RESPONSE TO STATUS OF TRANSFERS FROM GTMO

S E C R E T SANAA 000907

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER KAWC YM
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO STATUS OF TRANSFERS FROM GTMO

REF: STATE 47838

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. Summary. (S) This cable is post's response to reftel
request for a Country Team assessment of the ROYG's ability
and willingness to provide security and humane treatment for
the 13 Yemeni GTMO detainees cleared for transfer. Regarding
humane treatment, the ROYG provided adequate written
assurances that the detainees will be treated in accordance
with Yemeni law, but will not explicitly agree to third-party
monitoring, especially by USG officials. Domestic political
pressure and limited capacity render the ROYG unable to
ensure that the detainees will no longer pose a continued
threat to the international community. Increased training,
equipment, and facilities upgrades, as suggested in reftel,
may improve the ROYG's ability to investigate and prosecute
these individuals, but will not provide a short-term solution
to the shortcomings of the ROYG's security services. End
Summary.

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Security
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2. (S) The ROYG is likely to provide written assurances
that it will take responsibility for the security of the
returnees, but will view this pledge as an indication that
the ROYG, and not the USG, has the authority to make all
decisions related to the detainees once they have been
returned to Yemen.


3. (S) The limited capacity of the Yemeni security apparatus
hinders the ROYG's ability to ensure that these individuals
will no longer pose a threat to the international community.
Security officials have a limited ability to surveil and
monitor. In addition, large regions of the country have
limited to no government presence, which further erodes the
ROYG's ability to maintain constant surveillance. The ROYG
has the ability to deny passport privileges and stop an
individual from transiting any official border crossing.
Given Yemen's long and porous borders, however, an individual
can easily leave the country without being detected.


4. (S) The ROYG's limited security capabilities are
compounded by pervasive corruption, as evidenced by the
escape of 23 al-Qa'ida supporters from prison in February.
While the ROYG's investigation into that incident continues,
it is likely that the bribing of prison officials played a
significant role in facilitating the prisoners' escape.
While cooperation with USG agencies has increased in the wake
of the breakout, the ROYG is unlikely to provide the USG with
information on the detainees' movements in a comprehensive or
consistent manner.

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Investigation and Prosecution
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5. (S) The ROYG has a limited but increasing ability to
investigate and prosecute individuals if there is evidence
that they are members of (or have aided) al-Qa'ida or one of
its affiliates. Within the last several years, the ROYG has
successfully tried a number of al-Qa'ida supporters, even
though Yemeni law has no specific anti-terrorism provisions.
Most suspected al-Qa'ida supporters have been tried and
convicted under laws related to forming an armed gang
(maximum sentence of 15 years) or obtaining fraudulent
documentation (maximum sentence of seven years). Yemeni law
allows suspects to be detained for 48 hours without charges,
but this law is frequently ignored and individuals have been
detained indefinitely on suspicion of terrorist activity.



6. (S) The ROYG's ability to complete independently a
comprehensive investigation is limited, given a lack of
resources and expertise related to forensics and
surveillance. During the USS Cole trial, for example, the
ROYG relied heavily on FBI-collected and analyzed data.
Investigations of suspected terrorist crimes are also
generally conducted by the Political Security Organization,
which rarely shares all the information derived from
investigations with the Attorney General's office.


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Humane Treatment and Access
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7. (S) The ROYG will likely only agree to treat detainees
in accordance with domestic law, which prohibits torture.
The ROYG is unlikely to explicitly agree to USG or
third-party access to transferred individuals. While it is
unlikely that the ROYG will grant any kind of consistent
access to USG officials, the ROYG has granted periodic access
to third-party organizations like Amnesty International to
visit security detainees who claim they were transferred from
USG custody. ROYG officials responded to public inquiries
about these detainees by stating that they were being held
without trial at the behest of the USG.

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Comment: The Question of Political Will
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8. (S) In addition to a clear lack of capacity, domestic
politics will play a large role in terms of Yemen's
willingness to provide assurances and devote their limited
resources to managing the security threat, especially
considering the resources already being devoted to tracking
down the al-Qa'ida escapees. Because of the September
presidential and local council elections, President Saleh
will be hesitant to provide any written assurances that give
him the appearance of being controlled by the United States.


9. (S) Given the ROYG's limited capacity to monitor
detainees and independently investigate and prosecute
terrorist-related crimes, the ROYG cannot guarantee that the
transferred detainees will no longer pose a security threat.
While post already works with the ROYG on a number of levels
to increase its ability to combat terrorism, there are no
short-term solutions to these shortcomings. Training,
equipment, and facilities upgrades could significantly
increase the ROYG's ability to conduct investigations and
prosecute these individuals, but would not have a measurable
impact on the failings of the ROYG's corrupt security
services or the tremendous domestic political forces
buffeting Saleh.


10. (S) If the detainees are released into ROYG custody,
the Department should be prepared for the likelihood that the
security services' deficiencies may allow these individuals
to once again pose a security threat to the international
community. The best chance we have of managing this threat
is to coordinate the monitoring of these individuals at a
working level, rather than continuing to demand written
assurances we do not foresee a prospect of obtaining at this
point in time.
Krajeski