Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SAOPAULO722
2006-06-30 12:18:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Consulate Sao Paulo
Cable title:  

SAO PAULO MAYOR DISCUSSES PCC VIOLENCE, ELECTIONS, BOLIVIA

Tags:  PGOV PINR ECON ETRD EPET BR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6131
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0722/01 1811218
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301218Z JUN 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5340
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6430
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2650
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2326
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2053
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1782
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2884
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7229
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3011
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2505
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000722 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE PASS USTR FOR MSULLIVAN
STATE PASS EXIMBANK
STATE PASS OPIC FOR MORONESE, RIVERA, MERVENNE
NSC FOR FEARS
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA
TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND DDOUGLASS
DOL FOR ILAB MMITTELHAUSER
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
USAID/W FOR LAC/AA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR ECON ETRD EPET BR
SUBJECT: SAO PAULO MAYOR DISCUSSES PCC VIOLENCE, ELECTIONS, BOLIVIA


REF: (A) SAO PAULO 708; (B) BRASILIA 1266;
(C) SAO PAULO 689; (D) SAO PAULO 573 AND PREVIOUS;
(E) SAO PAULO 106

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

-------
SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000722 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE PASS USTR FOR MSULLIVAN STATE PASS EXIMBANK STATE PASS OPIC FOR MORONESE, RIVERA, MERVENNE NSC FOR FEARS USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND DDOUGLASS DOL FOR ILAB MMITTELHAUSER SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD USAID/W FOR LAC/AA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINR ECON ETRD EPET BR SUBJECT: SAO PAULO MAYOR DISCUSSES PCC VIOLENCE, ELECTIONS, BOLIVIA REF: (A) SAO PAULO 708; (B) BRASILIA 1266; (C) SAO PAULO 689; (D) SAO PAULO 573 AND PREVIOUS; (E) SAO PAULO 106 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Sao Paulo Mayor Gilberto Kassab told the Consul General (CG) June 29 that the recent gang violence in the city was a wake-up call to the public, which has responded in solidarity with the police. Kassab believes opposition candidate Geraldo Alckmin will have a hard time catching up with President Lula; therefore, the Liberal Front Party (PFL) is focusing its attention on helping former Mayor Jose Serra win the election for Governor of Sao Paulo. He predicted that, if re-elected, Lula will continue his orthodox economic policies and resist pressures for a turn to the left, and may even become more accommodating towards the U.S. in his approach to foreign policy. Kassab expected the political scene to change for the better as small parties disappear and large center-left and center-right coalitions are formed. Asked about Bolivia, he acknowledged concerns about Sao Paulo's heavy dependence on Bolivian gas, but ruled out any serious disruption. END SUMMARY. -------------- SOLIDARITY WITH EMBATTLED POLICE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) CG noted the morning's news of the killing of a prison guard, allegedly by the criminal gang First Capital Command (PCC) in the aftermath of the recent killing of 13 PCC members by state police (ref A). Kassab commented that the criminal gang problem had been brewing in Sao Paulo for years before erupting in the May wave of violence (ref D). It was a difficult time, both he and Municipal Secretary for International Relations Helena Gasparian noted, SIPDIS because the PCC was able to identify and kill individual police officers in their homes, putting enormous pressure on the police. Yet he also noted that the violence, while terrible in its own right and damaging to the c
ity's image, had one positive outcome. The show of force by the PCC had frightened the citizenry, which, when forced to choose sides, had shown solidarity with the police. Now everyone is more aware of the need to fight organized crime, though this remains a challenge due in large part to the weakness of federal law enforcement. ¶3. (SBU) CG described his recent meeting with state public security officials (septel) and the USG interest in exploring ways we might be able to help the state improve its ability to combat organized crime and mitigate the PCC's ability to control the state prison system. Over the longer term, Kassab expressed confidence that improved technology would assist authorities in combating crime more effectively. At the same time, he agreed with his PFL colleague, Sao Paulo Governor Claudio Lembo, that Brazil's elites need to provide more education and do more to combat economic inequality as part of the war on crime. -------------- GRIM VIEW OF ALCKMIN'S CHANCES -------------- ¶4. (SBU) CG asked Kassab, a PFL insider, how he viewed the presidential election. Kassab acknowledged that from an opposition perspective, it wasn't going well. He frankly did not see at this point how Geraldo Alckmin was going to overcome President Lula's large lead, estimated at nearly 30 points in some recent polls (ref SAO PAULO 00000722 002 OF 003 B). Though they continued to work for Alckmin, Kassab said he and his PFL colleagues are focusing more on ensuring Jose Serra's election as Governor. After failing to negotiate an alliance with the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB),Serra had chosen as his running mate PSDB Federal Deputy Alberto Goldman. But the PSDB-PFL alliance remained strong. Later that day, Kassab planned to attend the official launching of the Senate campaign of his friend and PFL colleague, Guilherme Afif Domingos, President of the Sao Paulo Chamber of Commerce, who is running with PSDB support against incumbent Eduardo Suplicy of Lula's Workers' Party (PT). -------------- LULA AS PRAGMATIC MODERATE -------------- ¶5. (SBU) CG asked Kassab for his views on what we could expect from a second Lula term if he is re-elected. Kassab noted that many political analysts expect that Lula, unencumbered by conservative allies and ineligible to run for re-election, would begin to pay more attention to the leftist elements of the PT and govern in more populist fashion. He, Kassab, did not agree. People don't change, he said, and Lula is ultimately conservative at heart, a trade unionist who worked pragmatically within the system for modest, incremental advances. He has won plaudits from around the world for his responsible management of Brazil's economy. He has never really paid much attention to the PT's leftist economists and is not likely to begin now. Kassab did not say what will become of the labor unions, landless movement (MST),and other leftist social movements that comprise the PT's core constituency; presumably they will continue to agitate from the left, but without much effect. ¶6. (SBU) On the trade front, Kassab opined, Lula may never support the FTAA, but he may eventually become more accommodating on trade issues. Many of the problematic foreign policy positions articulated by Lula and the MFA, especially those at odds with U.S. policy objectives, have been taken for electoral reasons; when these political imperatives disappear, he may become more moderate, including in his approach to bilateral relations with the United States. He may even move closer in some of his policies to the PSDB. Though Kassab did not say so explicitly, he hinted that the PSDB and PFL may be prepared to offer some support in Congress to such a "moderate" Lula to avoid political gridlock and keep the country on track. -------------- BIPARTISAN BRAZIL -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Kassab reiterated his view (see ref E) that the entry into force this year of the "Barrier Clause" will change Brazil's political panorama. After the smaller parties lose their viability when they fail to garner the required five percent of the national vote for the Chamber of Deputies, only five or six parties will remain. Lula's PT will be forced into a center-left alliance with the PMDB, which in return for its support will demand control of several Ministries to be used to advance the ambitions of their supporters. Meanwhile, the PSDB and PFL will form their own center-right coalition as a counter-weight. Any other surviving parties will eventually gravitate to one bloc or another, and Brazil will again have something resembling a two-party system. Kassab suggested this would have a salutary and stabilizing effect on Brazilian politics. -------------- BOLIVIAN GAS -------------- ¶8. (SBU) CG expressed interest in Kassab's perspective on Bolivia's SAO PAULO 00000722 003 OF 003 nationalization of its hydrocarbons sector. Kassab acknowledged that although a national issue, this was extremely worrisome for Sao Paulo, which remains heavily dependent on Bolivian gas to meet its energy needs. The city and the private sector were already exploring alternatives with a view to reducing that dependency, though it may have to pay higher prices in the short term. Ultimately, Brazil and Petrobras had the stronger negotiating position and would find an acceptable solution. Gasparian interjected that the 200,000 Bolivians residing illegally in Sao Paulo constituted a serious headache for the city. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (SBU) For the leader of a mega-city that recently suffered a major trauma and continues to confront challenges in the areas of crime, pollution, health care, the informal economy, and a large marginalized population, Kassab seemed remarkably relaxed, cheerful, and optimistic. Even the prospect of four more years of Lula, which dismays some leaders of the business community, did not appear to give him pause. Indeed, he volunteered that he sees no crises, political or economic, on the horizon. He expressed interest in maintaining close contact with the Consulate and having city officials participate in several upcoming USG-sponsored events. END COMMENT. ¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated/cleared with Embassy Brasilia. MCMULLEN

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -