SANAA EAC MEETING

S E C R E T SANAA 000349 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA/EX, D, P, DS, CA, INR, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016 TAGS: AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING REF: A) SANAA 266 AND B) SANAA 306 Classified By: RSO William Mellott for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d) SUMMARY. (S/NF) DCM convened the Embassy's EAC on 02/12/06, to discuss the ongoing situation concerning the 23 escaped Al-Qaida members. EAC discussed the immediate security and personal safety concerns of the embassy and it's employees. Members in attendance were AMB, DCM, RSO, POLM, OMC, DAO, POLE, CONS, FBI, AID, FPD. ¶1. (S/NF) EAC was briefed by all relevant agencies and sections on the situation, 10 days after the reported escape of the Al-Qaida prisoners. Members were advised that none of the escapees had been captured as yet and their whereabouts were still unknown. Relevant office and section heads advised that the ROYG has been cooperative in sharing what information there is, but that there was nothing new to report at this time. ¶2. (S/NF) EAC members agreed that the security and travel restrictions put in place in RefTel's were still warranted in light of the lack of information concerning the whereabouts of the escapees. Personal security and travel restrictions agreed to by the EAC are as follows: ¶A. Embassy personnel are strongly urged to maintain a low profile in Sana'a until the capture of the escapees or information of their whereabouts are learned. Unnecessary travel to the Bab al-Yemen, local neighborhoods, shopping and social venues and areas on the outskirts of Sana'a should be curtailed. Post personnel are reminded to avoid numerous trips to grocery stores and other venues frequented by Westerners. All personnel were reminded to vary their routes and times to and from work. ¶B. Limit all non-essential travel within or to Yemen. Official travel outside of Sana'a will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Travel to Yemen by official Americans will also be considered on a case-by-case basis. The RSO and section heads will review all travel and TDY requests and make recommendations to the DCM. ¶C. All American employees will be allowed flex time and access to armored shuttles. ¶D. Local Guard Force, Residential Guards and ROYG residential security forces will be alerted and will maintain a heightened security posture. ¶E. RSO will notify ROYG security forces to increase vigilance at the three approved hotels used by official American personnel. ¶F. All embassy personnel were reminded by the RSO to maintain vigilance and immediately report any incident that seems suspicious or unusual to the RSO office or Post 1. ¶G. EAC agreed that the most recent Warden Message adequately reflected the situation and no change was necessary at present. ¶3. (S/NF) EAC members discussed timelines and potential tripwires and all agreed that the one month mark would be the point at which discussion on future security restrictions and an enhanced embassy response might be warranted. All EAC members agreed that, absent significant numbers of the escapees captured or information concerning their whereabouts, post would have to make changes in the operation of the mission and the security of it's personnel. EAC members felt that the longer the terrorists were at large, the more likely they were to start planning operations against the embassy and its personnel. ¶4. (S/NF) EAC agreed to continue monitoring the situation and to liaise with their ROYG counterparts on the situation. Members agreed to reconvene if any information was received that increased the threat to the embassy or it's personnel. Post will immediately report developments as they occur. Krajeski