Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANAA3618
2006-01-03 09:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR AND FONMIN DISCUSS ZINDANI, KIDNAPPINGS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 003618 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER YE COUNTER TERRORISM TERFIN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND FONMIN DISCUSS ZINDANI, KIDNAPPINGS
AND REFORM

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 003618 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER YE COUNTER TERRORISM TERFIN SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND FONMIN DISCUSS ZINDANI, KIDNAPPINGS AND REFORM Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a January 2 meeting, FonMin Abubakr al-Qirbi told Ambassador that the ROYG had made a conscious decision to include UN-designated terrorist financier Abdul Majid Zindani in its official delegation to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting in Saudi Arabia, claiming it would help "moderate" Zindani's right-wing, extremist views. Qirbi reiterated the ROYG's request for any evidence of Zindani's support for terrorism so that the Government could prosecute him within Yemeni law. Addressing the recent spate of kidnappings, Qirbi said they were related to blood fueds that the tribes wanted to force the Government to help resolve, not protestations over lack of government services, as had been the case in the past. The FonMin also raised Yemen's efforts to re-qualify for the Millenium Challenge Account (MCA) Threshold Program, asserting that it was "time to take action" on reform. END SUMMARY -------------- ENLIGHTENING SHEIKH ZINDANI -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador told Qirbi that he could not emphasize enough the USG's frustration and anger over Zindani's inclusion in the ROYG's official delegation, headed by President Saleh himself, to the December OIC conference. Zindani was designated by the UN 1267 Committee as a terrorist financier, he said, and Yemen was obligated as a member state to freeze his assets and prevent him from traveling outside the country. Ambassador noted that Qirbi had no doubt received a read-out of the meeting between Undersecretary Burns and Ambassador al-Hajri in Washington covering the same points. ¶3. (C) Qirbi said the ROYG saw Zindani's visit to Saudi Arabia "in a different light," arguing that because Zindani is "looked at as a man with rather extreme religious views," government officials thought it would be beneficial to include him in the ROYG's delegation. "We thought attending the conference, especially with the paper it produced on 'Enlightened Islam,' would help him re-think his positions as an extremist and right-wing scholar," he said. ¶4. (C) Ambassador noted that the USG was encouraged by the increased determination shown at the OIC conference to combat both the results and the root causes of terrorism, but reminded the
FonMin that the issue of Zindani's travel was a legal one. As we had explained to ROYG officials on several occasions, only Zindani himself could apply for de-listing with the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Controls, and unless a decision is made to formally remove him from the 1267 list, the ROYG must comply with its obligations as a UN member state. ¶5. (C) Qirbi complained that this procedure "complicates things," stating that "we exchange information all the time without individuals getting involved." He argued that the Zindani issue was "hampered by a lack of progress" on the USG side, because the ROYG had asked several times for the USG to present it with whatever evidence it had about Zindani's support for terrorism so that it can "take action in accordance with Yemeni law." Ambassador made the point that Zindani's application for de-listing or the sharing of any information were separate issues that could be pursued, but in the meantime, Yemen could not shirk its legal responsibility to freeze his assets and restrict his travel. -------------- TRIBAL KIDNAPPINGS ON THE RISE AGAIN -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to the recent spate of tribal kidnappings of foreign tourists, Ambassador told Qirbi that this caused concern for the safety of foreigners in Yemen, and could adversely affect the country's recently revived tourism sector. Qirbi agreed, stating that the ROYG "always seeks to protect kidnapping victims," and hoped to prevent future incidents by "mobilizing public opinion" against the practice. He noted statements he and President Saleh had made on local television the previous day, saying he hoped the tribal leaders would "listen to the message." Qirbi said these kidnappings were different from those that took place routinely several years ago, in that the tribes were no longer seeking services or money from the Government, but were trying to pressure the Government into intervening in tribal fueds or releasing tribesmen it had imprisoned. -------------- REFORM: TIME TO ACT? -------------- ¶7. (C) The FonMin then asked the Ambassador about the status of Yemen's MCA Threshold Program suspension, to which Ambassador replied that the major donors were working with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation on specific steps that could be taken in order for Yemen's suspension to be re-considered in May. Donor recommendations focused on good governance, among other areas, he said, and included concrete proposals such as rendering public the reports of the Central Organization for Control and Audit. Qirbi confirmed that the ROYG was "looking at" the proposals, and said it was clearly "time to take action" on reforms, particularly after the ruling party conference in December laid out a platform focusing on the subject. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Qirbi's assertion that the ROYG pondered the possible beneficial results of including Zindani on its delegation to the OIC is a half-hearted attempt to come up with an ex-post facto explanation. The reality is that Zindani probably made clear his desire to attend, and President Saleh found it difficult to back down, UNSC Resolutions notwithstanding. The fact is that Zindani continues to wield a great deal of influence among Yemen's religious conservatives, and Saleh has made a calculated decision that it is easier for him - for now - to raise the ire of the international community rather than pick a fight with the Sheikh. Krajeski

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