C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000255

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MARR MOPS UN HA CI
SUBJECT: CHILE: TOUGH ANALYSIS AND CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR
HAITI

REF: SANTIAGO 81

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Emi L. Yamauchi
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Senior Chilean defense officials briefed
visiting Assistant Secretary of Defense Rodman on the Chilean
military's view regarding Haiti during the Defense
Consultative Committee (DCC) talks in Santiago on January 25.
Chilean MOD Undersecretary for War Gabriel Gaspar said that
the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
was essentially fighting a holding action in Haiti. He
proposed measures to propel change: an effective coast guard,
better intelligence sharing, a more robust role for police
advisors, a halt to deportations from the U.S., and U.S.
political pressure on Haitian businessmen who are opposing
Lavalas electoral participation. Chilean Chief of National
Defense Vice-Admiral Jorge Huerta signaled Chile's
participation in UN efforts in Haiti beyond June 2006 would
be a decision for the incoming administration of
president-elect Michelle Bachelet and the new Congress. End
Summary.

The View of Haiti from Chile
--------------


2. (C) On January 25, the Chilean Chief of National Defense,
Vice-Admiral Huerta, briefed ASD Rodman and his delegation on
the situation in Haiti as part of the Defense Consultative
Committee meetings in Santiago, January 24-25. Drawing on
his recent visits to Haiti as well as conversations with
UNSYG Special Representative for Haiti Valdes and acting
MINUSTAH military commander Brigadier General Eduardo
Aldunate, Huerta drew a sobering picture of the situation in
Haiti. He said, "In Haiti, rather than reconstruction, one
needs to speak of construction." MINUSTAH faces difficult
climactic and sanitary conditions: it has had to create its
own infrastructure from scratch, and deal with a poorly
educated and sometimes hostile population. While
demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programs have

been generally successful in disbanding militias, heavily
armed criminal gangs constitute an increasing problem, Huerta
emphasized.


3. (C) Huerta said the Haitian National Police (HNP) were
police in name only, possessing neither the skills nor the
inclination to protect the populace. The HNP often
victimized the very people they were supposed to protect, and
had sold UN-supplied equipment, including patrol vehicles,
for cash. To date, MINUSTAH has been able to minimize major
police abuses and thus had maintained a good degree of
popular support. Referring to criticism of the Brazilian
command for not operating aggressively, he noted that in the
urban slums, armed gangs continued to exert control, and used
human shields in their confrontations with MINUSTAH forces.
This made it nearly impossible to conduct military/police
operations without collateral damage to civilian populations.
Huerta argued that operations to pacify criminal gangs
around Port-au-Prince had generated formally registered
complaints of excessive force, which may haunt MINUSTAH in
the future.


4. (C) Overall, Huerta said MINUSTAH had maintained general
peace, albeit in a holding pattern without improving the
social or economic situation on the island. The next major
step - elections in February - would result in a government
"completely dependent" on foreign donations. Huerta asserted
that Haiti would not be able to function on its own for the
foreseeable future. Doing so would require a functional
civil society, nonexistent in Haiti. Gaspar added that
interim PM Latortue had his household packed up and was
primed to leave right after the elections.

The Political Imperative
--------------


5. (C) ASD Rodman lauded the tremendous job that Chile was
doing in a difficult environment. He agreed there was no
quick exit strategy from Haiti, and expressed hope the
election would create a nucleus for future consensus
building. DASD Pardo-Maurer noted that Latin America's
deployment and leading role in MINUSTAH was a regional

success story, even if the outcome was not a stable,
independent Haiti. Huerta pointed out Chile's continued
participation in MINUSTAH would depend on elected authorities
in Chile who had not yet taken office (Note: President-elect
Bachelet and a new Congress will take office March 11. End
note.) U/S Gaspar interjected that Haiti had a regional
resonance: "This is the most important military undertaking
in history by the countries of Latin America, and it is being
examined under kleig lights by the media and legislatures in
countries from Brazil to Chile." Those who support regional
involvement in Haiti are being pressed to justify the
investment, Gaspar continued, suggesting the cost of failure
would weigh on Chile's future decisions to join peacekeeping
operations in the region or world.

The Way Forward
--------------


6. (C) DASD Pardo-Maurer asked for Huerta's assessment of
the effect of drug-trafficking on the MINUSTAH operation and
political situation. Huerta said the lack of a coast guard
was allowing all types of contraband to enter and transit
Haiti, providing a source of funds and influence to the
criminal gangs. Gaspar pressed for a series of concrete
actions to improve MINUSTAH operations in Haiti. He said
MINUSTAH urgently needs a coast guard to control Haiti's
coastline, to cut the flow of contraband, and to provide
security. Civilian police advisors need to be given a
stronger role and greater control over the Haitian National
Police (HNP). Gaspar said the U.S. should temporarily
suspend criminal deportations to Haiti. In the current
environment, the Interim Government of Haiti cannot process
or hold deportees, which he said only added to the security
problems. Echoing earlier comments made by Chilean Foreign
Minister Walker (reftel) Gaspar noted that some U.S.-based
Haitian businessmen, predicting the victory of Lavalas
candidates in some races, are attacking the political
process. He asked the U.S. to bring some pressure to bear to
end these attacks. Gaspar also requested publication (before
the election) of information linking candidates such as Guy
Phillipe to drug trafficking.


7. (C) Comment: Although the analysis was sobering, neither
Gaspar nor Huerta seemed willing to write off MINUSTAH's
involvement as an inevitable failure. Rather, they reflect a
broader GOC view of Haiti as a long-term project, and were
pressing for concrete signals of support and tangible signs
of progress to maintain the political maneuvering space for
Chile's continued engagement in Haiti.


8. (U) This message was cleared by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.

SIPDIS
KELLY