DFM YUN BRIEFS DCM ON ROK-JAPAN MARITIME SURVEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001314

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PBTS PHSA PREL EFIS MOPS KS JA
SUBJECT: DFM YUN BRIEFS DCM ON ROK-JAPAN MARITIME SURVEY
DISPUTE: KOREANS HINTING AT COMPROMISE?

REF: A. TOKYO 2098


B. SEOUL 1271

C. TOKYO 2154

D. TOKYO 2159

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (C) In an April 20 meeting with the DCM, ROK DFM Yun
reported that earlier in the day, South Korean Foreign
Minister Ban Ki-moon had told the Japanese Ambassador that
(1) Japan should immediately abandon its proposed maritime
survey of submarine features in waters that Tokyo and Seoul
both claim as part of their EEZ; (2) the ROK would proceed at
an "appropriate time" to register names for submarine
features of the area with the International Hydrographic
Organization (IHO); and, (3) the two sides had a "convergence
of views" on resuming bilateral consultations to delineate
the EEZ between them. Media reports indicate Seoul has 18 or
more patrol boats conducting ship seizure drills in the area
of the proposed survey. In a separate conversation, the
Japanese Embassy confirmed that on April 21 Vice Foreign
Minister Yachi will announce a visit to Seoul to discuss the
issue and that the Japanese ships will not leave port as long
as discussions continue.


2. (C) COMMENT: Our reading of DFM Yun's briefing is that
the ROK is attempting to accept most of the points of the
proposed Japanese compromise (refs A and B),but Seoul does
not want to be perceived as addressing the issue on Japanese
terms. Hence, the ROK demand that Japan withdraw its survey
ships is coupled with the position that Seoul will proceed
with the names registration at "an appropriate time" and the
proposal to resume discussions to delineate the EEZ. The ROK
seems to be suggesting, without actually saying, that it will
defer submitting the names to the IHO and will discuss the
issue as part of a larger conversation on EEZ delineation.
The diplomatic task for now is for the Koreans to convey to
the Japanese that an "appropriate time" means after June.
END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

JAPAN RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL CONSEQUENCES
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3. (C) ROK Deputy Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se requested a
meeting with the Deputy Chief of Mission on April 20 to
discuss ROK opposition to Japan's plans to conduct maritime
survey operations in waters claimed by both Japan and the ROK
as part of their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). Yun noted
that the ROK had held two meetings of Cabinet-level ministers
to discuss the issue and that President Roh had also met with
leading political figures over the matter.


4. (C) On April 19, Yun recalled, Foreign Minister Ban had
publicly stressed that the Cabinet had taken a firm position
against the proposed survey and reiterated that the ROK was
ready for any contingency to prevent the survey from
proceeding. Moreover, Ban had asserted that Japan's proposed
survey was part of a series of actions by Tokyo to distort
the historical record; accordingly, the ROK would undertake a
comprehensive response. Calling upon Japan to abandon its
proposed survey immediately, Ban had expressed hope the issue
could be resolved diplomatically. If the Japanese proceeded,
however, Seoul would take necessary measures in accordance
with international and domestic law and Tokyo would be
responsible for the consequences. Also on April 19, the
National Assembly had passed a resolution calling for Japan
not to proceed with the survey.


5. (C) During the morning of April 20, said Yun, Foreign
Minister Ban Ki-moon had called in Japanese Ambassador Oshima
and reaffirmed this position. The ROK perceived the proposed
Japanese survey as more than a simple maritime survey of the
disputed area, but as another in a series of provocative
acts. The ROK wanted Japan to be aware that this was an
ongoing issue that was not related only to the question of
EEZ limitations but to sensitive matters of history,
particularly Japan's claims to the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands,
which Japan had incorporated in the course of its past record
of aggression. If Japan did not move to correct perceptions
of its intentions and continued taking provocative actions,

it would pose a serious threat to amicable relations between
the ROK and Japan, as well as to the peace of Northeast Asia.
Such a development would not be in the national interests of
Japan.

ABANDON SURVEY, ROK PROCEEDS WITH NAMES AT APPROPRIATE TIME
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6. (C) Ban demanded that Japan immediately abandon its
proposed survey. If Tokyo were to proceed with its survey
within the South Korean EEZ, he warned, the ROK would take
all necessary measures to safeguard its sovereign rights and
Japan would be responsible for the consequences. The ROK had
a sovereign right to proceed with the registration of names
at the IHO and would do so at an appropriate time in the
future. Finally, Ban said that it would be appropriate for
Seoul and Tokyo to resume discussions on the delineation of
the EEZ between the two countries.


7. (C) DFM Yun told the DCM that the ROK hoped Japan would
consider this message and take very judicious action. If
not, Seoul "would have to do what we have to do." At the
moment, the Japanese survey vessels were waiting at Sakai.

YUN: JAPANESE "UNDERSTOOD" MESSAGE
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8. (C) Noting that we would welcome any progress toward the
diplomatic resolution of the dispute, the DCM asked for the
Japanese Ambassador's reaction. Yun responded that
Ambassador Oshima appeared to understand what Foreign
Minister Ban wanted to convey: that the Japanese ships must
withdraw from the area immediately. The message on the IHO
was also clear: the ROK was considering registering names
for submarine features in the EEZ but would do so at an
appropriate time. The best solution would be for the
Japanese to forego their survey and engage in consultations
on next steps. There appeared to be a "convergence of
views," said Yun between Ban and Oshima on the desirability
of resuming talks on the delineation of the EEZ.


9. (C) Yun added that the ROK was eager to resolve the issue
as quickly as possible, as "every hour, every day" that the
media continued to report on the issue, it incited the anger
of the Korean people. The nature of this provocation by
Japan was different, said Yun, and had the potential to alter
the bilateral relationship in a fundamental way.


10. (C) Subsequently, Japanese Embassy First Secretary
Yasushi Yamamoto told poloff that Japan would continue talks
with the ROK and would announce in the morning of April 21
that Vice Foreign Minister Yachi would visit South Korea to
discuss the issue with ROK Vice Foreign Minister Yu
Myung-hwan (ref A). The survey ships had not departed port
and would not do so as long as talks were ongoing, he said.
Yamamoto did not comment on the substance of the morning's
meeting with FM Ban.

EXTENSIVE MEDIA COVERAGE CONTINUES
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11. (U) According to media reports, the ROK has 18 or more
patrol boats stationed in the area conducting "ship seizure"
drills. Separately, National Security Advisor Song Min-soon
was quoted as saying that: "The status of a foreign
government vessel can be respected only when it keeps its
dignity and politely behaves towards the sovereign state."
Not surprisingly, media coverage of this matter remains
intense, with all major outlets devoting extensive, sometimes
bellicose coverage to the issue.
VERSHBOW