PSDB STATE LEADER: LESSONS LEARNED FROM ALCKMIN CAMPAIGN;

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 001192 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE PASS USTR FOR SULLIVAN/CRONIN NSC FOR FEARS TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND DDOUGLASS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV ECON PINR BR SUBJECT: PSDB STATE LEADER: LESSONS LEARNED FROM ALCKMIN CAMPAIGN; OPTIMISTIC ABOUT INCOMING STATE GOVERNMENT -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Sao Paulo State Deputy Sidney Beraldo told Poloff that state leaders of the Social Democracy Party of Brazil (PSDB) have been conducting a "lessons learned" exercise to identify what went wrong in ex-Governor Geraldo Alckmin's unsuccessful presidential campaign. One conclusion is that the party erred in not making a more forceful response to President Lula's assertion that Alckmin would privatize all state-owned enterprises, in not touting the benefits of privatizations to date and more generally in not defending Fernando Henrique Cardoso's record as President. Beraldo also thought that Alckmin and his political advisors had ceded too much authority to media consultants, who had done a bad job of getting Alckmin's message out to the voters. Beraldo was optimistic about PSDB Governor-elect Jose Serra's ability to move Sao Paulo state forward, especially in investing in major infrastructure improvements. The PSDB and its coalition partners will control 44 out of 94 seats in the unicameral Legislative Assembly that will be seated March 15, and the party is reaching out to small parties in an attempt to put together a reliable working majority. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Poloff and Political Assistant met November 7 with Deputy Sidney Beraldo, a former president of the Sao Paulo State Legislative Assembly (ALESP) and a state PSDB leader, to talk about the elections just concluded, prospects for the newly elected Governor and ALESP, and the future of the PSDB. -------------- PSDB: SOUL-SEARCHING AFTER LOSING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -------------- ¶3. (U) From the start, Beraldo said, the PSDB knew they were facing a tough election. President Lula's advantage of incumbency weighed heavily throughout; unless he is extremely unpopular, an incumbent is always difficult to defeat. In addition to the exposure he got with the help of the campaign's large advertising budget, Lula was able to appear on television all the time, announcing new government accomplishments and programs. He also got a lot of propaganda mileage out of cash transfer programs (e.g., "Bolsa Familia"),all of which, as PSDB loyalists are always quick to point out, were begun by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC). This was Lula's fifth national election and he was already extremely well known. He also has genuine mass appeal; many voters feel a close connection with him that transcends policy and politics. ¶4. (SBU) Beraldo also noted that the PSDB and the Alckmin campaign had made a number of mistakes. The party's Sao Paulo State Executive Committee (the State Executive, he stressed, not the national Executive, which is "a disgrace") had just held a "lessons learned" session. Party leaders concluded that the PSDB had suffered from a lack of party unity. In some parts of the country, the local party organizations had simply not done enough to promote Alckmin's candidacy. Beraldo had traveled with the candidates around Sao Paulo state and asserted that Alckmin and (successful) gubernatorial candidate Jose Serra were in lockstep, and that Serra had done everything possible to help Alckmin (who carried the state, but by a disappointingly small margin). He had less direct knowledge of how hard Minas Gerais Governor Aecio Neves had worked for Alckmin, but noted that Lula was so far ahead in Minas that there was ultimately little that Neves could do to help. He agreed that Alckmin's showing in Minas had been disappointing and, combined with his poor showing in Rio de Janeiro, fatal to his chances. But then, Minas Gerais is a notoriously difficult state. The northern part of the state is very similar to the northeast and follows the northeast's voting patterns. ¶5. (SBU) This election, Beraldo continued, exposed the PSDB's greatest weakness: its failure to make inroads in the populous northeast. The party took a well-deserved beating due to its failure to deliver a compelling message to voters in the northeast. When Alckmin promised a management shock ("choque de gestao"), Beraldo got a call from a party leader in the small northeastern state of Paraiba, who said, "Here in Paraiba, a "choque de gestao" is what you get when a pregnant woman sticks her finger in a light SAO PAULO 00001192 002 OF 004 socket." (Note: This is a pun on the Portuguese word "gestacao," which means gestation or pregnancy. End Note.) Beraldo complained that the "marqueteiros" - media gurus - had wielded too much influence in shaping the message, and had done a bad job. The candidate and his political consultants should have pushed back and insisted on more control over the message. "Who can talk to the people if not the politicians? But they were frozen out of decisions by the "marqueteiros." ¶6. (SBU) Beraldo also noted that the PSDB's major coalition partner, the Liberal Front Party (PFL),is strong in the northeast but was not much help in delivering votes from there. This he attributed to the declining influence of the "colonels" or regional bosses who used to rule. In the second round, Lula won 77 percent of the valid votes in the northeast, including an amazing 85 percent in Maranhao state. ¶7. (SBU) The PSDB's other failure, Beraldo said, was its unwillingness to defend privatizations when Lula began frightening the voters with the charge that Alckmin would sell off the country's patrimony, and, more generally, its unwillingness to defend FHC's record as President. Privatization (of telecoms, to use just one example) had brought many benefits to many voters, including those of modest means. The party's state Executive Committee concluded that not defending the accomplishments of FHC's two administrations -- curbing inflation with the Plano Real, achieving political and economic stability -- was a major mistake. ¶8. (U) Even while acknowledging the PSDB's mistakes and Alckmin's lack of personal charisma as important factors in the campaign, Beraldo commented that nobody in the PSDB had anticipated that Lula would suffer so little damage in voters' eyes (and in vote totals) from the political scandals that plagued his first term, and still nobody can understand why this happened. -------------- UPBEAT ABOUT STATE GOVERNMENT -------------- ¶9. (U) Beraldo was optimistic about prospects for Sao Paulo state when former Mayor Jose Serra assumes the governorship. Serra, who served as Health Minister and Planning Minister under FHC and ran for President against Lula in 2002, comes to office extremely well-prepared both technically and politically, Beraldo said. Having a national figure running the state will be beneficial. Furthermore, the state is in good shape economically. Certainly, when the national economy doesn't grow -- 2.3 percent in 2005, and about 2.8 percent projected for 2006 -- Sao Paulo state suffers as well. But the late Governor Mario Covas (1994-2001) restored the state's solvency, and Governors Alckmin and Lembo provided sound financial management. The Law of Fiscal Responsibility prohibits the state from incurring debt of more than twice its budgetary receipts, and it is currently at 1.8 percent, so there is some small room for more investment in infrastructure. The state is also in an excellent position to attract new private investment. It is moving forward with several Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Priorities include construction of another subway line and the ring road around the metropolitan area, as well as a railroad to carry goods to the port of Santos. ¶10. (U) The state's PPP law allows the government to offer guarantees to private investors that will enhance their confidence and likelihood to invest, Beraldo said. He outlined plans for a PPP to expand the small port of Sao Sebastiao and the roads leading to it. (Note: Sao Sebastiao is a small town about 130 miles northeast of Sao Paulo on the state's northern shore. End Note.) They hope to be able to shift some freight traffic away from Santos, which is owned and operated by the federal government and has serious management problems. Due to inefficiencies, it costs USD 300 to ship a container from Santos, whereas the cost in the EU is in the USD 100-150 range. The state government also wants to build a pipeline to transport ethanol from the sugar mills in the interior of the state to Sao Sebastiao, Beraldo said. Several proposals from private investors are under consideration. -------------- SEEKING A MAJORITY IN THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY SAO PAULO 00001192 003 OF 004 -------------- ¶11. (U) The PSDB did well in the state elections, Beraldo said. The party won 24 seats in the Legislative Assembly, compared to 18 in 2002. Its coalition partners, the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and the Popular Socialist Party (PPS),won 11 and 5 seats respectively. The PSDB is also allied on the state level with the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB),which won four seats, giving the governing coalition 44 seats out of a total of 94. Talks are under way with the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) and the Green Party (PV) in the hopes of constructing a solid majority. (Note: The PTB, PPS, and PV are all merging with smaller parties to avoid losing their privileges under the "Barrier Clause" after failing to meet the 5 percent threshold in elections for the federal Chamber of Deputies. End Note.) On the other side of the aisle, President Lula's Workers Party (PT) won twenty seats (down from 22 in 2002),its Socialist allies 4, and Heloisa Helena's Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) - which, though comprised of PT defectors, is unlikely to support the PSDB state government -- won 2. Beraldo said candidacies to succeed Rodrigo Garcia (PFL) as the President of the Legislative Assembly had not been announced, and he declined to speculate on likely candidates. If Governor-elect Serra has a preferred candidate, he has not publicly announced it. (Note: Though he did not say so, Beraldo himself may be a candidate, as he is close to Serra. End Note.) Beraldo pointed out that in Sao Paulo, unlike in other states, the new Assembly will not be seated until March 15. -------------- ALCKMIN'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Beraldo did not know what Geraldo Alckmin plans to do next. Alckmin has stated publicly that he does not plan to seek the PSDB Presidency next year and also is not interested in running for Mayor of Sao Paulo in 2008, though there is time for him to change his mind. For the time being, he seems happy at the prospect of running the Teotonio Vilela Institute, the PSDB's policy shop. Beraldo speculated that Alckmin could always return to the practice of medicine (he is an anesthesiologist),though after years as a state and federal deputy, Lieutenant Governor and Governor, this would seem a difficult transition to make. ¶13. (U) Beraldo agreed with Poloff's observation that the PSDB needs to be reformed. He said the perception that the presidential nomination had been decided by three party leaders -- FHC, Neves, and Senator Tasso Jereissati -- was a media distortion; in fact, the three had consulted extensively with the party's base prior to making their decision. However, he acknowledged that the public perception of so small a group deciding such an important matter among themselves had damaged the party's image, and the PSDB would have to change its way of doing business in the future. ¶14. (U) When asked about the rivalry between Jose Serra and Aecio Neves (both of whom are expected to seek the 2010 PSDB presidential nomination),Beraldo noted that he was a Serra supporter. While Neves's landslide re-election in Minas Gerais was impressive, he said, it came about in large part because Neves faced no serious opposition. Furthermore, even while running under the PSDB banner, he somehow managed to be aligned with the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the PT at the same time. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The PSDB is still feeling its way after Lula's decisive victory over Alckmin. It needs to decide whether to mount a strong opposition to Lula as the second term gets underway or take a more conciliatory approach. Though 2010 is a long way off, many observers are already watching to see whether Serra or Neves emerges as the more likely presidential candidate, and what role Alckmin finds for himself. Some observers have noted that the PSDB and PT, the two major poles in Brazilian politics, have come more and more to resemble each other ideologically as the PT has begun to look less like a leftist party and more like a moderate social democratic party. The PSDB wants to win back some of that space. End Comment. SAO PAULO 00001192 004 OF 004 ¶16. (U) This cable was cleared/coordinated with Embassy Brasilia. MCMULLEN