BOSNIA - HIREP LAYS OUT POLICE REFORM STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 001980 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SCE (HOH/FOOKS); OSD FOR FLORY; NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2011 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KCRM KJUS BI SUBJECT: BOSNIA - HIREP LAYS OUT POLICE REFORM STRATEGY REF: SARAJEVO 1747 Classified By: CDA Judith Cefkin. Reason 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On August 24, OHR High Representative Schwartz-Schilling and Head of the EU Police Mission Coppola briefed key Ambassadors, including the U.S., about police reform. Schwartz-Schilling announced that he planned to conduct political negotiations on police reform, but only on the basis of the Police Directorate's final report. Coppola provided the Ambassadors with a copy of what he termed a "bottom-line" organigram of what the Directorate was likely to propose. He also outlined those areas where he thought Serb interests might be accommodated in the negotiating end game. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) On August 24, High Representative (HiRep) Schwartz-Schilling hosted the first of what he called a series of informal meetings on police reform with "key" members of the PIC Steering Board. Ambassador McElhaney and British Ambassador Rycroft attended. The German and EU Ambassadors were invited, but were out of town. Schwartz-Schilling stressed the need for "total solidarity" within the international community to bring police reform to a successful conclusion. He also outlined his reply to a July 19 letter from EU Common Foreign Security Policy HiRep Javier Solana and Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn on policing (copies of both faxed to EUR/SCE). OHR's Negotiating Strategy -------------- ¶3. (C) Schwartz-Schilling maintained that his decision to continue to pursue police reform through the Policing Directorate had been the right one. Even though the Republika Srpska (RS) member of the Directorate would now only participate as an observer, there has still been progress. With this in mind, he wanted the Directorate to complete its work, now scheduled for November 30. This report would provide the basis for OHR-sponsored political discussions on police reform. Schwartz-Schilling explained that he believed RS political leaders would soften their position on police reform after the elections if SAA conditionality were firmly applied. He will send a team to Brussels in early September to outline his strategy and ensure EU support. A Bottom Line Document -------------- ¶4. (C) After Schwartz-Schilling concluded, Head of the EU Police Mission Coppola handed out an organigram of Bosnia's new police structure that he termed "the bottom-line document" on police reform (faxed to EUR/SCE). The organigram, which represents the work of the Directorate, diagrams a two-tiered police structure -- state and local -- that would report to the BiH Ministry of Security. Core functions, such as administration and forensics, would be managed at the state level. Local police forces would operate within districts, which have yet to be defined, and would report to a Directorate for Coordination of local Police at the state level. ¶5. (C) Coppola claimed that the Directorate's proposed structure does not exclude any specific RS idea except for maintaining the status quo. The RS could even keep its Ministry of Interior (MoI),albeit stripped of its police function, he said. The new structure is also not a "radical attempt at centralization," Coppola claimed, adding that it actually decentralizes many police functions within the RS by giving local forces greater authority than they currently enjoy vis-a-vis the MoI in Banja Luka. (Comment: All this may be true, but the organigram does a poor job conveying this. 75% of it is devoted to State-level police bodies. End Comment). Room for Negotiation -------------- ¶6. (C) Schwartz-Schilling and Coppola concluded their presentation by underscoring that OHR has built some negotiating room into the proposed new policing structure in order to secure RS agreement. For example, OHR could agree to locate several state level bodies in Banja Luka, and the RS MoI could be given a role in policy-making on certain SARAJEVO 00001980 002 OF 002 issues. Coppola also said that local police areas could be drawn so that they "largely conform" to the inter-entity boundary line, except in the Sarajevo region, where it "simply made no technical sense" to split the area between and RS and a Federation police district. ¶7. (C) Ambassadors McElhaney and Rycroft expressed concern about some of OHR's proposed concessions, arguing that it made more sense for OHR to hold firm on substantive issues while conceding on procedural matters, such as the timing of political negotiations that RS leaders are demanding. Ambassador McElhaney added that conceding too much to the RS risked alienating the Croats, who he predicted would be reluctant to accept dismantling of the Canton police forces, if the RS police remained essentially in tact. Based on these comments, OHR agreed to take another look at its RS negotiating strategy. CEFKIN