BRITISH EMBASSY REPORTS CHILEAN CONCERNS OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000614 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC CI VZ SUBJECT: BRITISH EMBASSY REPORTS CHILEAN CONCERNS OVER VENEZUELA SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE REF: A. SANTIAGO 0577 ¶B. SANTIAGO 0561 ¶C. SANTIAGO 0516 ¶D. SANTIAGO 0514 ¶E. SANTIAGO 0488 ¶F. SANTIAGO 0447 ¶G. SANTIAGO 0429 ¶H. SANTIAGO 0384 Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Emi L. Yamauchi for reasons 1.4(b) an d (d). ¶1. (C) A British Embassy colleague told EPOL Counselor on March 22 that a British contact at the Chilean Foreign Ministry (who we suspect is a senior official in the Multilateral Affairs Directorate) appeared increasingly worried about negative U.S. reaction if Chile were to support Venezuela for the GRULAC Security Council seat. The British Embassy officer did not/not have instructions from London to talk to the Chileans about the Venezuela candidacy, but had raised the matter on his own account, to sound out the Chilean position. His Chilean contact delivered the expected explanations -- namely gratitude for Venezuela's support for Jose Insulza's OAS SecGen candidacy and Venezuela's ability to cause problems with Chile's neighbors. The Chilean official reportedly added, "Do you know what you get for voting with the Americans? Just a 'thank you'." The British officer noted that his most telling point with the Chileans seemed to be, "Do you think electing Chavez will actually buy you more stability in the region?" No instructions from EU on GRULAC seat -------------- ¶2. (C) The British diplomat said he did not expect the EU to arrive at a consensus position on the GRULAC seat, in large part because the Spanish were too involved with "selling things" to Chavez. To his knowledge, none of his European colleagues had received instructions from their capitals to talk to the Chileans, to CARICOM, or to African nations where had influence. He did not believe a British demarche alone would be very effective, because "we (the British) are viewed as U.S. lapdogs in any event." He suggested the Dutch would be easy to enlist, given their concern over the Netherlands Antilles. He was not aware of any French inclination to get involved, one way or the other. ¶3. (C) Comment: Our British colleague said it appeared to him that the Chileans were concerned by the strength of U.S. opposition, and were thinking more seriously about the potential consequences of a vote for Venezuela. We will continue to push on this issue at all levels with the new Chilean government (reftels). YAMAUCHI