BOSNIA: NATIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN CHARACTERIZED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002060 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT. FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, FOOKS) AND EUR PPD, NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER, GREGORIAN, OSD FOR FLORY E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2016 TAGS: PGOV BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA: NATIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN CHARACTERIZED BY DIVIDED BOSNIAKS, CROATS, AND SERBS REF: A. SARAJEVO 2039 ¶B. SARAJEVO 1762 Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS L. MCELHANEY, REASONS 1 .4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: September 1, the first official day of the campaign season in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was characterized by high-profile events emphasizing ethnic interests. Serb and Croat parties are seeking the support of their electorates by courting patrons in Belgrade and Zagreb. The Bosniak political debate is focused on issues of Islamic identity and the intersection of political and religious spheres. The common thread in the political discourse is criticism of the March constitutional reform package as candidates compete to be seen as the most reliable advocates for their ethnic group's interests. For now, the pragmatic approach to reform and capacity building that characterized constitutional reform negotiations, and will be crucial for Bosnia after the elections, has fallen victim to lowest-common-denominator electioneering. END SUMMARY. RS Premier Dodik in Belgrade -------------- ¶2. (C) Republika Srpska (RS) Premier Milorad Dodik launched his electoral campaign with a visit to Belgrade August 31 and September 1, where he met with Serbian President Boris Tadic and Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica. Despite conciliatory joint statements with his Serbian colleagues on their shared commitment to the prosecution of war criminals, most of Dodik,s comments were directed towards a pan-Serb constituency and designed to appeal to RS-based Serb nationalism. Dodik endorsed Belgrade,s position on Kosovo, stating that his government believes Kosovo should remain a part of the Republic of Serbia. He added that citizens of the RS were watching Kosovo negotiations closely and a decision creating an independent Kosovo would lead to "discontent" in the RS. Dodik also joined Serbian PM Kostunica,s condemnation of Chief Kosovo Negotiator Martti Ahtisaari,s statements on the collective responsibility of the Serb people, saying that as a UN representative, Ahtisaari,s role is to "conduct negotiations in an unbiased way and to represent both sides equally." ¶3. (C) Dodik,s appeal to RS nationalism, including his regular references to a possible referendum on RS independence, is prompting other RS-based political parties to ratchet up their nationalist rhetoric as well. Though Serb Democratic Party leader and RS President Dragan Cavic's public statements remain relatively conciliatory, SDS Vice President and SDS Tri-Presidency candidate Mladen Bosic asserted last week that the RS electorate no longer supported the package of constitutional reforms agreed to in March. He went on to suggest that post-election constitutional reform negotiations should start anew. On August 30, the Serbian Radical Party of Republika Srpska (SRS-RS),with support from SDS, sought to convene a special session of the RS National Assembly (RSNA) to debate several politically explosive issues related to the RS,s status within BiH, including constitutional reform and police reform (ref A). Bosnian Croats Compete for Zagreb,s Blessing -------------- ¶4. (C) As Dodik and his colleagues look to Belgrade, Bosnia,s Croat parties have been vying for endorsements from Zagreb, which they see as critical to energizing apathetic Croat voters (Note: Only 28% of Bosnian Croats voted in the 2002 national election. End Note). Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Hercegovina-1990 (HDZ-1990),which split from HDZ-BiH over constitutional reform and built its campaign around opposition to the March package, has aggressively courted Zagreb, particularly Croatian PM Ivo Sanader. For example, in mid-August HDZ-1990 leaders Bozo Ljubic and Martin Raguz attended mass with Sanader in the southern Croatian town of Prolozac. Afterwards several Sanader advisors appeared at HDZ-1990 election rallies. The courtship paid its biggest dividend at the September 2-3 HDZ-1990 party conference when Sanader addressed the gathering via video-link and wished Ljubic, Raguz and their followers "election victory." ¶5. (C) HDZ-1990,s anti-constitutional reform rhetoric and SARAJEVO 00002060 002 OF 002 its support from Zagreb have put HDZ-BiH and its leader Dragan Covic on the defensive. According to press reports, Covic is "desperately" trying to find political allies in Croatia to offset Sanader,s support for HDZ-1990. Covic has also steadily escalated his nationalist rhetoric. In a meeting with us several weeks ago, Covic privately criticized Sanader,s proposal to hold an international conference on the future of BiH in Zagreb (ref. B),but early in the week of August 28, Covic publicly endorsed it. (Note: Bosnians, particularly Croats, interpret the Sanader initiative as an implicit rejection of the March constitutional reform package. End Note). Covic went a step further in an August 31 interview by claiming, "we, the Croats, will have our own entity as well" and suggesting that he would seek an end to entity voting when constitutional reform talks resumed after the elections. Tihic Versus Ceric -------------- ¶6. (C) On August 31, the Islamic Community (IC) leader Reis Mustafa ef. Ceric chaired a session of the Riaset, essentially a legislative body that consists of the Reis, Muftis, Imams, and professors from Islamic schools. The Riaset announced that the IC would not endorse any political party or candidate. Despite this, and earlier promises not to interfere in politics, the Reis has appeared at religious ceremonies to which government leaders were not invited with Party for BiH (SBiH) leader and Tri-Presidency candidate Haris Silajdzic. The appearances with Silajdzic are often coupled with the Reis, public criticism of the Bosniak political leadership,s (read President Sulejman Tihic,s) failure to defend Bosniak interests within BiH (i.e., during constitutional reform talks). Several of Tihic,s allies within the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) have begun to fight back, however. In a letter subsequently leaked to the press, SDA Main Board President Irfan Ajanovic criticized the Reis for meddling in Bosniak politics and accused him of being linked to organized crime. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) As this snapshot of current election-related events makes clear, the general tone of the campaign (reported reftels) has not improved. The major political parties (except the Social Democratic Party) are neglecting issues-based campaigning in favor of scapegoating ethnic and religious rivals for the problems facing the country. Ten years after Dayton we had hoped to see an expansion of national political discourse, but what we see, in effect, is three distinct campaigns. Unfortunately, much of the campaign rhetoric has focused on criticism of the constitutional reforms negotiated in March rather than inter-ethnic civic or economic interests. This portends an election that will have little to do with resolving questions important to Bosnia,s Euro-Atlantic future, but rather reinforcing longstanding patterns of fractious identity politics. MCELHANEY