BOSNIA AND NATO: THE CASE FOR PFP MEMBERSHIP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002717 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, FOOKS),S/WCI, AND EUR/RPM (BROTZEN),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN, OSD FOR JONES, USNATO FOR SHAFFER, AFSOUTH FOR CURRAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA AND NATO: THE CASE FOR PFP MEMBERSHIP REF: A) SARAJEVO 1773 B) SARAJEVO 2259 Classified By: Amb. Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary. As we approach the NATO Riga Summit, we think that the time is right to consider admittance of Bosnia to the Partnership for Peace (PfP). With the implementation of defense reform legislation, Bosnia has met the technical requirements for PfP membership. Bosnia has made substantial strides in reaching full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). It is highly unlikely that the two remaining major persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCS) are on Bosnian soil or have been for anytime in the past two years and we see little more that can be done to squeeze the support networks. Most importantly, Bosnia's PfP membership now would serve U.S. interests by filling the security vacuum created by the departure of U.S. and European troops, bolstering the forces for reform that are critical to the country's long-term stability, and keeping Bosnia focused "westward" as patience flags with the slow march toward EU membership. End summary. -------------- TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MET -------------- ¶2. (C) Over the past year and a half, Bosnia has made tremendous progress in standing up a unified and professional armed forces. In its initial stages of implementation, defense reform has created a force that meets the technical requirements for PfP membership and which is also working towards increasing inter-operability with NATO forces. Defense reform was also a major step towards establishing a lasting and stable security sector in Bosnia allowing the draw down of the international military presence here. Though the dissolution of the former entity armies was a contentious issue for many Bosnian politicians, eventual PfP and NATO membership was not. In fact, the strong U.S. leadership and funding of the defense reform agenda and Bosnia's hopes for increased Euro-Atlantic integration, particularly PfP membership, have been the motivators that continue to hold the fragile process together. There are no doubts about PfP and NATO here -- public opinion is strongly in favor. �00A; -------------- SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON WAR CRIMES SUSPECTS -------------- ¶3. (S) The primary impediment to Bosnia's PfP accession has been concern over its cooperation with ICTY. Namely, Bosnia continues to be held accountable for the fact that Radovan Karadzic has yet to be apprehended and face justice. Support networks for Karadzic may still exist in Bosnia, but aggressive prosecutions of organized crime networks connected to him have substantially reduced that support. We have heard that the ICTY Chief Special Prosecutor recently reported that she had information that Karadzic was in the Republika Srpska (RS). However, we and our interlocutors have no credible intelligence information that can substantiate this assertion. Furthermore, we are aware of no USG or third-country government information that indicates that Karadzic, or fellow PIFWC Ratko Mladic, have been present in Bosnia during the past 24 months. State law enforcement authorities (i.e., SIPA, State Border Service, State Intelligence and Security Agency, Foreigners Affairs Service and the Bonsia and Herzegovina Prosecutors Office) have made high-level assurances that they have the capacity and the willingness to act in coordination with their counterpars in neighboring countries should Karadzic or Mldic enter Bosnian territory. ¶4. (S) The vast ajority of Bosnian politicians and the public strongly support vigorous efforts to bring war crimials to justice. To that end, Republika Srpska leaders declared on November 21, in the presence of Secretary Rice, that remaining ICTY indictees should be brought to justice, a clear turnaround in their position. Although ICTY Court President Pocar wrote in the October 2006 Annual Report to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that the Prosecutor "has been especially disappointed with the failure by Serbia and the Republika Srpska to trace and arrest outstanding fugitives," the ICTY Chief Special Prosecutor's June 2006 statement to the UNSC contradicts this. In that SARAJEVO 00002717 002 OF 003 statement, the Special Prosecutor, while urging further efforts, nevertheless acknowledged that RS cooperation with the ICTY has improved significantly over the past two years. ¶5. (S) From 2004-2005, with the cooperation of the RS Ministry of Interior, Serbia transferred 14 indictees to the ICTY. Bosnian Serb members of state-level institutions also played a pivotal role in securing the Russian transfer of PIFWC Dragan Zelenovic to Bosnia and then onto the Hague. RS Prime Minister Dodik's government recently ended the long-time practice of providing stipends from the RS budget to families of indictees on trial in The Hague. Dodik and other RS officials have repeatedly assured the USG that the RS wants to see Karadzic and Mladic held accountable in The Hague for their crimes (reftel A). Dodik also publicly criticized both men, underscoring that his government wants to see them brought before the Hague Tribunal. He delivered this message to RS voters during the recent election campaign and to the Serb public during visits to Belgrade. -------------- DODIK/RS CLEAR ON ICTY RESPONSIBILITIES -------------- ¶6. (SBU) In an October 27 conversation with Ambassador McElhaney, RS Premier Dodik reiterated his total commitment to cooperation with ICTY and outlined his government,s actions to secure the transfer of fugitive indictees Radovan Karadzic and Stojan Zupljanin, as well as efforts to uproot their support networks. In both the Karadzic and Zupljanin cases, Dodik said the RS police are offering cash for information on their whereabouts. In addition, on the Karadzic case, Dodik said his government was working with the Karadzic family to affect his surrender to ICTY. Dodik said that the RS police are monitoring family members of fugitive indictee Stojan Zupljanin as well, hoping to involve them in a similar effort leading to his surrender and transfer to ICTY. ¶7. (SBU) Dodik said that he had pledged to Serbian officials that, if they had credible information on the whereabouts of fugitive indictees but lacked the ability to arrest them for political reasons, he was prepared to dispatch RS police to Serbia, to render the fugitives to Bosnia and to then formally arrest and transfer them. Dodik said that in response to the most recent requests from ICTY, his government was redoubling its efforts against the support nets of fugitive indictees. (NOTE: On October 27 Momcilo Mandic, former head of Privredna Banka Srpsko Sarjevo and major financier of the fugitive supportnetwork, was convicted of fraud and financial crmes and sentenced to nine years in jail. END NOTE) -------------- PERIOD OF TRANSITION LEAVES A VACUUM -------------- ¶8. (C) Bosnia is currently facing its greatest period of transition since the end of the war. The U.S. and its European partners have announced plans to reduce both our political and military presence in the country, with a corresponding amount of authority transferring into local hands. By the end of 2006, all U.S. forces will be withdrawn. While these draw down decisions have been driven by Bosnia's successes in the past decade, such as defense reform, substantial anxiety remains among the local population, for whom the period of conflict is far from a distant memory. The public responded to the announcement that the U.S. was withdrawing most of its remaining troops with particular unease, fearing that the resulting security vacuum will undermine the peace and security they have enjoyed for the past ten years, and questioning whether Bosnia has a future inside Euro-Atlantic institutions. At the same time, public faith in the EU is declining as Bosnians realize that even after an SAA, an SAA that is likely to be delayed well into 2007, EU membersQp is probably a decade away. Recent European announcements from Commission President Barroso and others about a pause in further enlargement has left Bosnian politicians wondering whether their aspirations for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions will be realized. ¶9. (C) Too, Kosovo remains on the radar screen here. We expect some more difficult sledding over the next months as SARAJEVO 00002717 003 OF 003 Belgrade prepares itself for Kosovo's independence. We have seen how, already, Kosovo has played into the hands of those in Banja Luka and Belgrade who would use the pretext of Kosovo independence to stir unrest among Serbs here. A step towards clear association with NATO would go a long way during this period to discourage talk here of referenda to disconnect Republika Srpska from BiH. Srpska's military leaders, integrating into the new Bosnian army, are fully in favor of PfP, and the advantages it will offer. -------------- COMMENT: NO TIME TO HOLD BOSNIA BACK -------------- ¶10. (C) Over the past decade, huge U.S. political, military and economic investments in Bosnia have brought significant and positive returns. The U.S. has used all resources at its disposal to firmly move Bosnia down the path of recovery and solidify the gains of peace and stability in the Western Balkans. We can point to the successes in creating democratic structures, functioning government institutions, strong national law enforcement agencies and a single Armed Forces as lasting achievements of our engagement in Bosnia. But, while we acknowledge that success has driven our decision to draw down our presence in Bosnia, many more tough reform decisions await Bosnian leaders in the near term. Important and lasting constitutional reforms are necessary to create a viable and coherent state structure. Police and economic reform must also proceed. We need to protect the U.S. investment in Bosnia and ensure that the difficult process of reform continues if Bosnia is to take its place in a Europe that is free, prosperous and at peace. ¶11. (C) With the Office of the High Representative due to close and EU membership a distant and unsure prospect, we believe that Bosnian membership in PfP can fill the political/security void created by NATO's departure and EUFOR's draw down as well as provide a crucial Euro-Atlantic anchor for Bosnia. Without it, defense reform, an important achievement of U.S. engagement in Bosnia and key element of the U.S. policy goal of lasting peace and stability in the region, will likely see only halting and incomplete progress in the coming years. Furthermore, Bosnia has objectively met the technical criteria for PfP membership, and, we think, has fully cooperated with ICTY within its capabilities. In sum, an offer of PfP membership at the Riga Summit could go a long way in solidifying our gains to date, and put new energy behind our efforts to drive the Bosnian reform agenda forward. End comment. MCELHANEY