Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SARAJEVO2259
2006-09-27 06:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S TRAVEL HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED U.S.

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR BK 
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #2259/01 2700653
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270653Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4475
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002259 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH,
SAINZ, FOOKS),AND EUR/RPM, NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER,
GREGORIAN, OSD FOR MARK JONES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S TRAVEL HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED U.S.
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN BOSNIA AND EXPOSES SOME SHAKY
FOUNDATIONS OF DEFENSE REFORM


Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002259 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, FOOKS),AND EUR/RPM, NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER, GREGORIAN, OSD FOR MARK JONES E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S TRAVEL HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN BOSNIA AND EXPOSES SOME SHAKY FOUNDATIONS OF DEFENSE REFORM Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. To focus public attention on continued U.S. engagement in Bosnia after the announcement of the Eagle Base drawdown, Ambassador and emboffs traveled September 14-21 to headquarters of the BiH Armed Forces' (AFBiH) three new multi-ethnic brigades and the training center for the AFBiH Explosive Ordinance Disposal Unit (EOD) unit. Accompanied by BiH Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Podzic and Senior Military Representative, U.S. BG Weber, the substantial press attention highlighted the solid progress BiH has made in standing-up a single military force that is responsible for stability and security within the country's borders. The Ambassador's travels also laid bare several concerns that might undermine the long term success of reform efforts in the absence of a larger international security umbrella, such as Bosnian participation in the Partnership for Peace. END SUMMARY -------------- -------------- HELO ROADSHOW HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED U.S. ENGAGEMENT -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Traveling by U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, Ambassador and emboffs visited the headquarters of the three new AFBiH multi-ethnic brigades in Banja Luka, Tuzla and Capljina and the EOD unit in Glamoc on September 14, 18 and ¶21. Accompanied by BiH Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Sifet Podzic, the Ambassador's and BG Weber's presence sent a strong political and public message that the United States will remain deeply engaged in BiH despite the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Eagle Base and that the U.S. strongly supports Bosnia's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Both print and electronic media widely covered the visits, and largely focused on our intended message. -------------- REAL, VISIBLE PROGRESS... -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The visits also served to highlight the substantial progress BiH has made in implementing defense reform in the past year. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) was entirely supportive of the agenda and used th
e opportunity to showcase the advances in creating a single, unified AFBiH. Some of the lasting images of the trips would have been unthinkable 18 months ago. In Banja Luka, at the former headquarters of the Army of Republika Srpska, an honor guard, wearing the new uniforms of the AFBiH and presenting the Bosnian flag, warmly greeted Gen. Podzic, a Bosniak and former commander in the Federation Army. At the new joint training facility at Manjaca, the site of a prison camp during the war as well as the notorious April 2005 incident in which Bosnian-Serb recruits refused to take an oath of allegiance to BiH and whistled during the BiH national anthem, Ambassador and General Podzic received a briefing on the new AFBiH joint training program that focused on increasing inter-operability with NATO forces. ¶4. (SBU) The Ministry of Defense too has begun to implement real and important changes that can be seen on the ground. The deployment areas for the new army have been identified, and facilities are being readied to house them. A unified chain of command is in place, and commanders affirmed their obligation to rely on the single, national MOD for any orders. The EOD unit, which the U.S. trained and equipped, is multi-ethnic and will soon deploy its fourth rotation to support coalition efforts in Iraq. -------------- ... WITH MUCH MORE TO BE DONE -------------- ¶5. (C) It is also clear, however, that defense reform is a process that will take substantial time to be fully realized. The MOD has yet to make its key personnel decisions and appointments, running dangerously close to not meeting its October 1 deadline. To meet the requirements of the new force structure plan, the MOD must cut approximately 2000 soldiers from its ranks, and this has proven to be a particularly contentious process. This includes personnel decisions about multi-ethnic commands for the new brigades, the first step in integrating the units. The down-sizing, coupled with open questions about recruitment in the new SARAJEVO 00002259 002 OF 002 all-volunteer force, will effectively limit the ethnic integration of the new brigades in the short-term (Comment: Some experts believe the AFBiH may not be fully integrated for 20 years. End Comment). ¶6. (C) Along with the remaining administrative and legal hurdles, such as harmonizing pay scales, questions of identity and loyalty linger. Some Bosniak commanders also worry about the commitment of their Bosnian-Serb counterparts to the reform process. General Podzic told the Ambassador that the MOD would use the requirement for downsizing to remove officers with questionable loyalties to the state structure. Other visuals from the trips are illuminating in this regard. In Banja Luka, our advance team had to cover a large "Army of the Republika Srpska" sign above the headquarters main door and scrubbed the brigade "museum" of items from the 1992-1995 war. Portraits of famous historical Serbian military leaders and a large and particularly graphic mural depicting the 1389 Battle of Kosovo remained for the visit. At the training facility in Manjaca, the Bosnian national flag was flying for the Ambassador's visit, with a second, adjacent flagpole temporarily empty. In Capljina, army commanders had originally planned for the Ambassador to visit a monument to a Croatian unit that had fought in the Second World War as well as the Catholic chapel on the base. These episodes suggest Bosnian-Serbs and Croats remain somewhat conflicted about their loyalty to the state's new defense institutions. -------------- COMMENT: U.S. DEPARTURE LEAVES A VACUUM -------------- ¶7. (C) A common theme running throughout the visits was the crucial role that the United States continues to play in BiH, especially in the defense reform process. Albeit for different reasons, all parties in the defense reform process recognize that the United States' political power, military capabilities, and credibility in BiH were the glue that held the reform together. On the Bosniak side in particular, a general anxiety exists regarding the impending U.S. departure from Eagle Base in Tuzla. During the trips, we consistently focused on continued U.S. military cooperation and engagement with BiH and our retention of "over the horizon" capabilities. Despite that, it is difficult to overcome the perception that the U.S. is "abandoning" Bosnia. As a consequence, the drawdown from Eagle Base will leave a perceived security vacuum among Bosnians that could shake the unsettled foundations of the reform process. ¶8. (C) While the European Union will retain a military force (EUFOR),it is beginning to draw down to as few as several thousand by the end of the year. Largely as a result of the UNPROFOR experience during the war, Bosnians openly speak of their lack of confidence in the Europeans and do not see EUFOR as a real stabilizing force in the country. It does not help that the Greeks, who are slated to backfill the Austrians in EUFOR's Tuzla deployment, are reportedly telling people here that they have no intention of taking over the EUFOR presence there. Ideally, the new AFBiH should take a lead role in ensuring a secure environment, but it remains too early in the defense reform process for this to happen. To provide Bosnians with a more tangible political indication of our continued interest in their stability and security and with a mechanism that would act as a continued driver of a defense reform process, the U.S. should maintain its premier role in defense reform. We note too in advance of the NATO Riga Summit that expectations here about Bosnia's PfP membership are rising. MCELHANEY

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