BOSNIA: WHY THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM VOTE FAILED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000966 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (ENGLISH, SAINZ, FOOKS),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER, GREGORIAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA: WHY THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM VOTE FAILED AND WHAT IT MEANS Classified By: AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS L. MCELHANEY. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND ( D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a late-night vote April 26, the constitutional reform package agreed on by the leaders of Bosnia's major political parties failed to obtain the 2/3 majority it needed in the House of Representatives, falling short by only two votes. Of the 42 delegates, a majority -- 26 -- voted in favor, with 16 voting against (no abstentions or absences). The package and its backers -- Bosniak SDA, Serb SDS, SNSD, PDP, Croat HDZ and multi-ethnic SDP -- were the victims of an alliance of convenience between (Bosniak) Haris Silajdzic's Party for BiH (SBiH) and the new right-wing Croat party "HDZ 1990." The rejection of the package means Bosnia will, for now, retain its inefficient governmental structure, although we continue to probe for the possibility of finding the necessary votes -- if not at this moment, then in a more conducive post-election environment. The parliament's failure to pass the package leaves the Bosniak SDA party and its party president, Sulejman Tihic, as the biggest losers, with the public defection of one of the party's own parliamentarians driving the nail in the reform package's coffin and exposing deep rifts in the party's infrastructure. The political forces unleashed by the constitutional reform debate will continue to whirl in the pre-election period, and we will need to contain the destructive finger-pointing even as we work to lay out plans for the future of constitutional reform in Bosnia -- a process that must and will go on. END SUMMARY. THE ALLIANCE: SBIH, HDZ 1990 -- PLUS TWO ¶2. (C) After a 16 hour session on April 26 and nine hours of debate and caucusing the following day, the BiH House of Representatiaves voted down the U.S. and EU-backed constitutional reform package close to midnight April 27. The U.S. brokered package -- negotiated by the leaders of BiH's eight largest political parties (representing all ethnicities) over approximately 12 months of discussion -- was ultimately done in by a highly orchestrated and vicious joint campaign by the breakaway Croat party, "HDZ 1990" and the (ostensibly multiethnic but largely Bosniak) Party for BiH (SBiH). Behind the alliance: the electoral ambitions of their party leaders to de-throne SDA President Tihic and HDZ President Covic in the October national elections. As reported in previous cables, HDZ 1990 was founded largely to oppose the current HDZ leader, Dragan Covic, who participated in the constitutional reform negotiations; HDZ 1990 defined opposition to Covic as opposition to the constitutional reform. Five of six HDZ House of Reps parliamentarians ultimately aligned themselves with HDZ 1990, and cast their votes accordingly. ¶3. (C) SBiH, under the leadership of the mercurial and power-hungry Haris Silajdzic, proved an even more destructive force. A participant in the constitutional reform negotiations for the past year, it ceased to participate in the end-game ostensibly over a single issue -- retention of the existing complex voting procedure in the House of Representatives (the so-called practice of "entity voting"). But that was just their cover. The real reason was the Presidential ambitions of Silajdzic, who has spent most of his time in recent years outside the country but now seeks to seize the political moment by preying on fissures within the leading Bosniak SDA party. Though Silajdzic was not physically present in the Parliament, observers quickly identified his proxy: Zlatko Hadzidedic, an aide to SBiH Minister of Civil Affairs Halilovic, who orchestrated efforts by SBiH, HDZ 1990 and various radical independents to sow dissent. Hadzidedic focused his efforts (and money) on getting the two additional "no" votes against the package needed for the HDZ 1990 and SBiH alliance to prevail. ¶4. (C) He found those votes not among rejectionist Serb fringe parties but among the Bosniak ranks. Many here believe that at least one of two crucial Bosniak "no" votes was literally bought and paid for by SBiH. Over the 48 hours prior to and during the debate, Mehmed Zilic, the SDA defector, appeared to be a man who had promised his vote to someone else for a price. He was alternately intractable, unreachable and deliberately ambiguous despite a wave of successive entreaties by long-time friends, political allies and even religious leaders including the Reis (in response to a plea from the Ambassador). Zilic's position hardened perceptibly in the last day before the Parliament session; SARAJEVO 00000966 002 OF 003 ham-handed intimidation by SDA President Tihic's close ally, Minister for Human Rights Mirsad Kebo, provided the pretext for Zilic to break SDA ranks, but it was clear from his frequent caucusing with SBiH handlers, among other things, that he had promised his vote elsewhere. ¶5. (C) The second critical "no" vote was cast by Sead Avdic, an elderly "independent" MP -- independent due largely to his history of quarrelling with all his previous party allies. Avdic and Zilic are close; both left the SDP some years ago for different parties but have maintained ties. Throughout the debate, Avdic tried to portray himself as the broker of a grand compromise, only to find his proposal (a non-starter for all sides) rejected even by those who for days pretended to encourage him: SBiH and HDZ 1990. Avdic's petulance and intractability gained as he seemed to realize that his efforts at dealmaking had no takers, and Zilic's "no" vote gave him the protection he sought to vote likewise, having told us only an hour earlier that "he would not be the man to block the package." END-GAME NEGOTIATIONS CONSTRUCTIVE BUT UNSUCCESSFUL ¶6. (C) SDP leader Lagumdzija, joined by other political party leaders, offered HDZ 1990 a significant compromise at the start of the afternoon. The offer: a "super veto" in the upper House of Peoples, whereby any law deemed destructive to vital national interests by all seven members of a given ethnic caucus would automatically be rejected, without recourse to the constitutional court. Substantively, this should have met the HDZ 1990 concerns that the constitutional reform package had gone too far in reducing the role of the ethnic-based House of Peoples (indeed, the suggested compromise -- agreed among the pro-reform parties without our input -- violated our principle of avoiding ethnic-based formulations). But HDZ 1990 leader Martin Raguz and his group rejected any compromise, nor would they agree to abstain on the vote (thus permitting the required 2/3 of the assembly to pass the package through). The fact that literally NO compromise proved acceptable to the nay-sayers shocked the EC and EU ambassadors present during these consultations. Having gathered together a motley collection of ex-HVO (Bosnian Croat) generals, Croat "third entity" proponents and homeless hangers-on from the left and far-right, HDZ 1990 -- a single-issue party -- chose to head toward the October elections on this rejectionist platform. WHAT IT MEANS ¶7. (C) The vote means that the process of constitutional reform has come to a temporary close, though we continue to probe for ways to keep up the momentum and find the necessary votes, if not at this moment then in a more conducive post-election environment. For now, Bosnia and Herzegovina will keep its inefficient governmental structure and will need to consider carefully how it will ultimately achieve the constitutional changes needed for its eventual Euro-Atlantic integration. As this experience shows, it will not be easy. However, the constructive commitment shown by the package's negotiators during the end-game demonstrates that many in this country remain capable of seeing beyond narrow party interests. ¶8. (C) The constitutional reform process has redefined the working relationship between this country's major political parties. That is particularly true of the Bosnian Serb parties. The rough-edged and somewhat volatile SNSD leader Dodik (who became RS Prime Minister in February) used the process to increase his credibility as a leader. Once-pariah Serb SDS leader and RS President Dragan Cavic (dubbed by negotiators "the laptop Chetnik" for his attention to detail) emerged as a constructive force for compromise and a superb tactician in assisting his fellow-political party leaders to navigate the shoals of these past weeks of vote-grabbing. Even the mercurial PDP leader, BiH FM Ivanic, looked good during the end-game. Among the Bosniaks, SDP leader Lagumdzija was eloquent both in Parliament and in public, gaining considerable credibility. ¶9. (C) Croat HDZ leader Covic was a tough defender of Croat interests during negotiations, though he ultimately signed on to the deal and defended it publicly. He proved unable to prevent the HDZ parliamentarians from changing allegiances when HDZ 1990 was founded, and it was his party's internal disintegration that proved a major factor in the defeat of SARAJEVO 00000966 003 OF 003 the package. Covic's political fortunes remain in doubt, with his trial for corruption entering its final stages and this defeat giving him little ground within the party to crow about his leadership. ¶10. (C) The largest political loser, however, is SDA leader (and BiH Presidency member) Tihic. Had Tihic been able to hold onto Zilic's vote, it is almost certain that Avdic would have backed the package; this is the universal view here among commentators and, most damningly, his own party members. Simmering resentment in the SDA over Tihic's perceived willingness to bargain away the elimination of the Republika Srpska -- never a realistic option but one promulgated incessantly by Haris Silajdzic -- resurfaced during parliamentary debate, when one SDA member (Izet Hadzic) blurted out his own objection to the package in public remarks. Though Hadzic was quickly brought back into line, it provoked an acerbic Serb reaction and titillated the ranks of those working to kill the package. ¶11. (C) The vote, and the package, represent the best consensus possible at this point. Without a vote, it is likely that the package would have been subjected to even more debilitating criticism. The parliamentary rejection has poisoned the political atmosphere and propelled the country, early, into the election campaign. Over the next days and weeks, accusations and recriminations will be flying fast and furious. The message that responsible politicians will need to convey: those who favor change and progress toward Europe need to make that clear in the October balloting. This Embassy will be working, together with colleagues in the international community, to reinforce that message, to encourage the pro-reform parties to stand by what they achieved, and to maintain the momentum so painstakingly created. We also need to focus on how to institutionalize the constitutional reform process so that what was gained during the arduous months of negotiations -- rare unanimity of purpose among the entire spectrum of Bosnian leaders -- can be built upon once the sensitive pre-election period is over. We will follow up with a further cable on strategy. MCELHANEY