NATIONAL ANTI-CAFTA PROTEST OCTOBER 23-24

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 002320 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC AND DS/IP/WHA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016 TAGS: ELAB ETRD PGOV ASEC CS SUBJECT: NATIONAL ANTI-CAFTA PROTEST OCTOBER 23-24 REF: SAN JOSE 2312 Classified By: Ambassador Mark Langdale for reason 1.4 (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A broad coalition of union and student groups is posed to square off against the GOCR October 23-24, protesting mostly CAFTA but also pay increases below the rate of inflation and the high cost of living. Both sides have much at stake. The anti-CAFTA forces want to shake GOCR resolve (and demonstrate their influence) by putting large numbers of people in the streets. If the opposition cannot rally their troops now, doing so during the December-February holiday period (the GOCR,s target window for CAFTA ratification) will be far more difficult. For its part, the GOCR needs to avoid serious confrontation or violence, while maintaining public order. GOCR officials seem moderately upbeat, believing the public is tired of union shenanigans and ready to put the CAFTA chapter behind them. The police seem prepared, but have asked Embassy assistance to rent busses to re-deploy personnel around the San Jose area, if needed. Some senior government and media figures have told us privately that they view this showdown more as a test of how Costa Rica should be governed than about CAFTA, per se. Our best guess is that this week,s events will be neither be violent nor definitive; the actual CAFTA votes in the Assembly (whenever they take place) are more likely lightning rods for trouble. END SUMMARY. -------------- UNIONS WANT TO SEND A MESSAGE -------------- ¶2. (U) A broad coalition of public employee union members, parastatal workers from the insurance, utility, and telecommunications industries, university students, transport workers, and agricultural groups plan to strike and hold anti-CAFTA demonstrations on October 23 and 24. According to organizers, the groups plan to demonstrate throughout Costa Rica, then converge on San Jose to rally at the Legislative Assembly to protest CAFTA ratification, pay increases below the rate of inflation and the high cost of living. The number of protesters expected to participate in this so-called "National Resistance Journey" is unknown, but supporters, such as PAC party faction head Elizabeth Fonseca,(optimistically) hope to see some of the largest mass rallies since the 1949 revolution. As of late morning on October 23, the rallies and protests were still getting organized. Large-scale disruptions of electricity and telecommunications are not expected and roadblockages had not been scheduled by truck drivers or taxis. ¶3. (U) The two largest teachers unions have called on their members to participate in the strike, affecting as many as 900,000 students. Members of the national social security system (the "Caja"),who operate the public hospital system, are expected to join as well. Some 90,000 medical appointments and 1200 surgeries reportedly were rescheduled to allow Caja workers to join the protest. (Emergency medical services and care for those already hospitalized are scheduled to operate normally.) Flanked by President Arias and Justice Minister Chinchilla, Minister of the Presidency Rodrigo Arias announced on October 18 that that striking government workers would not be paid for their time off the job. Education Minister Leonardo Garnier instructed principals to report absent public school teachers and dock their pay accordingly. ¶4. (U) Although President Arias and leading strike organizer, Albino Vargas, head of the National Association of Public Employees (ANEP),had agreed to meet October 17 to discuss various issues including CAFTA and the planned demonstrations, Vargas subsequently cancelled the session, claiming that the President would not permit additional union leaders and associated anti-CAFTA groups to participate. Arias publicly regretted the cancellation and offered to reschedule, gaining some points in the media in the process (just as Vargas was criticized for canceling). -------------- BOTH SIDES HAVE MUCH AT STAKE -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Led by the firebrand Vargas, the anti-CAFTA forces need to shake the GOCR,s resolve (and demonstrate their influence) by putting large numbers of people, especially the easily incited students, into the streets. As this may be just the opening salvo in what could become a season of protests, the union leadership is unlikely to resort to violence - for now. In their view, the threat of violence and the ability to rally large crowds (which unions will label as anti-CAFTA, no matter what the groups are protesting) may be sufficient to force enough CAFTA supporters in the Assembly to think twice about their votes. (The PAC,s Fonseca told Pol Couns on October 20 that this would be an ideal outcome.) Some of Vargas,s rhetoric has bordered on sedition, however. In an interview published in a political newsletter on October 16, he asserted the legitimacy of rebellion as a political tool and asserted that a "referendum of the street" should decide CAFTA; even having all 57 members in the Assembly vote in favor would not be enough. In a television debate with Minister of Foreign Trade COMEX) Marco Vinicio Ruis the morning of October 23, Vargas was muted, insisting there would be no roadblocks, just people exercising their right to democratic protest. If the opposition forces cannot rally an impressive display of strength now, doing so during the December-February holiday period (the target window for CAFTA ratification),when the public is not thinking about politics, will be far more difficult. ¶6. (SBU) For its part, the GOCR needs to avoid serious confrontation or violence, while demonstrating control by maintaining public order. GOCR officials seem moderately upbeat. According to COMEX Director General Gabriela Castro, the unions may have overplayed their hand already with the public tired of union maneuvers such as dragging on the Limon port slowdown (Reftel),urging teachers and national health system workers to join the protests and Vargas,s refusal to meet with President Arias. Castro acknowledged to us on October 18, however, that the perception of the protests may be more important than the reality. The real "audience" is the media, especially television. The GOCR needs to be depicted as responsibly respecting the people,s right to protest, without losing control. NOTE: Late on October 20, the union in the port of Limon announced that it would strike October 23-24 in solidarity with the protestors elsewhere. -------------- POLICE ASK FOR TRANSPORTATION HELP -------------- ¶7. (C) In response to our inquiries about preparations for the upcoming demonstrations and particularly about any needs, the GOCR has only requested Embassy assistance in renting four large busses to provide additional mobility to the police. Police Operations Director Eric Lacayo and other police officials we have contacted seem confident they are prepared to deal with the demonstrators. Lacayo stated that he has orders to keep the roads clear, and unlike similar situations under the previous administration, Lacayo does not need to request further authorization to use force if necessary. Lacayo told us that he is only concerned, for the moment, about three locations: President Arias,s house (a few blocks from the Embassy) where protestors had planned a "serenade"; the street in front of the ICE (Telecom) building, whose union, the largest in the public sector, can easily turn out thousands of employees who view their economic interests as threatened by CAFTA; and the main road to the airport (which may be the site of a large student march). A large-scale march on the airport could greatly complicate Lacayo,s efforts to keep streets clear. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Some senior government (such as 1st VP Kevin Casas) and media figures (such as La Nacion Director General Alejandro Urbina) have told us privately that they view the overall CAFTA showdown more as a test of how Costa Rica should be governed than about CAFTA itself. Vargas in particular has questioned the legitimacy both of Oscar Arias,s being able to serve a second term, and his re-election victory. More broadly, union leaders like Vargas,s deputy Mauricio Castro, mainstream opposition politicians like the PAC,s Fonseca and a number of our best political commentator contacts lament what they view as Arias,s "praetorian governing style," which seems out of touch with the people and runs counter to the "consensus" and "national dialogue" model long cherished in Costa Rica. While we seriously doubt that Arias,s government will be jeopardized by the upcoming protests or the final push for CAFTA ratification slowed, how his government handles events in the next two-three months (including this week,s protests) may have a significant impact on the effectiveness (or not) of the rest of his administration. FRISBIE