Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANAA305
2006-02-08 12:18:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SANAA EAC MEETING

Tags:  AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SANAA 000305 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT,
NEA/EX, D, P, DS, CA, INR, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING

REF: SANAA 266

Classified By: RSO William Mellott for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)

SUMMARY. (S/NF) DCM convened the Embassy's EAC on 02/08/06,
to discuss the ongoing situation concerning the 23 escaped
Al-Qaida members. EAC discussed the immediate security and
personal safety concerns of the EAC. Members in attendance
were AMB, DCM, RSO, POLM, OMC, DAO, POLE, CONS, FBI, AID, FPD.

S E C R E T SANAA 000305 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA/EX, D, P, DS, CA, INR, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016 TAGS: AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING REF: SANAA 266 Classified By: RSO William Mellott for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d) SUMMARY. (S/NF) DCM convened the Embassy's EAC on 02/08/06, to discuss the ongoing situation concerning the 23 escaped Al-Qaida members. EAC discussed the immediate security and personal safety concerns of the EAC. Members in attendance were AMB, DCM, RSO, POLM, OMC, DAO, POLE, CONS, FBI, AID, FPD. ¶1. (S/NF) EAC was briefed by all relevant agencies and sections on the situation, six days after the reported escape of the Al-Qaida prisoners. Members were advised that none of the escapees had been captured as yet and their whereabouts were unknown. ¶2. (S/NF) AMB advised the EAC that he and the DCM had met earlier in the day with President Saleh and that Saleh had pledged full cooperation and information sharing with the U.S. Embassy in the matter. President Saleh advised the AMB and DCM that they were closing in on some of the escapees and that the re-capture of subjects was the highest priority for the ROYG. ¶3. (S/NF) EAC members agreed that the security and travel restrictions put in place in RefTel were still warranted in light of the lack of information concerning the whereabouts of the escapees. Personal security and travel restrictions agreed to by the EAC are as follows: ¶A. Maintain a low profile in Sana'a for the next two weeks. Travel to the Bab al-Yemen, local neighborhoods and areas on the outskirts of Sana'a are restricted. All post personnel are reminded to avoid numerous trips to grocery stores and other venues frequented by Westerners. All personnel were reminded to vary their routes and times to and from work. ¶B. Limit all non-essential travel within or to Yemen. Official travel outside of Sana'a will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Travel to Yemen by official Americans will also be considered on a case-by-case basis. ¶C. All American employees will be allowed flex time and access to armored shuttles. ¶D. Local Guard Force, Residential Guards and ROYG residential security forces will be alerted and will maintain a heightened security posture. ¶E. RSO will notify ROYG security forces to increase vigilance at the three approved hotels used by official American personnel. ¶F. All embassy personnel were reminded by the RSO to maintain vigilance and immediately report any incident that seems suspicious or unusual to the RSO office or Post 1. ¶G. EAC agreed that the most recent Warden Message adequately reflected the situation and no change was necessary at present. ¶4. (S/NF) EAC agreed to continue monitoring the situation and to liaise with their ROYG counterparts on the situation. Members agreed to reconvene if any information was received that increased the threat to the embassy or its personnel. ¶5. (S/NF) Post will continue monitoring the situation and immediately report developments as they occur. Krajeski

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