's justification for its claim of sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo/Takeshima); and (3) hosting visits from Japanese politicians next week to encourage dialogue. He emphasized the importance of President Roh's April 25 statement on ROK-Japan relations that gave the context behind recent provocative actions by Japan. Yun also expressed appreciation for USG cooperation and called for a continued USG role in the issue. END SUMMARY. . NOT JUST TERRITORIAL PROBLEM BUT "ISSUE OF HISTORY" -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Deputy FM Yun Byung-se requested a meeting with the DCM on April 28 to discuss Seoul's sovereignty claim to the Liancourt Rocks. Based on the ROK-Japan vice ministerial talks over the previous weekend (ref a),the ROKG was preparing for the next round of consultations with Japan over the delineation of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) between them. The talks would be held before the end of June. (NOTE: According to press reports, FM Ban on April 26 announced that MOFAT would create a special task force to coordinate Seoul's position for the EEZ talks. END NOTE.) ¶3. (C) Yun said that President Roh Moo-hyun's special message on April 25 (ref b) on ROK-Japan relations had highlighted a pattern of insensitive Japanese behavior. The key point of the message, which was addressed to domestic and international audiences, was that the Dokdo issue was not just a territorial problem but an "issue of history." The presidential message received overwhelming political and public support, codified Seoul's position, and would guide talks with Japan. If Japan took offensive actions, especially after the presidential message, Seoul would have no choice but to respond, Yun stated. ¶4. (C) Yun briefly recounted Korean arguments for its claim to Dokdo and provided a 15-page primer on Korea's claim to the islets, an English translation of Roh's April 25 message, and a five-page paper documenting Japanese aggression towards the Liancourt Rocks. (NOTE: The Embassy faxed these documents to EAP/K. END NOTE.) . JAPANESE POLITICIANS TO VISIT NEXT WEEK -------------- ¶5. (C) Reiterating that the next EEZ talks would probably be held in June, Yun said that for the time being it looked like a catastrophe had been averted. Hopefully, EEZ talks could be one element in dissuading Japan from engaging in unnecessary activities. Meanwhile, Seoul welcomed increased dialogue with Japan. ¶6. (C) Seoul would host two visitors from Tokyo, Japanese Vice FM and four-term ruling Liberal Democratic Party representative Yasuhisa Shiozaki on May 1 and former LDP Secretary General Taku Yamazaki on May 2. These politicians, SIPDIS who reportedly had ties to PM Koizumi, were not in positions to negotiate but their visits might prove helpful if they could help explain the ROKG position to Tokyo, Yun opined. The visitors were expected to see Foreign Minister Ban and meet with Korean politicians, probably from the ruling Uri Party. ¶7. (C) Yun said that the ROK Minister for Culture and Tourism, Kim Myong-gon, would probably still complete a planned visit to Tokyo scheduled for May because it was not related to the Dokdo issue. At this time, however, a ROK-Japanese summit would be impossible and visits of security-related ministers were improbable. Seoul's future flexibility would depend on the Japanese attitude. . ROKG REQUESTS CONTINUED USG ROLE -------------- ¶8. (C) Yun expressed appreciation for the constructive USG role in the maritime dispute with Japan and promised to keep the Embassy and Washington informed of any developments. He also requested that Washington consider the materials he provided to gain a better appreciation for Seoul's position and continue to exercise whatever leadership the USG deemed appropriate. ¶9. (C) The DCM thanked Yun for the materials and for keeping the USG closely informed. It was important for our capitals to keep open channels for communication. The USG would welcome further updates. VERSHBOW