Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANAA1873
2006-06-28 12:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

THE SALEH SHOW: POLITICAL THEATER IN SANAA

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM YM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3378
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHYN #1873/01 1791254
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281254Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4481
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001873 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM YM
SUBJECT: THE SALEH SHOW: POLITICAL THEATER IN SANAA

REF: A. 2005 SANAA 1910

B. SANAA 1743

C. 2005 SANAA 2766

Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001873

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM YM
SUBJECT: THE SALEH SHOW: POLITICAL THEATER IN SANAA

REF: A. 2005 SANAA 1910

B. SANAA 1743

C. 2005 SANAA 2766

Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. On June 24, President Saleh ended almost a
year of speculation and announced his intention to run in
September's Presidential election. Speaking before a
peaceful mass rally in Sanaa, Saleh rescinded his July 2005
public pledge not to seek re-election, saying he was
"responding to the will of the people." The announcement
capped five days of ruling party antics and well-orchestrated
public rallies in support of Saleh. Saleh's retraction had
long been anticipated, however, causing many to view the
recent events as nothing more than political theater. The
real question remains, whether or not the opposition will
field a serious candidate to challenge the President. End
Summary.

-------------- --
"I'll Stay with You!": Saleh Accepts Nomination
-------------- --


2. (U) Speaking before a crowd of supporters gathered on a
parade ground in downtown Sanaa, Saleh retracted his July
2005 pledge not to seek a second term (ref A),saying "I
comply with the people's pressure." Saleh expressed shock
at the rally's size, which Yemeni Television estimated to be
two million people who came "freely and spontaneously from
all over the country." Saleh said his decision was a direct
reflection of the "people's will" and came in response to the
"tears of women, children and old people." Crowds had been
gathering at the rally site since the early morning, calling
on Saleh to "finish the journey" that he started and rule the
country for seven more years.
--------------
Well-Organized Spontaneity
--------------


3. (C) Emboffs observing the rally estimated that the crowd
contained only 130,000 people and noted that only men were
present. License plates on cars and buses transporting
participants to the rally site indicated that most came from
tribal areas outside of Sanaa, predominately from the
presidential strongholds of Khowlan and Amran. The night
before the "spontaneous" rally, Emboffs observed military
vehicles scattered around the rally site, in addition to

several Mercedes Benzes and Land Cruisers of the type
typically belonging to well-connected government supporters
and tribal sheikhs. By the morning of the rally, security
forces were deployed in large numbers across the city and
appeared well prepared to manage the traffic and the crowds
throughout the peaceful rally.

--------------
The Wait is Over...
--------------


4. (C) Saleh's announcement came after five days of a
variety of public demonstrations. Since June 20, small crowds
gathered daily in several major cities throughout the
country, "demanding" that Saleh run again. Embassy contacts
report that government officials conducted a door-to-door
campaign through several neighborhoods to encourage children
and disabled individuals to participate in the
demonstrations. On June 21, the ruling General People's
Congress (GPC) called an "emergency" convention to plead with
Saleh to accept the party's presidential nomination. Saleh
rebuffed their pleas, saying "I am not a taxi for hire...and
will not be an umbrella for corruption."


5. (U) An organization of businesses supporting Saleh's
re-election pledged to go on strike for one hour every day
until he retracted his pledge. Tribes in the oil-rich Marib
region east of Sanaa blocked off several roads, saying they
would not allow fuel trucks through until Saleh agreed to run
again. Around Sanaa, supporters also replaced posters from
the ROYG's recently launched anti-corruption campaign with
pro-Saleh campaign material. Opposition news outlets claimed
that rallies organized to encourage Saleh not to run again
were prevented by security forces.

--------------
But Why Were We Waiting at All?
--------------

SANAA 00001873 002 OF 002




6. (C) Ever since Saleh's public announcement in July 2005
that he would not seek a second term, neither political
insiders nor the general public believed that Saleh would
step aside. Initial reactions to the retraction have focused
on speculation regarding Saleh's motivations, with a variety
of competing theories being supported. One ruling party
official expressed his frustrations to Econoff, saying he
could see no real purpose behind the President's "theatrics,"
given that everyone expected Saleh to run again. Other
observers viewed Saleh's threat not to run as an effort to
gain leverage over corrupt government officials or reformers,
who are both placing increasing demands on his presidency.
Many view the theatrics as an organized campaign by those who
benefit most from Saleh's rule to protect their privileged
positions. Still others consider it a poorly staged personal
ploy by Saleh to win public support and admiration.

--------------
Comment: Inside Saleh's Mind
--------------


7. (C) It is clear that the events leading up to Saleh's
long-anticipated retraction were well orchestrated by
government officials and their supporters. What is unclear
is what Saleh, or those around him, hoped to gain through
such a patently stage-managed "public outcry." Although a
dozen candidates have joined the presidential race so far, no
one is capable of mounting a serious challenge to Saleh, who
has effectively dismantled any real competition during his
28-year rule. Even the opposition coalition, which enjoys
significant popular support, has not developed a serious plan
to challenge Saleh and its component factors may not be able
to agree on their own "consensus" candidate (ref B).

8. (C) Whatever Saleh's motivation, the President's
acquiescence in his party's nomination is a resounding
victory for the status quo. Considering the great
uncertainty surrounding a post-Saleh Yemen (ref C),even the
opposition may quietly breathe a sigh of relief at this
announcement and put off a true contest for the presidency to
2013 or beyond. While Saleh's re-election is certain, the
September local council elections will produce truly
competitive races. If those elections are free and fair, the
2006 elections could still prove a step forward in Yemen's
democratic development.
Krajeski