SACA TO ANNOUNCE 6TH CONTINGENT TO IRAQ; EXPRESSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000109 SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO USTR E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2016 TAGS: PREL ETRD ECIN SMIG ES HO IZ SUBJECT: SACA TO ANNOUNCE 6TH CONTINGENT TO IRAQ; EXPRESSES POLITICAL CONCERNS Classified By: AMBASSADOR H. DOUGLAS BARCLAY PER 1.5B AND D ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: President Saca will inform the President January 13 that El Salvador will send a sixth contingent of troops to Iraq. The formal public announcement will come in early February. Saca told the Ambassador January 12 that he is concerned about two issues going into March 12 elections: the political impact of delayed (past Febuary 1) entry-into-force of CAFTA as well as the potential ripple effect of any announcement that Honduras,s TPS would not be extended. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Ambassador met January 12 with President Saca. Defense Minister Romero, Foreign Minister Lainez, Minister of Gobernacion Figueroa and Presidential Private Secretary Charlaix also attended ) an indication, according to Saca, of the importance of the issues he wished to discuss. DCM and MILGRP Commander accompanied the Ambassador. ¶3. (C) Saca noted that he was scheduled to speak with President Bush early the following day. He stated that he would inform the President that El Salvador would send a sixth contingent of troops to Iraq in February, when the fifth contingent is scheduled to rotate home. (The GOES will delay public announcement until February 6 or 7, when a farewell ceremony for the departing troops is scheduled.) Saca said that commitment to a sixth contingent could complicate politics for him; yet the need to &complete the job,8 the importance of supporting the US as an ally, and progress on the ground all argued for renewing El Salvador,s presence in Iraq. ¶4. (C) Saca added that he was concerned about two issues that could also complicate the political landscape going into the elections. These were not linked to the decision to maintain El Salvador,s presence in Iraq, but nonetheless were areas where he hoped for US understanding. The first was CAFTA, where he would have a difficult time explaining further delay (beyond February 1) in entry-into-force. USTR was currently tying EIF to Salvador,s acceptance of systems equivalence, which was not part of the CAFTA agreement. Legislation was already in place, and El Salvador would agree to recognize US standards, but would need to follow a legal process that would take several months to complete in order to implement this policy. The Salvadoran public now expected CAFTA to commence on February 1; further delay would hurt El Salvador and the US commercially while giving a great victory to &the enemies of free trade.8 Moreover, Saca added, USTR pressure threatened to unravel the pro-CAFTA coalition in Salvadoran politics that Saca had carefully negotiated. (Saca added that a draft letter from Central American presidents on poultry and recognition of US standards was currently circulating; he was seeking to discourage the effort.) ¶5. (C) The second concern, according to Saca, was Temporary Protective Status for the tens of thousands of Salvadorans currently in the US. Although a decision on El Salvador would not come until later in the year, Honduras,s TPS expired in March and, while he knew the decisions were distinct, any decision not to extend TPS for Honduras would be read here as a harbinger of a decision on El Salvador. Adding to these concerns were indications that DHS would oppose extension of El Salvador,s TPS when that decision was debated. Saca said he hoped he could meet with President Bush sometime in early February to discuss TPS and other matters. Such a meeting would give &a push8 to ARENA,s political fortunes and, Saca suggested half in jest, produce a national legislature that could make parliamentary approval of a seventh Iraq contingent a foregone conclusion later in the year. Barclay