BOSNIA: A ROUGH SEMESTER AHEAD AS NATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 001826 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, FOOKS),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER, GREGORIAN, OSD FOR FLORY E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA: A ROUGH SEMESTER AHEAD AS NATIONAL ELECTIONS, INTERNATIONAL DRAWDOWNS, KOSOVO NEGOTIATIONS LOOM Classified by Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Our tranformational diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina will confront a number of challenges over the next months: -- The Kosovo final status talks, as did the Montenegro referendum, will provide Bosniaks and Serbs, in particular, additional means to radicalize the political campaign in advance of parliamentary and presidential elections October 1; -- The final and complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces, coupled with the fading influence of the High Rep,s office, should segue into an enhanced role for the Europeans, although we see little evidence that they are ready to assume greater responsiblity; -- The Bosnians are looking for signs that they can win EU approval of a Stabilization and Association Agreement by the end of 2006, even though we see no traction on ICTY and police reform issues; -- The High Rep currently is planning his post-election moves to assume a leadership role in the constitutional reform discussion, which could transform this U.S.-initiated process into a &soft power8, committee-run exercise. ¶2. (C) Ironically, the Bosnians have little trust in the Europeans (the UNPROFOR, pre-NATO period during the conflict being something that no one forgets) even though their major objective today is to move into the European Union. The United States for years has been seen as the guarantor of peace and stability, which argues for our continued, intense involvement here, and a hard push to Brussels institutions to focus our European friends on their responsibility here. In that vein, we need to ensure that they give the Bosnians a fair look ) despite "enlargement fatigue8 ) in finalizing the current stabilization discussions. Too, we will need to keep a close eye to the political dialogue getting out of hand here as the political temperature rises in the electoral season. What we haveproduced in constitutional reform discussions neds to be protected by handling High Rep Schwarz Schilling,s aspirations with care. End Summary. -------------- Nationlists Take the Lead in Divisive Talk -------------- ¶3. (C) The political debate in Bosnia has become more focused, and divided along ethnic (Croat, Bosniak (Muslim) and Serb) lines as we move to national elections October 1. For some time, Embassy has been reporting on the effects of the (albeit) peaceful transition to independence in Montenegro. As expected, that debate has been taken up by Haris Siladzjic, once a stalwart of Izetbegovic,s Party of Democratic Action (SDA) (Bosniak nationalist Muslim) political party. Siladzjic, from his long-time residence in Istanbul, has come back with his smaller Party for BiH (SBiH) to challenge SDA standard-bearer Suleiman Tihic for the Bosniak presidency slot. A smart and canny politican, Siladzjic despises Tihic, particularly because Izetbegovic, on his deathbed, gave the nod to Tihic in the last presidential election, spelling defeat for the former Prime Minister. Siladzjic,s party backed out early from the U.S.-sponsored constitutional reform discussions, using the argument that without complete abolition of the entities (read Republika Srspka),there should be no agreement. Siladzjic and his party, who actively worked to scuttle the agreement in the parliament, have campaigned ever since against more moderate Bosniaks, arguing that they &sold out8 to the Serbs. ¶4. (C) Silajdzic,s rhetoric, including charges that the U.S. supports the entities because they were not fully eliminated in the negotiations, has been taken up by the Serbs in Banja Luka, and particularly Milorad Dodik and his ruling left of center, increasingly nationalist, Alliance of Independent Serb National Social Democrats (SNSD). With the constant salvos from Siladzjic, Dodik increasingly has resorted to nationalist rhetoric for short-term political gain, almost forsaking the U.S.-backed reforms that he had privately agreed to support after the elections. He too has gone on the defensive in responding to Siladjic. Taking his SARAJEVO 00001826 002 OF 004 cue from the Montenegro referendum, he has beat the drum for a referendum among Bosnian Serbs to indicate whether they should remain in BiH, an approach similar to what happened in 1992 when Bosniaks voted for a unified BiH and the Serbs voted to NOT be part of it. This verbal "war of the entitites8, joined by other Bosnian Serb parties, has played out for two months, further poisoning the political atmosphere. ¶5. (C) While the Europeans and High Rep Schwarz-Schilling have been content to issue press releases condemning divisive talk, we have worked hard with Dodik directly to get him to temper his approach. Dodik, though, feels that he must engage in nationalist rhetoric to garner votes that would otherwise go to wartime leaders in Karadzjic,s SDS. Dodik tells us despite his own, divisive rhetoric about referenda that Siladzjic,s election would be a disaster for BiH and for further progress in building a coherent state. Dodik pays lip service to constitutional reform, but his statements put moderate Bosniaks like Tihic and left-center social democrat Lagumdzjia on the defensive. Meanwhile, elements within Tihic,s party (particularly those with fundamentalist sympathies) are attracted by Siladzjic,s radical rhetoric, making it difficult for moderate elements in the SDA to respond. The Muslim religious community, particularly its leader Reisu-l-Ulema Mustafa ef. Ceric, intensely dislikes Tihic and quietly has sought to undermine him. For our part, we have an interest in ensuring that Muslim radical elements are held at bay within Tihic,s SDA, as they are the major opponents of his pro-U.S. support for Bosnian deployments to Iraq, for anti-terrorist measures, and critically, for a moderate, negotiated approach to constitutional reform. -------------- -------------- &If Kosovars Can Have Independence, Then So Can Bosnian Serbs8 -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Hovering above the pre-election campaign is the specter of the Kosovo final status talks, and what, if any, forces a final settlement might unleash among Bosnian Serbs. If the Montenegro referendum is any indicator, Kosovo will be an irresistible pretext for Bosnian Serbs to argue that Republika Srpska too, should have more autonomy. Dodik has told the Ambassador privately that he "doesn,t give a damn about Kosovo,8 and explicitly provided assurances that he has no intention of trying to engineer a referendum in the RS. Nonetheless, the political damage has been done. Bosniak politicians already are convinced that independence for Kosovo will spark demands from Banja Luka. Although the Kosovo-effect may come after elections in October, it will provide ample opportunity for Serbs to continue their musings about secession. In the meantime, moderate Bosniaks like Tihic and Ladumdzjia have refrained from responding to Dodik, realizing that without a Serb partner in government, any progress in continued institution building will be set back for years. ¶7. (C) Ambassador has met with Siladzjic to discuss the constitutional reforms on several occasions. Siladzjic, who is extremely self-absorbed and appears unstable, sees the world, as he told us, at a much more strategic level than any other Bosnian politician. He may well be thinking that Bosnian Serbs could be working with Belgrade to be part of a sweetener when Kosovo independence becomes a reality. For our part, we have distanced ourselves from Siladzjic, and have refused to respond to some of the more ridiculous things he says. We have heard through several sources that Siladzjic will continue to play on Bosniak Muslim fears that, with the departure of U.S. troops, and the planned shutdown of the High rep,s office in 2007, Croats and Serbs in BiH will gain the upper hand. -------------- The International Drawdown Makes Many Nervous -------------- ¶8. (C) Reductions in the presence of the &international community8 here are palpable. Because of the critical U.S. role in the security sector, announcements of the pullout of residual U.S. forces here has met with considerable consternation from Bosniak Muslims, and, expectedly, understanding from the Serbs and Croats. The EU force here (EUFOR),too, will be reduced by the end of the year, it is SARAJEVO 00001826 003 OF 004 planned, to about 2500 troops. Meanwhile, the Office of the High Rep, once a major force in directing the fractured ethnic politics of BiH, has already undergone large reductions. The selection of new High Rep Schwarz-Schilling ) following activist Paddy Ashdown ) has meant, already, that the &let Bosnians be Bosnians8 approach pervades the much less visible and effective High Rep hand in overseeing Bosnian attempts to move toward a more coherent state. Schwarz-Schilling believes strongly that his role should be one of mediator and facilitator. If the High Rep morphs into the EU Special Representative (EUSR),as projected in June 2007, we are likely to see a further diffusion of European influence here. The EUSR will simply join an EU family of institutions, including the European Commission (EC),EUFOR, and the EU Police Mission (EUPM),which will continue to respond to Brussels through each,s one discrete reporting chain. Signs of the change are reflected in the increasing absence of substance in meetings with the High Rep and the growing differences among different EU agencies. ¶9. (C) Increasingly, the Europeans are providing little guidance to the Bosnians as to how to finish up their Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA),an all-important step in moving Bosnia into European structures. While just about everything has been done on the NATO track to finish up the creation of a state defense ministry and one military ) the defense law was approved recently by the Presidency ) the Europeans have a number of issues unresolved that could halt progress on their agreement with the Bosnians. Many of the Europeans ) particularly the French and the Germans ) seem to have taken anti-enlargement sentiment at home seriously, and their role in pushing things forward here, as a result, has diminished. The High Rep being a German doesn,t help in this sense. Too, the Bosnians are looking around for some help in fulfilling the requirements for completing and signing the SAA, particularly pushing toward agreements on a number of conditions in the agreement that must be reached, one being police reform, where process has been mistaken for progress. ¶10. (C) On the departure of Ashdown, who was a prime proponent of advancing the EU-required reorganization of Bosnian police structures (essentially taking the entity Interior Ministries) &MUPs8 out of the hands of the Serbs on the one hand, and the Croats and Bosniaks on the other), progress has slowed as the Europeans have run up against local opposition. The Serbs want continued control over the RS &MUP8, to keep a tight lid on the political situation in favor of the current parties, and to ensure that power in Srpska remains with Banja Luka, and is not transferred to Sarajevo. There is little enthusiasm in the Federation, either, to meld 10 different cantonal police structures into a nationwide one. In that context, the Europeans have taken a less than detailed set of three principles, negotiated by Ashdown and the U.S. last year, and begun turning it into a full-fledged plan ) on which they have no buy-in from the Serbs, who have used every tactic to discredit and undercut the EU police commission in charge of the discussions. ¶11. (C) Our interventions with the Serbs ) particularly Serb PM Dodik ) have been numerous and strident. Telling him nt to give the Europeans a pretext for walking awayfrom an EU SAA stabilization and association agrement, the Ambassador has proposed to him that hebegins to see what, in the European police plan,he can accept, and what will need further discusion. At the same time, and with some justification, Dodik claims that the Europeans have not really negotiated, preferring to elaborate a detailed, technical plan based on the scant detail of three principles. We have been careful to avoid Dodik,s divide and conquer tactics, while at the same time urging the EU to lift the discussions above working level EU Police Monitors and local police chiefs. Both the High Rep, the EU police officials ) on the basis of some general instruction from Brussels ) are content to continue the discussion and bring to a head a negotiation in which the Serbs have only participated, of late, as observers. We do not believe ) with the preponderance of go-slow adherents among EU members ) that the Bosnians will get past conditions on police reform and be in a position to sign an SAA stabilization agreement this year. -------------- The High Rep Wants in on the Action SARAJEVO 00001826 004 OF 004 -------------- ¶12. (C) Finally, High Rep Schwarz-Schilling continues to push his own role in reforming Bosnia,s fractured Dayton-era constitution. Schwarz-Schilling, whom we doubt will ever really spearhead a true negotiation to change Dayton, insists that EU foreign policy chief Solana and enlargement commissioner Rehn have told him that he must "take a lead8 in this area. He told us that he fully respects that the U.S. should have the opportunity to get the initial phase of amendments passed in the Bosnian parliament post October 1 elections, but he has given us only the sketchiest idea of how he would suggest to proceed after that. In his brief time here, he has been unwilling to do more than use his office for hortatory statements. It is doubtful that he will ever "take off the gloves8 with the Bosnians, which is necessary here to effect change. Although he claims to the Ambassador that he respects the U.S. work on reform, he seems to be responding to an instinctive European reaction that when the U.S. takes the lead, they must be more involved. With the ramping down of the OHR presence and the transition to an EU Special Rep summer 2007, we doubt that Schwarz-Schillng will be in a position to pressure Bosnian politicians to make necessary changes. We have told him clearly that the U.S.-sponsored package is on the table and that we are keeping it alive so that if the votes are available post-elections, we will move quickly to get it approved. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) As the election period gets into full swing, we hear more and more in the press about inter-ethnic violence ) graveyard desecration, shots fired at an imam, etc. With the tapes of a wartime Bosniak general showing him ordering soldiers to burn Serb homes in the Krajina, Serbs now are raising cries of mass slaughter. They are taking full advantage to equate their suffering during the war with that of Bosniaks and Croats. As a result, the ensuing political dialogue is more the venting of frustrations of the different ethnic groups than actually discussing voters, bread and butter issues. We are girding ourselves for a bumpy ride in the coming days as the confluence of election rhetoric and jitters over regional developments gather steam. ¶14. (C) We have continued to encourage consultations among major political parties begun in the U.S.-sponsored constitutional reform negotiations. The glow from that exercise in building a consensus (still a dirty word for radicals in each camp) has spilled over into the political arena. For the first time in post-conflict Bosnia, Bosniak Tihic calls Serb Dodik to complain about Dodik,s rhetoric on a referendum for the RS to leave Bosnia. Serb Cavic talks with Croat Covic. The only outsiders continue to be Siladzjic - who dearly wants U.S. recognition but continues to attack Bosniaks for capitulating to the Serbs in constitutional discussions ) and Croat and Bosniak ultra-nationalists. If the Serbs in particular start lobbing intimations about separation, using the parallel of Kosovo moving toward independence, we will need to come down hard on them. It would not be surprising to us that some in the Bosnian Serb capital would attempt to stir trouble regionally through talk about a break-away Republika Srpska. ¶15. (C) Against this background, near-term progress on police reform and other issues needed to sign the EU Stabilization and Association Agreement will be minimal. We are pushing the Serbs to negotiate seriously rather than attacking the EU-sponsored process. Although it is not clear from here, many of the Europeans tell us that ICTY head Carla del Ponte will likely certify that BiH is cooperating with the ICTY ) so that this condition for the SAA might be satisfied. MCELHANEY