BOSNIA: BIH OFFICIALS UNHAPPY OVER NEWS OF U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 001275 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO, FRIED, VOLKER),D (SMITH),P (BAME), EUR/SCE (ENGLISH, SAINZ, FOOKS),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER, GREGORIAN, OSD FOR FLORY E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016 TAGS: OPDC PREL BK NATO SUBJECT: BOSNIA: BIH OFFICIALS UNHAPPY OVER NEWS OF U.S. TROOP REDUCTION REF: STATE 84064 Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) This is an Action Request, please see para. 5. ¶1. (C) Summary: Bosnian leaders, particularly those from Bosniak Muslim parties, were unhappy and apprehensive about the news, delivered per reftel, that the U.S. troop presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) would be diminished in the coming months and the U.S. presence at Eagle Base, Tuzla, ended. They were particularly anxious about the potential impact of the downsizing during the current election campaign. The Ambassador reassured the BiH leadership that the U.S. would continue its involvement in Bosnia, including through bilateral military engagement. The Bosniak reaction is expected; we can help alleviate the apprehension through a careful media strategy (worked out in tandem with NATO HQ),a remaining visible U.S. presence at least through October elections, and a range of possible bilateral initiatives that will ease the sting of withdrawal. End Summary Visceral Bosniak Reaction ¶2. (C) In a series of four meetings, the Ambassador delivered reftel news of U.S. troop reduction and withdrawal from Eagle Base, Tuzla, to the members of the Tri-Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH),Prime Minister Terzic, and Defense Minister Radovanovic. Bosniak Presidency Member Tihic, deeply unhappy, privately told the Ambassador that he viewed the departure of the U.S. forces as a signal that the U.S. is "no longer interested" in BiH, though he fortunately toned down his rhetoric in the Ambassador's subsequent meeting with the entire Tri-Presidency. During that discussion, Croat member of the Tri-Presidency Jovic underscored the need to properly engage the Bosnian public through well-publicized bilateral events, both within and outside the military sphere, aimed at demonstrating an ongoing U.S. presence in BiH. Prime Minister Terzic, too, had a visceral initial reaction, proclaiming dramatically that the closure of Eagle Base will be "a huge issue" for the Bosniaks during the upcoming pre-election campaign. Defense Minister Pragmatic, Focused on Future ¶2. (C) As ever pragmatic, Defense Minister Radovanovic acknowledged the importance of the transition as a reflection of Bosnia's future. Radovanovic told the Ambassador that he will a create commission composed of BiH Ministry of Defense (MOD),NATO HQ, and local officials to develop a long-term strategy for utilizing Eagle Base once the remaining U.S. troops depart. The commission will discuss the possibility of retaining part of the complex to meet future NATO requirements for accessible military facilities as well as possible U.S. bilateral needs. (Note: We are highly skeptical that the Bosnians will have either the resources or the institutional ability to retain Eagle Base for any practical use. More likely, it will be shut down following the U.S. departure and the subsequent EUFOR drawdown.) Radovanovic emphasized the growing political importance of timely BiH membership in Partnership for Peace, commenting that failure to gain entry by the November NATO Summit in Riga would adversely affect the momentum of defense reform. The Ambassador concurred about the importance of PfP for Bosnia, underscoring the need for movement on political criteria regarding the ICTY as the single remaining precondition. Questions Regarding Disposition of Tuzla Base ¶3. (C) During the Radovanovic meeting, a number of questions arose related to ownership of Eagle Base. During the transition from SFOR to EUFOR, the U.S. retained control of the airfield and EUFOR assumed jurisdiction over the base. U.S. ownership of other facilities within Eagle Base is unclear, however. Prior to the arrival of the stabilization forces in 1994, Eagle Base served as a Yugoslav National Army (JNA) site. Under the 2004 Defense Law, the facility should theoretically resort to ownership by the BiH MOD. As the U.S. withdraws, BiH officials will look to the U.S. to ensure property claims are clarified appropriately and in line with BiH law and U.S.-BiH historical agreements. SARAJEVO 00001275 002 OF 002 Comment and Action Request ¶4. (C) Equating the troop reduction with overall U.S. "abandonment", as both Tihic and Terzic rather melodramatically put it, will be a common theme among Bosnian Muslims once the word spreads of the impending drawdown. For Bosniaks, the troop reduction validates long standing fears that the U.S. will forsake BiH, leaving the Bosnian Muslims to the same Europeans who failed to react adequately in the 1992-95 timeframe. The impact of the U.S. drawdown optic will have even greater resonance in Bosnia's pre-election atmosphere, already heated by Serb references to separatist referenda. To counter the accusations of abandonment, the Embassy is engaging NATO HQ Sarajevo to develop a comprehensive public affairs strategy; continued visible U.S. engagement will be critical to a successful transition. We would also recommend that a U.S. presence at Eagle Base be maintained at least through October elections (also the timeframe for Kosovo status discussions) as reassurance. ¶5. (C) Action Request: Other bilateral initiatives, some with military benefit in their own right, could also help to ease the sting of the U.S. withdrawal. Among those deserving of strong consideration are: -- EUCOM can develop a strong Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plan which emphasizes, in addition to our ongoing military assistance, a continual bilateral training and exercise relationship with the AFBiH. The U.S. could gain valuable public diplomacy traction if such a plan were announced before the actual troop reduction occurs. A visible demonstration within the next few months of our over-the-horizon capability via military exercise would also help reduce Bosniak anxiety over the U.S. restructuring. Another ship visit in early Fall would help in this regard, as well. -- Meetings with local defense attaches here in Sarajevo have highlighted the stalled progress of the NATO Trust Fund, established to help with the demobilization of soldiers made redundant by defense reform. A relatively small but widely heralded U.S. donation to the Trust Fund could encourage others to contribute and again give us a much needed bump in our public relations effort. -- The postponed Bilateral Defense Consultations (BDC) could be held this summer, another venue in which our bilateral relationship and TSC plan are reviewed, formalized and made ready for an early Fall announcement. -- Finally, increased FMF and IMET funding is important to send a strong message of bilateral support and assistance. Bosnia has already contributed troops to the coalition effort in Iraq and would take the necessary steps to field a presence in Afghanistan, if the funds were available. Increased FMF, however, will be necessary to accomplish this until such time as Bosnia is eligible for PfP coalition funds. MCELHANEY