YEMENIS TELL GEN ABIZAID ABOUT IRANIAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001833 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016 TAGS: PREL MNUC PINR IR YE SUBJECT: YEMENIS TELL GEN ABIZAID ABOUT IRANIAN INTERFERENCE AND REGIONAL INTENTIONS Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D ). ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: President Saleh and Minister of Interior Rashad al-Alimi told CENTCOM Commander GEN John Abizaid on June 18 that, while Iran's Revolutionary Guards have been active in Yemen since 1983, their recent support for insurgents in Yemen's Saada region was unacceptable and, along with other activities in the region, constituted proof of Tehran's desire to "re-establish the Persian empire." In that connection, President Saleh asked GEN Abizaid to provide imagery of 1/50,000 resolution of Saada in order to assist the Yemeni Government's plans to "strike" insurgent leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi and finish this insurgency once and for all. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) The MinInt, who is concurrently Deputy Prime Minister, met with GEN Abizaid on June 18 with the new Minister of Defense and Chief of Armed Forces also in attendance. After a brief update on the needs and plans of the Yemeni Coast Guard, the discussion turned to the growing threat from Iran and cooperation in improving regional defenses. ¶3. (C) Warming to the subject, the MinInt explained that Iran's interference in Yemen began in 1983, when the Revolutionary Guard trained terrorist groups and executed operations in Yemen. A cinema was bombed, acid was thrown in women's faces, and an attempt was made to bomb the Saudi Embassy in Sanaa. ¶4. (C) In 2004, Alimi continued, Shia from Iran and Saudi Arabia began supporting followers of insurgent cleric Badr al-Din al-Houthi in the northern governate of Saada. "Documents we seized in Saada proves this support," Alimi contended. The Yemeni Government rolled up a cell linked to al-Houthi in Saana that was planning to attack the Embassy and assassinate the Ambassador. "This is what the Revolutionary Guards are doing in Yemen," Alimi concluded. ¶5. (C) GEN Abizaid noted that Yemen was facing threats from al-Qaida on one hand and from the Revolutionary Guards on the other, to which a senior military official added, "and the threat from the Revolutionary Guard is greater." Alimi opined that the threat from Iran was actually greater for Gulf countries than for Yemen, but that Iran's support of the al-Houthi insurgency was nonetheless dangerous, "given Saada's proximity to Shia areas of Saudi Arabia and the oil fields." ¶6. (C) In a separate meeting on the same day, President Saleh advised GEN Abizaid that Iran has destructive intentions in Iraq and Bahrain, because Tehran "wants to restore the Persian empire." He said it was in the interests of all nations to work with the USG to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. ¶7. (S) Responding to a statement by GEN Abizaid about the importance of Yemen working with the USG to improve border and coastal security, Saleh said that what Yemen needed most urgently was imagery of Saada at 1/50,000 resolution. Saleh explained, "I want a decisive operation in Saada before the election against Abdul Malik al-Houthi," the current leader of the insurgency. "I want to track his phone calls and then strike him like we did Harithi." (NOTE: Saleh was referring to Abu Ali al-Harithi, an al-Qaida affiliate who was killed with a Hellfire missile fired from a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle in Yemen in 2003.) ¶8. (S) GEN Abizaid said that this kind of imagery would require overflight permission from the Yemeni Government and that he would see what he could do to fulfill Saleh's request. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: Saleh from time to time rails in private meetings with us about Iranian meddling in Yemen's internal affairs, but he is careful to keep a correct relationship with Tehran. Ambassador pointed out during the meeting with MinInt Alimi that Iran's National Security Advisor had recently visited, but we heard nothing but statements that were positive and supportive of Iran. Alimi replied simply that Yemen had voted with the USG to refer Iran to the UNSC in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Post SANAA 00001833 002 OF 002 believes Yemen's concerns about Iranian involvement here are genuine and Saleh does not wish to see a nuclear Iran at his doorstep. Given the balancing act that the ROYG has to play, however, we can expect quiet votes from Yemen at the IAEA, but not outspokenness against Iran's nuclear ambitions. ¶10. (U) GEN Abizaid has cleared this message. Krajeski