SACA TO ANNOUNCE 6TH CONTINGENT TO IRAQ; EXPRESSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000109

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO USTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2016
TAGS: PREL ETRD ECIN SMIG ES HO IZ
SUBJECT: SACA TO ANNOUNCE 6TH CONTINGENT TO IRAQ; EXPRESSES
POLITICAL CONCERNS


Classified By: AMBASSADOR H. DOUGLAS BARCLAY PER 1.5B AND D


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Saca will inform the President
January 13 that El Salvador will send a sixth contingent of
troops to Iraq. The formal public announcement will come in
early February. Saca told the Ambassador January 12 that he
is concerned about two issues going into March 12 elections:
the political impact of delayed (past Febuary 1)
entry-into-force of CAFTA as well as the potential ripple
effect of any announcement that Honduras,s TPS would not be
extended. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Ambassador met January 12 with President Saca.
Defense Minister Romero, Foreign Minister Lainez, Minister of
Gobernacion Figueroa and Presidential Private Secretary
Charlaix also attended ) an indication, according to Saca,
of the importance of the issues he wished to discuss. DCM
and MILGRP Commander accompanied the Ambassador.


3. (C) Saca noted that he was scheduled to speak with
President Bush early the following day. He stated that he
would inform the President that El Salvador would send a
sixth contingent of troops to Iraq in February, when the
fifth contingent is scheduled to rotate home. (The GOES will
delay public announcement until February 6 or 7, when a
farewell ceremony for the departing troops is scheduled.)
Saca said that commitment to a sixth contingent could
complicate politics for him; yet the need to &complete the
job,8 the importance of supporting the US as an ally, and
progress on the ground all argued for renewing El Salvador,s
presence in Iraq.


4. (C) Saca added that he was concerned about two issues that
could also complicate the political landscape going into the
elections. These were not linked to the decision to maintain
El Salvador,s presence in Iraq, but nonetheless were areas
where he hoped for US understanding. The first was CAFTA,
where he would have a difficult time explaining further delay
(beyond February 1) in entry-into-force. USTR was
currently tying EIF to Salvador,s acceptance of systems
equivalence, which was not part of the CAFTA agreement.
Legislation was already in place, and El Salvador would agree
to recognize US standards, but would need to follow a legal
process that would take several months to complete in order
to implement this policy. The Salvadoran public now expected
CAFTA to commence on February 1; further delay would hurt El
Salvador and the US commercially while giving a great victory
to &the enemies of free trade.8 Moreover, Saca added, USTR
pressure threatened to unravel the pro-CAFTA coalition in
Salvadoran politics that Saca had carefully negotiated.
(Saca added that a draft letter from Central American
presidents on poultry and recognition of US standards was
currently circulating; he was seeking to discourage the
effort.)


5. (C) The second concern, according to Saca, was Temporary
Protective Status for the tens of thousands of Salvadorans
currently in the US. Although a decision on El Salvador
would not come until later in the year, Honduras,s TPS
expired in March and, while he knew the decisions were
distinct, any decision not to extend TPS for Honduras would
be read here as a harbinger of a decision on El Salvador.
Adding to these concerns were indications that DHS would
oppose extension of El Salvador,s TPS when that decision was
debated. Saca said he hoped he could meet with President
Bush sometime in early February to discuss TPS and other
matters. Such a meeting would give &a push8 to ARENA,s
political fortunes and, Saca suggested half in jest, produce
a national legislature that could make parliamentary approval
of a seventh Iraq contingent a foregone conclusion later in
the year.
Barclay