BOSNIA - NEXT STEPS ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002876 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE, AND P (BAME); OSD FOR FLORY; NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - NEXT STEPS ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM REF: A. SARAJEVO 2825 ¶B. SARAJEVO 2782 ¶C. SARAJEVO 2699 SARAJEVO 00002876 001.7 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b and d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Six weeks after the October 1 elections, Bosniak (Muslim) opposition to and anxiety about the U.S.-brokered package of constitutional amendments remains a problem. Newly elected Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic continues his public and private campaign against the amendments, convinced that the international community will bail Bosniaks out of the political morass that would result from their defeat. Former President Tihic's Party for Democratic Action's (SDA) support for the package is uncertain, and greater clarity is unlikely before the party resolves its ongoing leadership struggle. While the politics of constitutional reform remain hazy, some process issues are clearer. There is consensus among the major political parties that the House of Representatives should not reconsider the U.S.-brokered package before there is a new government, for example. A vote is unlikely until at least the end of February. We plan to use that time to continue our efforts to shore up support for the package within the SDA as well as the Bosniak public. Among other things, we will use the 11th anniversary of Dayton to underscore the importance of constitutional reform generally and the U.S.-brokered package in particular. We would welcome a statement from the Secretary that does the same. Other measures we plan to take to advance our agenda as well as proposals for Washington action are contained at the end of this message. END SUMMARY Whither the Bosniaks Part I: Silajdzic - Living in the Past -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Among Bosniak political parties, only the Social Democratic Party (SDP) firmly supports the U.S.-brokered package of constitutional amendments. After several meetings with newly inaugurated Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic (Refs B and C),we doubt that he or his party, the Party for BiH (SBiH) could be persuaded to support it. Silajdzic has a litany of complaints, but his strongest objection is to the continued existence of entity voting. At times (but not consistently),he concedes constitutional change requires agreement among the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, but when pressed he admits he has no idea how to persuade the RS-based parties to accept entity voting's elimination. Though he praises the U.S. role in Bosnia in meetings with us, with others he claims U.S. support for the March package is motivated by a desire to wash its hands of Bosnia and/or a need to placate radical Serbs in order to secure a deal with Belgrade on Kosovo. More disconcertingly, he perceives the constitutional reform process as an extension of the 1992-1995 war. He argues the Serbs are using it to complete their genocide and ethnic cleansing of the Bosniaks and to create a "Greater Serbia." ¶3. (C) Silajdzic's wartime intellectual framework distorts his assessment of the role the international community should/will play in Bosnia. Though he bemoans international community pressure to adopt the March package, arguing publicly "Bosnia is not a colony," privately Silajdzic told us the international community should impose a new constitution (presumably one without entity voting). He argues the Office of the High Representative (OHR) should remain in Bosnia beyond summer 2007 "to address inevitable blockages in the reform process." It is an open question whether he is prepared to create conditions that would require the PIC to reconsider its current plans to close OHR, but we would not rule it out. Silajdzic also justifies his opposition to the March package by claiming the EU accession process will require elimination of entity voting, so why "confirm" it by accepting the U.S.-brokered package. The assumption that underlies his arguments is that the international community will bail him out, if he derails constitutional reform. ¶4. (C) Silajdzic is working overtime to raise doubts among Bosniaks about constitutional reform generally and the March package in particular, by passing around "legal analyses" critical of the amendments. The "analyses" are partisan political documents designed to serve Silajdzic's interests, not objective, scholarly papers. Paranoid political SARAJEVO 00002876 002.8 OF 003 assumptions about the motives behind Serb support for the March package are also woven into their text. Nonetheless, they are having an impact, not least because Silajdzic uses his cozy relationship with Dnevni Avaz, (Bosnia's largest daily),to ensure that the "analyses" receive wide circulation. The newspaper has now moved to questioning the motives of the USG, and the Ambassador, in pushing the package. (Party for Democratic (SDA) MPs regularly raise with us concerns about the March package drawn from Silajdzic's "legal analyses.") Whither the Bosniaks Part II: The SDA, Dazed and Confused -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Prospects for the U.S.-brokered package hinge on the SDA. Outgoing Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency and embattled SDA President Sulejman Tihic tells us SDA support for the U.S.-brokered package remains solid, but our conversations with SDA MPs suggest otherwise. SDA MPs publicly assert that they will support party policy on constitutional reform, which currently calls for adoption of the U.S.-brokered package. Privately, they express concern to us about the politics and substance of constitutional reform. Most interpret Tihic's loss to Silajdzic as repudiation by Bosniak voters of the U.S.-brokered package and worry continued SDA support for it would further weaken the party. Several propose "technical changes" to the package as a means of defanging Silajdzic's arguments against it and mitigating the political dangers to the SDA of supporting it. The Silajdzic "legal analyses" have prompted suggestions from SDA MPs, including SDA Deputy Vice President Bakir Izetbegovic, to change the "dissolution clause," for example. Some SDA MPs seek substantive, political changes under the rubric "technical change," such as one proposal to modify entity voting. ¶6. (C) SDA's position on constitutional reform has been subsumed by the party's internecine struggle over Tihic's future as SDA President. The prevailing wisdom is that if Tihic loses his leadership battle, the SDA will walk away from its commitment to support the U.S.-brokered package. While that is probable, the link between Tihic's and constitutional reform's fate is not immutable. Many of Tihic's opponents are motivated by their own ambitions and/or antipathy towards Tihic rather than opposition to the U.S.-brokered package. Tihic's opponents had expected a decisive clash at the November 8 meeting of the SDA Presidency, but instead Tihic managed to outmaneuver them. The struggle for SDA leadership could take several more weeks to play out, perhaps dragging into the New Year. Its final outcome probably hinges on the position of Bakir Izetbegovic (son of wartime Bosniak leader Alija Izetbegovic),who is widely seen as the most likely successor to Tihic. In the meantime, we continue to argue the U.S.-brokered package's merits with SDA MPs, remind them of SDA's commitment to the Secretary on it, and review the consequences of walking away from the deal. Non-Bosniak Universe: Continued SNSD, SDS, PDP and HDZ Support -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Serb and Croat parties that supported constitutional reform in April - the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD),the Serb Democratic Party (SDS),the Party for Democratic Progress (PDP),and the Croatian Democratic Union-BiH (HDZ) - continue to support the U.S.-brokered package. The Serbs have stressed that their support for the package is contingent on its adoption without any changes, however. The Serbs warn that re-opening the package, presumably even for technical changes, would mean starting over. The emerging leadership battle within SDS could complicate Serb support for constitutional reform (Ref A). If Dragan Cavic is ousted as SDS leader, presumably by a more right wing personality, his successor could reverse the party's support for constitutional reform, which would cost the package three crucial votes it does not currently have to spare. Greater Clarity on Process Issues -------------- ¶8. (C) While the political prospects for the U.S.-brokered package remain hazy, there is greater clarity on some of the SARAJEVO 00002876 003.8 OF 003 process questions associated with its possible reconsideration by the new Parliamentary Assembly (PA). Proponents and opponents alike are virtually unanimous that the new PA should not take up the package until a new government is formed. The proponent of the package (i.e., who reintroduces it) could be either the new government, depending on the outcome of coalition negotiations, or the House of Representatives caucuses of the six parties that agreed to the package in March. Given Silajdzic's views, it is highly unlikely the Presidency could serve as the proponent. The PA would be required to ask the Presidency and Council of Ministers for their opinions on the package. The opinions are not binding, but they provide an opportunity to complicate the politics of passage. Finally, the package would require technical changes related to its implementation before it is reintroduced. Political and process issues mean that a vote on the U.S.-brokered package is not likely before the end of February. It could come even later if the package passes through full parliamentary procedure (i.e., comprehensive public hearings),as some SDS MPs appear likely to insist. Constitutional Reform: The Way Ahead -------------- ¶9. (C) We plan to use the time between now and February to continue our efforts to shore up support for the U.S.-brokered package. Our primary focus, as it has been for the past several weeks, will be on the Bosniak political leadership, particularly the SDA. On November 21, the 11th anniversary of Dayton, we are holding a series of events designed to highlight U.S. commitment to Bosnia and the importance of constitutional reform to the country's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. In connection with these events, we also propose a statement from the Secretary outlining our hopes for Bosnia and our bilateral relationship as well as urging reforms and adoption of the constitutional reform package. ¶10. (C) In addition to events associated with the Dayton Anniversary, we plan the following: -- Embassy officials continue to work behind the scenes to secure support of political party leaders and MPs - particularly the Bosniak parties - in advance of government formation. -- Embassy media effort to rebut Silajdzic anti-reform propaganda and shore up support within the SDA. -- Outreach to BiH civil society groups to build public support for the amendments. OHR has suggested a panel discussion on the benefits of the U.S.-brokered package to ease Bosniak, particularly SDA, anxieties. The panel would include three members of the HighRep's informal advisory body on constitutional reform. -- Coordinated messages by U.S., HighRep, EU and Peace Implementation Council Steering Board in support of amendments. ¶11. (C) As in the past, Washington efforts are crucial to our constitutional reform agenda, particularly given attempts by opponents of constitutional reform to argue that the Embassy is misrepresenting USG policy on the issue. With this in mind, -- Continued media efforts, such as DAS DiCarlo's November 9 VOA interview, by senior Washington officials. -- Visit by A/S Fried to BiH at an appropriate time to lobby publicly and privately in support of constitutional reform. -- Messages from senior Dept officials and other influential former USG officials to key Bosnian political party leaders and to the public, including the Secretary's Dayton Anniversary Statement. -- Visit by the newly elected members of the Presidency to Washington to hear directly senior USG views about constitutional reform. MCELHANEY